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54 Wis. 2d 224

194 N.W.2d 639

McAllister v. State

Wisconsin Supreme Court

Decided March 2, 1972

Wisconsin Supreme Court · decided 1972-03-02

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently June 1986

15 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““. . . The court has a duty to fulfill the Ernst requirements on the record. Defendant denies he understood the charges against him. The state attempts to circumvent the Ernst requirements by arguing that defendant really did understand the charge, but again that is not the issue. The issue here is what duty the trial court had when accepting the plea of guilty. Unlike the cases relied upon by the attorney general, here defendant never testified as to his knowledge of the charge or of his understanding of the crime. “The requirement that defendant understand the charge against him is most basic to a knowing plea. Unlike the requirements that the court ascertain that defendant has not been coerced and has sufficient education to enter a plea, defendant’s understanding of the charge cannot be demonstrated through other testimony. Certainly such knowledge is not shown here. The record does not disclose that defendant understood the charge or that his acts violated the statute. Such knowledge cannot be drawn from his other statements to the court. The record is thus fatally defective and reversal is required.” Id. at 230.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 85 Wis. 2d 494 - Spinella v. State, 131 Wis. 2d 246 - State v. Bangert

““. . . Consequently, if a defendant’s guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void. Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.” (t . . There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating in the record at the time the plea is entered the de fendant’s understanding of the nature of the charge against him.” (( “. . . [S] ince the elements of the offense were not explained to petitioner, and since the specific acts of tax evasion do not appear of record, it is also possible that if petitioner had been adequately informed he would have concluded that he was actually guilty of one of two closely related lesser included offenses, which are mere misdemeanors.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including 85 Wis. 2d 494 - Spinella v. State

Relies on Boykin v. Alabama · McCarthy v. United States · 43 Wis. 2d 661 - Ernst v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1972-03-02

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Wilkie, J.

¶1A single issue is involved in this review:

¶2Was defendant’s plea of guilty knowingly and intelligently made?

¶3As we see it, there is no question that the trial court, on the record made here, did not sufficiently ascertain that the defendant understood the nature of the charge against him and that defendant’s conduct fell within the charge to which he was pleading.

¶4In Ernst v. State 1 (applicable here), this court extensively reviewed the procedure for accepting a guilty plea in view of the United States Supreme Court decisions of McCarthy v. United States 2 and Boykin v. Alabama.3 In Ernst the court made mandatory the standards previously suggested in State ex rel. Burnett v. Burke,4plus the additional requirement of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as required by McCarthy and Boykin. The second Burnett standard and the additional McCarthy requirement are germane to this case.

¶5*229The second Burnett requirement provides that the trial court must “establish the accused’s understanding of the nature of the crime with which he is charged . 5 The McCarthy requirement is that the court determine “ ‘that the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged ....’” 6 It is required that the “ ‘defendant [possess] an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.’ ” 7

¶6From the record here it is apparent that the trial court did not comply with either the second requirement of Burnett or the MeCurthy-Boykin standard. At the taking of the plea the court did not in any way question defendant about his understanding of the charge or ascertain that the defendant understood the elements of the crime or that his conduct fell within the purview of the statute.

¶7The state relies upon Martinkoski v. State,8 Burkhalter v. State,9and Edwards v. State 10 in support of the argument that defendant’s understanding of the charge need not appear of record. A review of these cases reveals one essential difference. In each of these cases, at the plea taking the defendant specifically stated that he understood the charges against him. In Martinkoski, the case primarily relied upon by the attorney general, this court noted that the defendant recited the elements of the crime to the court and that the defendant knew to which crime he was pleading.11 In Burkhalter 12 and *230Edwards 13 this court specifically noted that the court questioned the defendant about his understanding of the crime and as to whether the acts were indeed violations of the statutes in question.

¶8The record at the taking of the plea here is absolutely silent in regard to the defendant’s understanding of the charge against him.

¶9The attorney general argues that defendant’s acts were within the proscriptions of the charged statute, but such an argument is inapposite. The court has a duty to fulfill the Ernst requirements on the record. Defendant denies he understood the charges against him. The state attempts to circumvent the Ernst requirement by arguing that defendant really did understand the charge, but again that is not the issue. The issue here is what duty the trial court had when accepting the plea of guilty. Unlike the cases relied upon by the attorney general, here defendant never testified as to his knowledge of the charge or of his understanding of the crime.

¶10The requirement that defendant understand the charge against him is most basic to a knowing plea. Unlike the requirements that the court ascertain that defendant has not been coerced and has sufficient education to enter a plea, defendant’s understanding of the charge cannot be demonstrated through other testimony. Certainly such knowledge is not shown here. The record does not disclose that defendant understood the charge or that his acts violated the statute. Such knowledge cannot be drawn from his other statements to the court. The record is thus fatally defective and reversal is required.

¶11Because of the disposition of the case on the basis of the error in the plea-taking procedure, we do not consider other questions presented by counsel.

¶12By the Court. — Order reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings.

¶13 (1969), 43 Wis. 2d 661, 170 N. W. 2d 713.

¶14 (1969), 394 U. S. 459, 89 Sup. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418.

¶15 (1969), 395 U. S. 238, 89 Sup. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274.

¶16 (1964), 22 Wis. 2d 486, 494, 126 N. W. 2d 91.

¶17Id.at page 494; Ernst v. State, supra, footnote 1, at page 674.

¶18Ernst v. State, supra, footnote 1, at page 674.

¶19 Id. at page 673; McCarthy v. United States, supra,footnote 2, at page 466.

¶20 (1971), 51 Wis. 2d 237, 186 N. W. 2d 302.

¶21 (1971), 52 Wis. 2d 413, 190 N. W. 2d 502.

¶22 (1971), 51 Wis. 2d 231, 186 N. W. 2d 193.

¶23Supra, footnote 8, at page 246.

¶24Supra, footnote 9, at page 421.

¶25Supra, footnote 10, at page 232.

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