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← 538 S.W.2d 97 - Griffin v. Ellinger

Griffin v. Ellinger’s Empirical Analysis

1976

Citation profile

32
cited by 32 later decisions
10
states following
March 2014
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 27 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently March 2014 · most notably Colonial Baking Co. of Des Moines v. Dowie (1983), Wolf v. Little John Corp. of Liberia (1979)

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 27 state decisions — followed in 10 states

13019761980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Seale v. Nichols · 211 Pa. Super. 87 - Pollin v. Mindy Mfg. Co. · Griffin v. Ellinger

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument (a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the person represented nor shows that the representative signed in a representative capacity; ib) except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is personally obligated if the instrument names the person represented but [does] not show that the representative signed in a representative capacity * * *.”
    7 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Under Section 3.403(b), extrinsic evidence is admissible between the immediate parties to the instrument to show that they agreed or otherwise understood that the signer would not be personally liable thereon, even though the instrument itself does not reveal the signer’s representative capacity. The Code does not delineate what proof is necessary to “otherwise establish” between the parties that the signer is not personally liable on an instrument which he intended to sign only in a representative capacity. Therefore, the general principles of law and equity are to be applied. Section 1.103. In Seale v. Nichols, 505 S.W.2d 251 (Tex.1974), this Court had occasion to construe Section 3.403(b). We there stated that, in order for an agent to avoid liability on his signature, “he must disclose his intent to sign as a representative to the other contracting party.” 505 S.W.2d at 255 . We also recognized that prior dealings between the parties are relevant in determining whether the parties understood the signature to be in a representative capacity. (Emphasis supplied.)”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.