¶1(dissenting).
¶2Today the majority creates a new precedent without discussing or overruling precedents which have been the rule ever since this Court was created. See the references to Branch’s Annotated Penal Code, infra. The new overly protective rule prevents the introduction of volunteered statements to a probation officer by a probationer when he is not under arrest.
¶3The order revoking probation was reversed on the ground that appellant was under arrest when he made statements admitting his guilt to officers. The last statement made to the probation officer was made while he was not in custody. ,
¶4Appellant went “on his own” to see his probation officer and voluntarily told him that he had committed theft at a service station where he was employed. When one makes volunteered statements, failure to give the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, does not render the statements inadmissible. Bailey v. State, 532 S.W.2d 316 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Adami v. State, 524 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
¶5The evidence that the trial judge heard will be set out to see if an abuse of discretion has been shown. All of the evidence favorable to the finding of the trial judge should be considered. At the outset, it should be noted that the emphasized part of the testimony of Beavers that appellant had agreed “to work the shortage out” does not detract from the fact that appellant committed the theft. At least it shows that appellant acknowledged the shortage although it may not show that he caused it.
¶6H. E. Beavers testified that he was employed by Geneco Corporation as a supervisor for several service stations in Dallas County. On June 19, 1975, it was discovered that money was missing from the station that appellant had operated for some two weeks. No “draw slip” for any amount had been made by appellant.
¶7R. D. Lewis, a Dallas police officer assigned to the “I. D. Section of the Polygraph Examiner”, testified that on June 21, “Investigator Crum of the Crimes Against Persons Bureau brought him (appellant) to me to give him an examination to see if he had anything to do with a theft at a service station.” He then had an interview with appellant concerning the theft from Beavers’ station. Lewis testified that he explained to appellant that he was not under arrest, and that appellant willingly and understandably signed a consent form reading:
“I understand that I am not under arrest at this time and that this examina*854tion is completely and wholly voluntary. I have not been threatened or promised anything in order to get me to consent to the taking of this examination. No violence has been used toward me in order to force me to consent to this examination.
(Signed) Richard Creeks”
¶8Lewis testified next, over objection, that he and appellant then discussed the theft here involved, and that “Richard Creeks admitted to me verbally that he had taken sixty dollars of the hundred and thirteen dollar shortage on the 19th of June.”
¶9Reggie Storey, the probation officer, testified that on June 23rd he learned that appellant had been arrested for theft and had been released from custody and he had a warrant issued for his arrest for probation violation. On the 24th of June, appellant came to Storey’s office “on his own.” Storey did not arrest him, having been advised by his chief, “Do not stop him.” However, Storey had notified officers and knew they were on the way to arrest appellant on the warrant Storey had requested. Storey testified that before appellant was arrested he admitted that he had “stolen some money from the place of business where he worked.” Storey did not recall the date of the theft given by appellant.
¶10In Taylor v. State, 420 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Cr.App.1967), the conviction was for murder. The shooting occurred at 2:50 p.m. and shortly thereafter the sheriff arrived at the scene. Meanwhile, appellant had voluntarily arrived at the sheriff’s courthouse office but no one was there. Taylor heard over a two-way radio at the office that the sheriff was on the way to Taylor’s house. Taylor could not operate the radio and he went to another office in the courthouse and asked a woman to call the sheriff and tell him that he (Taylor) was not running. Taylor then went back to the sheriff’s office and waited. When the sheriff arrived between 3:15 and 3:30 p.m. Taylor stood up and said: “Well, I told them I was going to do it.” The sheriff then pointed to a 30 — 30 rifle which was later shown to be the murder weapon and Taylor said it belonged to him but warned the sheriff to be careful because it was loaded.
¶11The sheriff testified that he had not arrested Taylor prior to the complained of statements. In the Taylorcase this Court noted from Miranda v. Arizona, supra, the following:
“ ‘There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.’ ”
¶12In Taylor’s case, he knew that the sheriff was looking for him for the purpose of arresting him. In the present case appellant did not know that the probation officer planned to arrest him. He was at liberty when the statements were made. It is true that the probation officer would not have allowed appellant to leave. The same was true in Taylor’s case because he knew the sheriff was looking for him because of the murders he had committed. This Court held Taylor’s statements to be admissible because they were volunteered. The statements in the present case were volunteered. From the Taylorcase we see that volunteered statements may be received in evidence even though the sheriff was about to make an arrest and the person making the statement knew that his arrest was imminent. In the present case appellant did not know that he was about to be arrested and because of this his statement could have been more freely given than that in the Taylorcase.
¶13In Cunningham v. State, 488 S.W.2d 117 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), this Court held that an admission by a probationer to the probation officer, even as a result of questioning during a reporting session, was not an in-custody confession condemned in Miranda v. Arizona, supra. It was noted that this sort of questioning “ ‘. . . was hardly the sort of incommunicado, police-dominated atmo*855sphere of custodial interrogation and overbearing of the subject’s will at which the Miranda rule was aimed.’ ” In the present case there was no police dominated atmosphere. His will was not overcome because a warrant for his arrest had been issued, because he did not know that such a warrant was outstanding and he had previously told the probation officer that he had been arrested for the theft.
¶14The correct rule is found in 1 Branch’s Ann.P.C.2d, Section 85, confinement or custody:
“Whatever be the intentions of the officer, if he had not arrested defendant and defendant was not apprised of his intentions to do so at the time he made the statements, they are admissible. It is not the intention of the officer that governs. [Citations omitted].”
¶15Another statement applicable to this case is found in the same section. It is:
“Although the officer would not have permitted defendant to depart, yet if defendant did not reasonably believe himself to be under arrest, proof of his unwarned confession is admissible. [Citations omitted].”
¶16In Malazzo v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 441, 308 S.W.2d 29 (1957), the county attorney was permitted to testify that the accused had made bond and he came to his office and made the statement that he was involved in the burglary; that he went into the house and helped move the television and load it in the car and carry it away. This Court held no error was shown because of the facts showing that he was not under arrest at that time.
¶17Appellant next contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the order revoking probation.
¶18Appellant’s identification as the probationer in the case was established by the testimony of the probation officer. The testimony given by Beavers of the theft of money from the service station together with probation officer Storey’s testimony of appellant’s oral confession and the admission of the shortage by appellant sufficiently support the findings and order of the trial court. It is not necessary to pass upon the question of the confession to the polygraph operator. No abuse of discretion has been shown.
¶19The judgment should be affirmed.