Sells v. Porter’s Empirical Analysis
539 F.3d 889 · 2008
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 3 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 33 later decisions — most recently February 2021 · most notably GMAC Inc. v. Coley (In Re Coley) (2010), Helena Chemical Co. v. Richmond (In Re Richmond) (2010)
2 federal appellate · 3 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 11 U.S.C. § 523
Relies on Kawaauhau v. Geiger · Barclays American/Business Credit, Inc. v. Long · Johnson v. Miera · Geiger v. Kawaauhau · Blocker v. Patch
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) the party sought to be precluded in the second suit must have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the original lawsuit; (2) the issue sought to be precluded must be the same as the issue involved in the prior action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded must have been actually litigated in the prior action; (4) the issue sought to be precluded must have been determined by a valid and final judgment; and (5) the determination in the prior action must have been essential to the prior judgment.”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Willful and malicious are two distinct requirements that [plaintiff] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. Fischer v. Scarborough (In re Scarborough), 171 F.3d 638, 641 (8th Cir.1999). The Supreme Court has made clear “debts arising from recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the compass of § 523(a)(6).” Kawaau-hau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 64 , 118 S.Ct. 974 , 140 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998); In re Patch, 526 F.3d at 1180. “[Nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.” Geiger, 523 U.S. at 61 , 118 S.Ct. 974 , 140 L.Ed.2d 90 ; In re Patch, 526 F.3d 1176, 1180 (2008). A willful injury is “a deliberate or intentional invasion of the legal rights of another, because the word ‘injury’ usually connotes legal injury ... in the technical sense.” Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 118 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir.1997), aff'd, 528 U.S. at 57, 118 S.Ct. 974 , 140 L.Ed.2d 90 . Further, the debt- or need not intend the consequences of his conduct to cause a willful injury. In re Patch, 526 F.3d at 1180 . It is enough “[i]f the debtor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct.” Id. Maliciousness is conduct “targeted at the creditor ... at least in the sense that the conduct is certain or almost certain to cause ... harm.” Siemer v. Nangle (In re Nangle), 274 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir.2001) (quoting Barclays Am./Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Long (In ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.