State v. Johnson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 80 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 85 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““If you do find the defendant guilty under Count II of assault with intent to kill with malice aforethought, you must consider whether he is guilty under Count II of assault with intent to kill without malice aforethought. “As to Count II, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: First that on or about October 21, 1976, in the County of Cape Girardeau, State of Missouri, Roscoe Pittman shot at Phillip Wayne Brough, and Second, that he did so with intent to kill Phillip Wayne Brough, and Third, that the defendant knowingly and intentionally aided or encouraged the person who engaged in the conduct submitted in the above paragraphs, then you will find the defendant guilty under Count II of assault with intent to kill without malice aforethought. “However, if you do find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of the foregoing, you must find the defendant not guilty under Count II of that offense. “If you find the defendant guilty under Count II of assault with intent to kill without malice aforethought, you will fix his punishment: ****** (MAI-CR 6.24)” Instruction No. B— “One of the issues in this case is whether the use of force on Phillip Brough was a justifiable assault. By ‘justifiable assault’ is meant the use of force on another in lawful self-defense. On that issue you are instructed as follows: 1. The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in lawful self-defense. ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Pride

2. “Although defendant attacks on various grounds every single viewing of himself or his likeness by all witnesses who testified, a substantial portion of his attack is directed at testimony as to occasions during preparation for trial at which witnesses were shown photographs of defendants by the prosecuting attorney. If initial identification procedures were not improper or impermissibly suggestive, they were not violative of defendant’s constitutional rights. In addition, if subsequent in-court identifications of appellant are found to have a basis independent of any improper procedure, such identifications are admissible despite potentially suggestive pre-trial identification procedures. State v. Ross, 502 S.W.2d 241 , 246[2] (Mo.1973); State v. Taylor, 496 S.W.2d 822 , 824[3, 4] (Mo. 1973). Because it was not error to admit identification testimony on the above stated basis, it is unnecessary to review here each step in the prosecuting attorney’s preparation of this case subsequent to initial identifications of defendant by these witnesses. Not finding any evidence that would have required suppression of the witnesses’ identification testimony, the point is ruled against defendant.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Johnson v. Wyrick

3. “The officer testified that the informant was not a witness. There is no evidence that he was a participant. Neither of the alleged informant’s tips, that regarding the blue Chevrolet and that leading to Alfred’s arrest, were demonstrated to have led to defendant’s arrest or conviction nor was it shown that any evidence discovered as a result of the alleged tips was used against this defendant at his trial. The police were unable to establish what car, if any, was used, and Alfred was released for lack of evidence. ****** Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of this case and the flexible standards set forth in Roviaro, we do not believe that it was error to deny the request for disclosure. There is no indication here, as there has been in the cases in which the court compelled disclosure or dismissal, that the informant took part in the event or was even present.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Johnson v. Wyrick