Volume 542 — United States Reports

Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004), was a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. The lawsuit, originally filed as Newdow v. United States Congress, Elk Grove Unified School District, et al. in 2000, led to a 2002 ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance are an endorsement of religion and therefore violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The words had been added by a 1954 act of Congress that changed the phrase "one nation indivisible" into "one nation under God, indivisible".

Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004), was a Supreme Court case that held that although the Administrative Procedure Act says that a person may challenge an agency's failure to act, this provision essentially just carries forward the writ of mandamus. Thus an agency cannot be compelled to act unless there is some non-discretionary, discrete act. Therefore, in this case, an interest group could not challenge an agency's failure to "act so as to preserve the wilderness" in accordance with the statute.

United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that, in a criminal proceeding in federal court, a defendant who does not alert the district court to a possible violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure must show on appeal that the violation affirmatively affected his rights in order to obtain reversal of his conviction by guilty plea. Rule 11, which pertains to criminal prosecutions in United States federal courts only, governs the offering of plea bargains to criminal defendants and the procedures district courts must employ to ensure that the defendant knows of and properly waives his trial-related constitutional rights.

Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that the Tax Injunction Act does not prevent a person from bringing a prospective challenge to the constitutionality of a tax credit assessed for other people.

Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that an employer may be liable for a Title VII violation under a constructive discharge theory. However, the plaintiff who quit based on harassment must prove that they quit because conditions for any reasonable person would be unbearable. If they cannot do so, the employer may try to employ an affirmative defense based on earlier cases, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. Boca Raton.

Held: Where the price-fixing conduct significantly and adversely affects both customers outside and within the United States, but the adverse foreign effect is independent of any adverse domestic effect, the FTAIA exception does not apply, and thus, neither does the Sherman Act, to a claim based solely on the foreign effect. Pp. 161-175.

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a statute requiring suspects to disclose their names during a valid Terry stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the statute first requires reasonable suspicion of criminal involvement, and does not violate the Fifth Amendment if there is no allegation that their names could have caused an incrimination.

Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court limited the scope of the Texas Healthcare Liability Act (THCLA). The effective result of this decision was that the THCLA, which held Case Management and Utilization Review decisions by Managed Care entities like CIGNA and Aetna to a legal duty of care according to the laws of The State of Texas could not be enforced in the case of Health Benefit plans provided through private employers, because the Texas statute allowed compensatory or punitive damages to redress losses or deter future transgressions, which were not available under ERISA § 1132.

Held: The District Court was not required to provide the warnings directed by the Ninth Circuit. Pp. 230-234. (a) Federal district courts must dismiss "mixed" habeas petitions. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 522.

Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States involving 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which authorizes United States district courts to enforce discovery requests made in connection with litigation being conducted in foreign tribunals. Prior to Intel, there had been substantial disagreement as to the availability of Section 1782 discovery.

Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court was asked whether evidence of the defendant's low IQ in a death penalty trial had been adequately presented to the jury for full consideration in the penalty phase of his trial. The Supreme Court held that not considering a defendant's low IQ would breach his Eighth Amendment rights and constitute a cruel and unusual punishment.

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), held that, in the context of mandatory sentencing guidelines under state law, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial prohibited judges from enhancing criminal sentences based on facts other than those decided by the jury or admitted by the defendant. The landmark nature of the case was alluded to by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who characterized the decision as a "Number 10 earthquake".

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that a requirement that a different Supreme Court decision requiring the jury rather than the judge to find aggravating factors would not be applied retroactively.

Cheney v. United States District Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004), was a 2004 United States Supreme Court case between Vice President Dick Cheney and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The case came as an appeal after the lower District Court for the District of Columbia ordered Cheney to disclose some of his records that would show how his National Energy Policy Development Group developed its recommendations. Cheney appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, but the Appeals Court rejected the appeal. In a 7–2 decision, the Court sent the case back to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.

Held: Because Mills announced a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure that does not fall within either Teague exception, its rule cannot be applied retroactively. Pp. 411-420.

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court case, in which José Padilla, an American citizen, sought habeas corpus relief against Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, as a result of his detention by the military as an "unlawful combatant."

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that foreign nationals held in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp could petition federal courts for writs of habeas corpus to review the legality of their detention. The Court's 6–3 judgment on June 28, 2004, reversed a D.C. Circuit decision which had held that the judiciary has no jurisdiction to hear any petitions from foreign nationals held in Guantanamo Bay. The lead petitioner, British citizen Shafiq Rasul, was one of the Tipton Three. The U.S. transported the three men to the United Kingdom in March 2004 before the decision was handed down, and the government released them the next day.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court recognized the power of the U.S. government to detain enemy combatants, including U.S. citizens, but ruled that detainees who are U.S. citizens must have the rights of due process, and the ability to challenge their enemy combatant status before an impartial authority.

Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that struck down the police practice of first obtaining an inadmissible confession without giving Miranda warnings, then issuing the warnings, and then obtaining a second confession. Justice David Souter announced the judgment of the Court and wrote for a plurality of four justices that the second confession was admissible only if the intermediate Miranda warnings were "effective enough to accomplish their object." Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in a concurring opinion that the second confession should be inadmissible only if "the two-step interrogation technique was used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning."

United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court case relating to Miranda warnings.

Held: The Sixth Circuit erred in granting relief under § 2254(d)(1). First, it found the state court's application of Strickland unreasonable on the basis of evidence not properly before the state court. Although the state court ventured that it would deny relief on the merits taking Gooch's statement into account, its judgment also rested on the holding that her statement was not properly before it.

Held: The Third Circuit was correct to affirm the District Court's ruling that enforcement of COPA should be enjoined because the statute likely violates the First Amendment. Pp. 664-673. (a) The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it entered the preliminary injunction. The abuse-of-discretion standard applies on review of such an injunction.

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the Alien Tort Statute and the Federal Tort Claims Act. Many ATS claims were filed after the Second Circuit ruling in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala created a new common law cause of action for torture under the ATS: "For purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind." The Court in Sosa does not find there is a similar cause of action for arbitrary arrest and detention.