Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

538 So. 2d 96

Docket No. 88-158.

State v. Eady

The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Norman EADY, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided February 7, 1989.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1989-02-07

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“heard a tire screeching and like a passing gear kicking in.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 637 So. 2d 946 - State v. Joy, 938 So. 2d 513 - Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Roberts

“he could not be `sure' the defendant was exceeding the speed limit. . . . " Id. (emphasis added). The district court held that probable cause for the stop was established and reversed the suppression order. The court stated: There is no question that neither proof beyond a reasonable doubt so as to justify a conviction nor even probable cause to believe that a traffic offense has been committed is required to support a police stop on that basis. Instead, only a simple "founded”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 938 So. 2d 513 - Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Roberts

Relies on New York v. Belton · Harris v. State · 319 So. 2d 22 - Bailey v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1989-02-07

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently December 2016

5 state decisions

201989199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*97 Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Richard L. Polin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

¶2Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Henry H. Harnage, Asst. Public Defender, for appellee.

¶3Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARKDULL and COPE, JJ.

¶4SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

¶5The state appeals from and we reverse an order suppressing the weapon involved in a prosecution for carrying a concealed firearm on the ground that the traffic stop for speeding which led to its discovery was unjustified.

¶6Officer Gatterello of the Miami Police Department was on routine patrol in his cruiser in the mixed commercial-residential northwest section of the city when he saw a vehicle proceeding at what he described as "a high rate of speed" and "heard a tire screeching and like a passing gear kicking in." After the car passed him and continued to speed up, Gatterello pulled it over. A computer check revealed that the operator, the appellee Eady, was driving with a suspended license and had an open bench warrant. After the officer arrested Eady on these grounds, a concededly valid search of the car[1] revealed a pistol concealed under the front seat. The trial judge granted the defendant's motion to suppress the gun on the ground, as reflected by Gatterello's candid statements at the suppression hearing, that the officer could not be "sure" the defendant was exceeding the speed limit and that he wished to stop him only for a warning that this might be the case. These facts do not support the order under review.

¶7There is no question that neither proof beyond a reasonable doubt so as to justify a conviction nor even probable cause to believe that a traffic offense has been committed is required to support a police stop on that basis. Instead, only a simple "founded" or "reasonable" suspicion of a violation based on the officer's visual or aural perception is necessary. See Bailey v. State, 319 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1975); State v. Cobbs, 411 So.2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). In our judgment, this rule is clearly satisfied by the undisputed facts of this case. What Gatterello both saw and heard fully and objectively supported his suspicion that Eady was going too fast under the circumstances and was thus guilty of a violation of the law. See § 316.183(1), Fla. Stat. (1987) ("No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions, and having regard to the actual and potential hazards, then existing."); State v. Fernandez, 526 So.2d 192, 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); cause dismissed, 531 So.2d 1352 (Fla. 1988); Gustafson v. State, 243 So.2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), modified, 258 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1972).

¶8REVERSED.

NOTES

¶9[1] New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); State v. Maya, 529 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); State v. Fernandez, 526 So.2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), cause dismissed, 531 So.2d 1352 (Fla. 1988); State v. James, 526 So.2d 188 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).

/538/so2d/96 · .json · Public domain