Rosson v. Fitzgerald’s Empirical Analysis
545 F.3d 764 · 2008
Citation profile
13 federal appellate · 10 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 86 later decisions — most recently November 2023 · most notably Jacobsen v. Moser (2010), Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran (2010)
13 federal appellate · 10 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 11 U.S.C. § 102 · 11 U.S.C. § 105 · 11 U.S.C. § 1307 · 11 U.S.C. § 706 · 28 U.S.C. § 158
Relies on Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass. · Miller v. Gammie · In Re Jonathan Barnes Leavitt, Debtor. Jonathan Barnes Leavitt v. Carlos Soto · Nash v. Kester · Eisen v. Curry
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 86 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“On request of the debtor at any time, if the case has not been converted under section 706, 1112, or 1208 of this title, the court shall dismiss a case under this chapter. Any waiver of the right to dismiss under this subsection is unenforceable.”
8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[Although Marrama did not address the exact issue decided in Beatty, it is clear that, after Marrama, Beatty too is no longer good law, insofar as it holds that a Chapter 13 debtor has an absolute right to dismiss under § 1307(b). As noted above, Croston was at pains to explain that there was no analytical distinction between the legal issue in that case and the issue in Beatty. See Croston, 313 B.R. at 451-52 . We agree, and accordingly we conclude that the Court’s rejection of the “absolute right” theory as to § 706(a) applies equally to § 1307(b). Therefore, in light of Marrama, we hold that the debtor’s right of voluntary dismissal under § 1307(b) is not absolute, but is qualified by the authority of a bankruptcy court to deny dismissal on grounds of bad-faith conduct or “to prevent an abuse of process.” 11 U.S.C. § 105 (a). See Jacobsen, 378 B.R. at 811 (reaching same conclusion). But see In re Polly, 392 B.R. [at] 236 ... (holding that right to voluntarily dismiss Chapter 13 case is “absolute” (distinguishing Marrama)).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Jacobsen v. Moser“(A) means after such notice as is appropriate in the particular circumstances, and such opportunity for a hearing as is appropriate in the particular circumstances; but (B) authorizes an act without an actual hearing if such notice is given properly and if- (i) such a hearing is not requested timely by a party in interest; or (ii) there is insufficient time for a hearing to be commenced before such act must be done, and the court authorizes such act”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. In re Malek
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.