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← 538 F.3d 202 - Odd v. Malone

Odd v. Malone’s Empirical Analysis

538 F.3d 202 · 2008

Citation profile

46
cited by 46 later decisions
1
states following
January 2024
most recently cited

13 federal appellate · 5 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 46 later decisions — most recently January 2024 · most notably al-Kidd v. Ashcroft (2009), Schneyder v. Smith (2011)

13 federal appellate · 5 district · 1 state decisions

350200820102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. · Mitchell v. Forsyth · Imbler v. Pachtman · Burns v. Reed · Buckley v. Fitzsimmons

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A prosecutor bears the “heavy burden” of establishing entitlement to absolute immunity. Light v. Haws, 472 F.3d 74, 80-81 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1212 (3d Cir.1979)). In light of the Supreme Court’s “quite sparing” recognition of absolute immunity to § 1983 liability, we begin with the presumption that qualified rather than absolute immunity is appropriate. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339 , 355 (3d Cir.1999) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 , 111 S.Ct. 1934 , 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991)). To overcome this presumption, a prosecutor must show that he or she was functioning as the state’s advocate when performing the action(s) in question. Yarris, 465 F.3d at 136. This inquiry focuses on “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Light , 472 F.3d at, 78 (quoting Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 125 (3d Cir.2001)). Under this functional approach, a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity for actions performed in a judicial or “quasi-judicial” capacity. Giuffre, 31 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 346 (3d Cir.1989). Thus, immunity attaches to actions “intimately associated with the judicial phases of litigation,” but not to administrative or investigatory actions unrelated to initiating and conducting judicial proceedings. Giuffre, 31 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 , 96 S.Ct. ”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “We can imagine few circumstances under which we would consider the act of disobeying a court order or directive to be advocative, and we are loath to grant a prosecutor absolute immunity for such disobedience.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “demanded that [the A.D.A.] appear before her to explain why the plaintiff had been forced to remain in jail.” Judge Means' reaction here was similar. Judge Means and his staff were”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.