United States v. Lee’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

19 federal appellate · 2 district · 15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]here are two related situations that may suggest the proper rule. The first is where a tribunal grants a new trial in the interests of justice without the intervention of a reviewing court. In this situation, it appears appropriate to hold that waiver of a jury trial or consent to trial by a magistrate should continue in force.... The second situation is when a reviewing court finds error in the conduct of a trial and reverses with directions for a new trial. In that situation the general rule is that a litigant is not bound by his prior waiver of a jury trial. . .. Unless the language of a waiver unambiguously states that it will apply in all retrials should they be ordered, a waiver should not continue in effect after the jurisdiction of the court to which it was tendered terminates upon the taking of an appeal.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Groth · State v. State

2. ““. . . Unless the language of a waiver unambiguously states that it will apply in all retrials should they be ordered, a waiver should not continue in effect after the jurisdiction of the court to which it was tendered terminates upon the taking of an appeal. The general rule to be applied where a judgment of a trial court is reversed after a bench trial was stated in Burnham v. N. Chicago St. Ry. Co., 88 F. 627, 629-630 (7th Cir. 1898): 2. The stipulation to waive a jury, and to try the case before the court, only had relation to the first trial. There could be no presumption then that there would ever be a second trial; and therefore it should not be presumed that the parties, in making the stipulation, had in mind any possible subsequent trial after the first, to which the stipulation could refer. The right of trial by jury in cases at law, whether in a civil or criminal case, is a high and sacred constitutional right in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, and is expressly guaranteed by the United States constitution. A stipulation for the waiver of such right should therefore be strictly construed in favor of the preservation of the right. The rule and the reason for it are fairly laid down by the supreme court of Alabama in Cross v. State, 78 Ala. 430 , as follows: ‘All we decide is that the agreement to waive the right of trial by jury must ordinarily be construed to apply only to the particular trial at which it is made. Such a waiver is a renunciation of a valuable constitutio”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Bullard v. State · Walworth County Department of Health & Human Services v. Roberta J. W.

3. “This brings us to Lutz’s final point; namely, that he was entitled to be tried without a jury. Before the first trial, the prosecution and the defense with the approval of the trial judge waived a jury trial, pursuant to Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The prosecution refused to waive the jury at the second trial. We agree with the trial judge, and reject Lutz’s contention, that the prosecution was not bound by its first waiver. The waiver referred to the earlier trial, before another judge. Once a mistrial was declared each party was free to assert or waive his rights. In addition, the new judge at the second trial insisted that the second trial be before a jury. And in any event, Judge Fullam filed a sealed finding at the time he submitted the case to the jury which was identical with that eventually returned by the jury-”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Groth