State v. Ontiveros

                                                                                           New Mexico
                                                                  Office of the Director   Compilation
                                                            '00'07- 08:00:02 2024.03.08    Commission




             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 

Filing Date: December 18, 2023

No. S-1-SC-39186

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

       Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.

ANDREW ONTIVEROS,

       Defendant-Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
John Dean, District Judge

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Benjamin L. Lammons, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Respondent

                                       OPINION

ZAMORA, Justice.

{1}    The issue before us is whether law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution when, incident to an arrest, police conducted a
warrantless inventory search of a vehicle that was lawfully parked at the registered
owner’s home. We conclude on the facts of this case that the inventory search violated
Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights and affirm the Court of Appeals.
I.     BACKGROUND

{2}     Officer Alvin Bencomo of the Farmington Police Department was on patrol when
he observed a car with a broken taillight and a cracked front windshield drive past him.
To initiate a traffic stop, Officer Bencomo activated his emergency lights and followed
the car a short distance before it turned into a trailer park and came to a stop. There
were two men in the car: Defendant, who was driving, and his passenger. When Officer
Bencomo made contact with Defendant, he ran Defendant’s name through dispatch and
discovered Defendant’s license had been revoked due to a prior conviction for driving
while intoxicated. After Defendant informed Officer Bencomo that the car he was driving
did not have an interlock device, the officer arrested him.

{3}    During the traffic stop, Defendant told the officer that the car was registered to his
grandmother and that he had parked it in front of her trailer. The grandmother did not
appear at the scene at any time during the police investigation. After completing a
license plate check, the officer confirmed that Defendant’s grandmother owned the car
Defendant was driving. Officer Bencomo testified that although he did not independently
verify who owned the trailer, he knew that the car was parked in front of the
grandmother’s residence.

{4}    After the arrest, Officer Bencomo asked Defendant whether his passenger had a
valid driver’s license. Instead of directly answering the question, Defendant responded
by suggesting to the officer that the car should stay parked where it was in front of his
grandmother’s residence. Officer Bencomo rejected Defendant’s suggestion, deciding
instead to tow and impound the car for safekeeping because it was parked in an “open
area” and “the registered owner was not on-scene.” In anticipation of the impoundment,
the Farmington police conducted a pre-tow inventory search of the interior and trunk of
the grandmother’s car. Among other contraband, the search yielded controlled
substances and drug paraphernalia.

{5}     Officer Bencomo testified that the pre-tow search of the car was consistent with
standard police procedures set out in the Department’s written tow and impoundment
policy. Under the Department’s policy, officers may consider towing a vehicle when
“reasonably necessary to[] safeguard the vehicle and/or its contents” among other
goals. This can occur in a variety of circumstances, including “[w]henever the operator
of [a] vehicle has been arrested, injured, or otherwise incapacitated” or “[w]henever the
operator of [a] vehicle is found to have suspended or revoked driving privileges and
there exists no properly licensed driver, designated by the owner of the vehicle, readily
available to drive the vehicle.” The Department’s policy also clarifies the mandatory
nature of a police inventory search providing that “[a]ny vehicle towed at the direction of
a law enforcement officer shall have a complete inventory of the vehicle’s contents
performed to protect the [Department] from liability and to safeguard the property rights
of the owner of the vehicle’s contents” (emphasis added).

{6}    At the close of the suppression hearing, the district court found that the car was
parked directly in front of the trailer that belonged to Defendant’s grandmother, the
registered owner of the car. Nonetheless, the district court denied Defendant’s motion to
suppress, concluding that, as a matter of law, both the impoundment and inventory
search of the car were lawful. The district court determined that law enforcement (1)
“was in lawful custody and control of the vehicle based on the traffic stop and arrest of
Defendant,” (2) “followed the scope and procedure of the [Department’s policy]” given
Defendant’s arrest, and (3) reasonably towed Defendant’s vehicle despite its location on
private property. Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled
substance and driving with a suspended or revoked license pursuant to a conditional
guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the State failed to satisfy any of
the burdens it bears under State v. Davis, 

, 

, and that the
warrantless inventory search of the vehicle was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.
State v. Ontiveros, 

, 

.

{7}    We granted the State’s petition for writ of certiorari to determine the lawfulness
under the Fourth Amendment of the inventory search conducted by the police.

II.    DISCUSSION

A.     Standard of Review

{8}     Appellate review of motions to suppress presents mixed questions of law and
fact. State v. Martinez, 

, 

. We examine whether there
is substantial evidence to support the district court’s factual findings, deferring to the
district court’s review of the testimony and other evidence presented and viewing the
facts in the manner most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. ¶¶ 3, 8. Here, there is no
challenge to the district court’s factual findings, which we accept and view in the manner
most favorable to the State, the prevailing party in the district court. Applying the law to
the facts, we determine de novo the constitutional reasonableness of the search or
seizure. State v. Urioste, 

, 

, 

.

B.     The Impoundment and Inventory Doctrine

{9}    The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable government
searches. U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”). The ultimate touchstone of any Fourth Amendment inquiry is
reasonableness. Cady v. Dombrowski, 

 (1973); State v. Yazzie, 2019-
NMSC-008, ¶ 13, 

. The application of the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness standard depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Cooper v. California, 

 (1967). The State bears the burden of establishing
the validity of a warrantless search, which is presumed unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Davis, 

.

{10} To justify the warrantless inventory search of the vehicle Defendant was driving
at the time of his arrest, the State relies on the impoundment and inventory doctrine,
which is one of three recognized community caretaking exceptions to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Ryon, 

, 

, 

. The impoundment and inventory doctrine allows law
enforcement to impound a vehicle and perform a warrantless inventory search of the
vehicle for public safety and other non-criminal, non-investigatory purposes. See State
v. Byrom, 

, ¶ 10, 

 (citing Ryon, 

; Cady, 

). It is the non-criminal nature of law enforcement’s contact
with citizens that gives rise to this community caretaker exception. Id. ¶ 33; accord
South Dakota v. Opperman, 

 (1976).

{11} To meet its burden, the State must demonstrate that a police officer’s decision to
conduct a warrantless inventory search serves a recognized community caretaking
function. These functions may include removing the vehicle so it is not a traffic hazard
or protecting it from theft or vandalism. Opperman, 

. Although a
police officer is not required to adopt the least intrusive means available to safeguard a
vehicle and its contents, Colorado v. Bertine, 

 (1987), the
inventory search must nonetheless be reasonable in light of all attendant facts and
circumstances, Opperman, 

.

C.     Impoundment and Inventory Search of This Vehicle Was Unreasonable

{12} Police inventory searches are constitutionally reasonable if (1) the object is
lawfully in police control or custody, (2) the inventory of the object is made pursuant to
established police regulations, and (3) the search of the object is reasonable. Davis,

; State v. Williams, 

, ¶ 4, 

, 

. This three-factor test has historically provided our courts with a functional
framework for analyzing whether inventory searches are constitutionally reasonable. But
as the Court of Appeals recognized, “the state of the law of the impoundment and
inventory doctrine has evolved from the distinctive three-part test . . . and now focuses
more generally on the reasonableness of the officer’s asserted custody or control of the
item seized and searched.” Byrom, 

, ¶ 26; see Williams, 1982-NMSC-
041, ¶¶ 5-7; State v. Boswell, 

, ¶¶ 8-14, 

, 

.
In this context, reasonableness “is a function of an officer’s responsibility to safeguard
the citizen’s property and a prudent officer’s need to insulate the police from liability
should the citizen’s property be lost or stolen.” Byrom, 

, ¶ 34; see
Opperman, 

; Boswell, 

, ¶¶ 9-10; State v. Ruffino, 1980-
NMSC-072, ¶ 5, 

, 

.

1.     Police Control or Custody

{13} To determine whether an inventory search pursuant to a law enforcement
decision to tow a vehicle was reasonable, we look first to whether Defendant’s vehicle
was lawfully in police control or custody. Davis, 

. For the police to
have lawful custody or control of a driver’s vehicle incident to an arrest, there must be a
reasonable nexus between the arrest and the reason for searching the vehicle.
Williams, 

, ¶ 6. As our search and seizure jurisprudence has
developed, the proper focus of the reasonableness of impoundment and inventory is
whether the object—here a vehicle—is made unsecure by the arrest. Davis, 2018-
NMSC-001, ¶ 21. Properly applied, the community caretaking doctrine provides only a
limited exception to the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. It should not be
countenanced as a broad catch-all justification for warrantless inventory searches.

{14} We begin our analysis by determining whether the vehicle driven by Defendant
was made unsecure due to an increased risk of theft or vandalism as a consequence of
his arrest. Given the location of Defendant’s vehicle at the time of his arrest and relying
on the uncontested facts from the suppression hearing, we conclude that it was not.

{15} At the time of his arrest, the vehicle driven by Defendant was legally parked at
the registered owner’s home. There was no evidence and there were no findings that
the vehicle created a hazard to other drivers where it was parked or that it was made
less secure by Defendant’s arrest. The State nonetheless argues that the inventory
search was reasonable because Defendant’s lawful arrest prevented him from driving
the vehicle and because there was no one else who was immediately available or
amenable to take possession of the vehicle given that the registered owner was not on
the scene and that Defendant did not respond to Officer Bencomo’s inquiry about
whether the passenger had a valid driver’s license.

{16} When no one is immediately available to take possession of a vehicle, law
officers may have a legitimate non-investigatory reason to impound a vehicle and
conduct an inventory search, such as to protect a defendant’s property or to protect
themselves from claims or disputes over lost or stolen property. See, e.g., Jaynes v.
Mitchell, 

 (1st Cir. 2016). But those non-investigatory reasons
evaporate when, as here, law enforcement knows the vehicle is legally parked at the
registered owner’s home. Leaving the vehicle where it was parked because no one else
could immediately take possession of the vehicle did not subject the vehicle or
Defendant’s property to an increased risk of theft or vandalism due to his arrest. Nor did
the police have an increased risk of claims or disputes about lost or stolen property as
they generally have no community-caretaking duty to protect a vehicle parked on the
owner’s property. Cf. 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 7.3(c), at 840 (6th ed. 2020) (“If a person is arrested in or at his place of
residence and his car is parked in the garage or lot or other place where that person
ordinarily leaves his car, then the police cannot justify seizure of the car on the ground
that such action is needed for the protection of the vehicle and its contents.”).

{17} In contrast, the State appears to rely on Officer Bencomo’s testimony that the
vehicle was parked in an “open area” to argue that law enforcement did have a
community-caretaking duty to protect the vehicle despite its being lawfully parked at the
registered owner’s residence. However, the State’s support for such a legal duty is
speculative and points to nothing in the factual record of the district court to
demonstrate the necessary risk to the vehicle. See Davis, 

. The
record establishes that Officer Bencomo knew that Defendant’s grandmother was the
registered owner of the vehicle and that the vehicle was lawfully parked at her
residence. Under these facts, the State’s reliance on the officer’s unexplained
characterization of the “open area” does not establish a legitimate, non-investigatory
reason to impound the vehicle or conduct an inventory search.

{18} The State agues generally that the Court of Appeals erred by burdening law
enforcement with a new “comparative risk assessment tool” that improperly focuses on
the location of the vehicle and by concluding that Defendant’s arrest did not increase
the risk of loss, theft, or destruction of the vehicle he was driving. We disagree. The
Court of Appeals analysis falls squarely within the reasonableness parameters we most
recently articulated in Davis, the case of principal reliance by the State, Defendant, and
the Court of Appeals. One specific and important focus of the constitutional
reasonableness inquiry in impoundment and inventory cases is “whether the object is
made unsecure by the arrest.” Davis, 

. That inquiry necessarily
entails an assessment of whether the location of the vehicle subjects it to an increased
risk of theft or vandalism because of the driver’s arrest, making the vehicle’s location an
important and consistently recognized factor in determining whether the police have
lawful control and custody of it.

{19} For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that this vehicle parked at its
owner’s residence was not under lawful custody or control by law enforcement. But cf.

 (“[I]t would be ‘clearly improper for the police to simply leave’ unattended at the
scene of an arrest those objects belonging to an arrestee that are rendered unsecure by
the arrest.” (citation omitted)).

2.     Established Police Procedures

{20} We next address the challenge to established police procedures. The district
court’s finding that the police followed the standardized procedure set out in the
Department’s policy in inventorying and impounding the car following Defendant’s arrest
is supported by the record below and applicable law.

{21} The Department’s policy specifically requires that an officer’s impoundment and
inventory of a vehicle be “reasonably necessary” to “safeguard the vehicle and/or its
contents” among other goals. That proviso sufficiently “circumscribe[s] the discretion of
individual officers,” Bertine 

 n.7, and the Court of Appeals properly
rejected Defendant’s argument that the Department’s policy was facially violative of the
Fourth Amendment. Ontiveros, 

.

{22} However, the Court of Appeals also determined that the officer failed to adhere
to the Department’s discretionary policy because he made it his own personal policy
always to tow vehicles upon a driver’s arrest. Ontiveros, 

. In so
concluding, the Court of Appeals failed to “indulge in all reasonable inferences in
support of the district court’s decision and disregard all inferences or evidence to the
contrary.” Martinez, 

 (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted).

{23} Viewed in the manner most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to
support a finding that the impoundment of the car was not a foregone conclusion, but
instead was consistent with the standardized criteria contained in the Department’s tow
and impound policy. These standardized criteria authorize the Department’s officers to
consider towing and impounding a vehicle when it is “reasonably necessary to,” among
other things, “safeguard the vehicle or its contents.” The policy also provides that an
officer may consider towing a vehicle when its operator has been arrested.

{24} As confirmed by the dash-cam video of the encounter, Officer Bencomo’s preinventory questioning of Defendant included asking Defendant whether his passenger
had a valid driver’s license. In asking Defendant whether his passenger had a valid
driver’s license, it is reasonable to conclude that Officer Bencomo was exercising the
discretion afforded him under the Department’s policy by trying to determine if someone
else could take possession of the vehicle as an alternative to impoundment.

{25} The Court of Appeals concluded that Officer Bencomo’s testimony at the
suppression hearing indicated that he did not adhere to the Department’s policy and
instead made it his policy always to tow vehicles upon a driver’s arrest. Ontiveros, 2022-
NMCA-019, ¶ 16. The strongest support in the record for that conclusion is Officer
Bencomo’s testimony that he “usually tr[ies] to conduct everything standard with all [his]
arrests and tow every . . . car” whose driver is arrested (emphasis added). But we do
not view the officer’s reference to his usual approach in deciding whether to impound a
vehicle as sufficient evidence of a complete abandonment of the governing
departmental tow and impound policy when, as here, his questioning of Defendant
evidences the exercise of at least some consideration of whether it was reasonably
necessary to impound the vehicle driven by Defendant. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, indulging all reasonable inferences in support of the district court’s
decision, and disregarding the contrary inference drawn by the Court of Appeals from
the officer’s reference to his impoundment-related predilections, we conclude the police
decision to impound and inventory the vehicle was consistent with the standardized
criteria contained in the Department’s tow and impound policy.

3.     Reasonableness of the Impoundment and Inventory Search

{26} The third factor in determining whether an impoundment and inventory search is
valid is that it be reasonable. Davis, 

. An inventory search is
reasonable if it furthers one of the following governmental interests: “(1) to protect the
arrestee’s property while it remains in police custody; (2) to protect the police against
claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; or (3) to protect the police from potential
danger.” Id. ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An inventory search is
not reasonable if police acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigating a
possible crime. See Bertine, 

.

{27} As analyzed above, we conclude that the vehicle Defendant was driving was not
subject to a heightened risk of theft or vandalism due to his arrest compared to any
other time when the vehicle was parked at the owner’s residence without the owner
being immediately present. Given that there was no heightened risk to the vehicle, we
conclude that the vehicle did not need to be impounded and searched to protect the
police against possible claims or disputes over lost or stolen property. As to the third
community caretaking justification for a warrantless inventory search, there is no claim
that such an impoundment and search was needed to protect the police from potential
danger and no evidence in the record of any potential danger to the police were an
impoundment and search not performed. Accordingly, this rationale does not bear on
our analysis.

{28} As a final observation, we note that often, as here, there may be analytical
overlap between a challenge to the first or second Davis factor⸻whether the object
was lawfully in police custody or control or whether the inventory was made pursuant to
established police regulations⸻and a challenge to the third factor, whether the search
itself was constitutionally reasonable. Davis, 

. In some
circumstances, as in Davis regarding custody or control, the inquiry into the first or
second factor may effectively resolve the inquiry into the third factor, and little, if any,
further analysis will be necessary. Id. ¶¶ 27-31; see also State v. Boswell, 1991-NMSC-
004, ¶¶ 12-14, 

, 

 (concluding that analysis of first Davis
factor tracked facts relevant to third Davis factor). In other circumstances, such as when
an individual is also or exclusively challenging the scope or manner of the inventory
search, the core purposes of the inventory doctrine will once again guide our analysis of
that particular challenge. See, e.g., Ruffino, 

, ¶¶ 1-2 (challenging the
inventory search of locked car trunk upon the defendant’s arrest on a minor charge);
State v. Shaw, 

, ¶¶ 1-3, 

, 

 (challenging the
taking of individual cigarettes out of their pack during a booking inventory search
following the defendant’s arrest on a domestic disturbance charge); State v. Vigil, 1974-
NMCA-065, ¶ 4, 

, 

 (challenging inventory search of closed
paper bag in locked trunk following the defendant’s arrest for assault). While potentially
repetitive, this analytical overlap ensures that the impoundment and inventory search
exception to the Fourth Amendment remains sharply focused on the non-criminal, non-investigatory justifications for the community caretaking exemption for warrantless
searches.

III.   CONCLUSION

{29} The State failed to meet its burden under the Fourth Amendment to demonstrate
the reasonableness of the impoundment and warrantless inventory search of the vehicle
driven by Defendant at the time of his arrest. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of
Appeals in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress, and we remand to the district court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

{30}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice

WE CONCUR:

C. SHANNON BACON, Chief Justice

MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice
DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice