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← 540 F.3d 449 - Slusher v. Carson

Slusher v. Carson’s Empirical Analysis

540 F.3d 449 · 2008

Citation profile

61
cited by 61 later decisions
1
states following
June 2022
most recently cited

6 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 61 later decisions — most recently June 2022 · most notably Miller v. Sanilac County (2010), Atkinson v. City of Mountain View (2013)

6 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

530200820102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Terry v. Ohio · Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York · Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Graham v. Connor

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]he inadequacy of police training only serves as a basis for § 1983 liability 'where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.' " Slusher v. Carson , 540 F.3d 449 , 457 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris , 489 U.S. 378 , 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197 , 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) ). Most importantly, " '[t]o establish deliberate indifference, the plaintiff 'must show prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the [City] has ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[A] person has been “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[A]t a minimum, Slusher's liberty was restrained when Deputy Carson grabbed her right hand as she certainly was not "at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about [her] business.” Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 629 , 123 S.Ct. 1843 , 155 L.Ed.2d 814 (2003) (concluding that a seizure lakes place for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when "taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.’ ”) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991)); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (”[A]n arrest is effected by the slightest application of physical force.”)....”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.