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← 539 F.2d 211 - Public Citizen, Inc. v. Simon

Public Citizen, Inc. v. Simon’s Empirical Analysis

539 F.2d 211 · 1976

Citation profile

27
cited by 27 later decisions
1
states following
January 2006
most recently cited

13 federal appellate · 4 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 27 later decisions — most recently January 2006 · most notably Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi (1984), United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon (1981)

13 federal appellate · 4 district · 1 state decisions

1701976198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Warth v. Seldin · Flast v. Cohen · Massachusetts v. Mellon · Everson v. Board of Education · Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “to attack any executive action that draws on an outstanding appropriation on the ground that the purchases or services are not in accord with the congressional intent in passing the appropriation ... would place the judiciary in the role of management overseer of the Executive Branch. Such oversight is a function of Congress.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The impact on federal taxpayers in such cases is conceptually direct, even though the dollar-and-eents consequence for a taxpayer is minimal. The doctrine thus evolved for federal taxpayers reflects considerations similar to those developed by the Court in the “good-faith pocketbook action” limitation on state taxpayer standing in the Supreme Court. sjs s-s sjs >Jc sfc sjs Although state taxpayers may be able to challenge executive conduct, as was the case in Everson, while federal taxpayers after Richardson and Schlesinger are restricted to congressional exercises of the taxing and spending power, this anomaly is a consequence of the Court's traditional differentiation between state and federal taxpayers for purposes of standing. See, e.g., Froth-ingham; Doremus. The Flast “nexus” test, at least its first prong, is an attempt to frame a federal equivalent for the Doremus “good-faith pocketbook action” limitation on state taxpayer suits.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “This is an area of the law where the result is clear, in view of the cases, but there is less clarity in the doctrinal development. What was wrought by the Flast opinion — in opening the door to taxpayer actions, yet opening it only part way— was pragmatic in result, avoiding the flood of all manner of taxpayer actions. And yet it was rooted in a conceptual underpinning, permitting federal taxpayer standing in a class of cases where taxpayer suits were particularly appropriate and manageable — specifically, in cases involving the validity of taxing and appropriation statutes (as distinguished from cases involving “incidental expenditure[s] of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute”).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.