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← 54 U.S. 345 - Martin Very v. Jonas Levy

Martin Very v. Jonas Levy’s Empirical Analysis

54 U.S. 345 · 1851

Citation profile

59
cited by 59 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
11
states following
January 2023
most recently cited

27 federal appellate · 2 district · 17 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 59 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently January 2023 · most notably Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. (1981), Harold Wener v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Molly Wener v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1957)

27 federal appellate · 2 district · 17 state decisions — followed in 11 states

220185118601870188018901900191019201930194019501960197019801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Sandford v. Handy · Kellogg v. Richards · Jeffrey v. Bigelow · Booth v. Smith

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 59 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““An agreement to give a less sum for a greater, if the time of payment be anticipated, is binding; The reason being, as expressed in Pennel’s case, (5 Co., 117) that peradventure parcel of the sum, before the day, would be more beneficial than the whole sum on the day.” 16 (Emphasis added.)”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““In the interpretation of a power of attorney stated in ambiguous language, or in that which is of doubtful import, various factors must be taken into consideration. Where the words used are ambiguous in themselves they are to be taken most strictly against the principal. In such case it has been said that the agent in his dealings with a third person can bind the principal in accordance with usage or by any construction of it which is reasonable. Moreover, the principal is bound when the agent and a third person have acted in regard to an object permitted in the power granted, even though the mode of action is open to question, and the court, upon a critical examination of the language used, might be of the opinion that a different construction would be more correct. . . . The rule thus stated places upon the principal the burden of reasonable mistakes made by the agent in the interpretation of his authorization caused by facts of which the agent has no notice.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “At law, a mere accord is not a defence; and before breach of a sealed instrument, there is a technical rule, which prevents such an instrument from being discharged, except by matter of as high a nature as the deed itself. * * * But no such difficulties exist in equity.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.