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← 543 F.2d 894 - Douglass v. First National Realty Corp.

Douglass v. First National Realty Corp.’s Empirical Analysis

543 F.2d 894 · 1976

Citation profile

70
cited by 70 later decisions
5
states following
June 2000
most recently cited

35 federal appellate · 6 district · 12 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 70 later decisions — most recently June 2000 · most notably Falstaff Brewing Corporation v. Miller Brewing Company (1983), TWM Manufacturing Co. v. Dura Corp. (1983)

35 federal appellate · 6 district · 12 state decisions

3401976198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Duncan v. State of Louisiana · United States v. United Mine Workers of America · Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. · Shillitani v. United States · McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 70 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In recent years, however, we have sought more “objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense.” “[W]e had found the most relevant such criteria in the severity of the maximum authorized penalty.” In fixing the maximum penalty for a crime, a legislature “include[s] within the definition of the crime itself a judgment about the seriousness of the offense.” The judiciary should not substitute its judgment as to seriousness for that of a legislature, which is “far better equipped to perform the task, and [is] likewise more responsive to changes in attitude and more amenable to the recognition and correction of their misperceptions in this respect.” In using the word “penalty,” we do not refer solely to the maximum prison term authorized for a particular offense. A legislature’s view of the seriousness of an offense also is reflected in the other penalties that it attaches to the offense. We thus examine “whether the length of the authorized prison term or the seriousness of other punishment is enough in itself to require a jury trial.” Primary emphasis, however, must be placed on the maximum authorized period of incarceration. Penalties such as probation or a fine may engender “a significant infringement of personal freedom,” but they cannot approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a prison term entails. Indeed, because incarceration is an “intrinsically different” form of punishment, it is the most powerful indication whether an offense i”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Certainly a $5,000 fine would be regarded as a serious hazard by most people, even some for whom it would not be calamitous. For this reason, we do not believe the [United States Supreme] Court intended the rationale of Muniz to extend to contempt cases involving individuals as distinguished from multimember organizations. For the very same reason, we are of the view that a fine as large as $5,000 cannot be assessed in a nonjury contempt proceeding against a contemnor who is an individual. ... We think, however, that the congressional enactment defining petty offenses must, at least for the time being, be accepted as the standard. . .. Until the Supreme Court provides additional guidance in this gray area, we feel the sound doctrine is to accord the statutory definition its accustomed effect, and in the exercise of our supervisory authority to limit fines for criminal contempt in this circuit to $500, as imposed on individuals without a jury trial or a waiver thereof.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as— (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.