Vanzandt v. Heilman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 33 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ * * * In at least three states specific performance of contracts to give an oil and gas lease has been refused where the lease, when made, was to contain a surrender clause, or a provision that it should be void if the lessee did not commence to drill within a stipulated time. It is said that there is no mutuality of obligation and that a court of equity will not compel an act by one party where the other is not bound. This view is erroneous. If it were followed, the result would be that a contract to give an unless lease could never be specifically enforced. Yet, such leases are everywhere regarded as valid when made and have been the subject of specific performance. That the lessee must pay an initial consideration for the lease would seem to be a sufficient answer to the objection of lack of mutuality of obligation. As to the second objection, lack of mutuality of remedy, it is extremely unlikely that a lessee would go to the trouble and expense of a suit in equity in order to get a lease which he intended immediately to surrender or allow to become void by failure to drill. Furthermore, that is the contract to which the parties agreed, and there is no reason to deny specific performance of the agreement so long as the lessee has not in fact surrendered his rights.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Torgeson v. Connelly

2. ““From the cases and comments referred to and quoted, we have come to the conclusion that the mere lack of mutuality of remedy in favor of the defendant is not ground for refusing equitable relief. As stated by Judge Cardozo in Epstein v. Gluckin, supra, [ 233 N.Y. 490 , 135 N.E. 861 ], ‘What equity exacts to-day as a condition of relief is the assurance that the decree, if rendered, will operate without injustice or oppression either to the plaintiff or defendant’; or, as stated by Judge Harlan Stone in his article quoted from 16 'Columbia Law Review, ‘There is want of mutuality of remedy, when and only when the court is unable for any reason to insure the defendant’s receiving that which he is entitled to receive in exchange for the performance of his own promise;’ provided the transaction is free from fraud, duress, unfairness or other inequities.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Jones v. English

3. “"What equity exacts to-day as a condition of relief is the assurance that the decree, if rendered, will operate without injustice or oppression either to plaintiff or [to] defendant. (Citing authorities.) Mutuality of remedy is important in so far only as its presence is essential to the attainment of that end. The formula had its origin in an attempt to fit the equitable remedy to the needs of equal justice. We may not suffer it to petrify at the cost of its animating principle." [Id. 103, 214 P.2d 867 .]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. McCoy v. Alsup