Stanger v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 38 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"The law presumes that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced. In order to overcome this presumption, the moving party must establish that a trial judge has personal prejudice for or against a party.... Such bias or prejudice exists only where there is an undisputed claim or the judge has expressed an opinion on the merits of the controversy before him.... Judges are credited with the ability to remain objective notwithstanding their having been exposed to information which might tend to prejudice lay persons.... Hence, the mere fact that a defendant has appeared before a certain judge in a prior action or the judge has gained knowledge of the defendant by participating in other actions does not establish the existence of bias or prejudice, particularly when a change of judge is sought in a jury trial.... Prejudice must be shown by the judge's trial conduct; it cannot be inferred from his subjective views."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Zavesky v. State · Reynolds v. State

2. ““We are not convinced that the practice of allowing a parent or relative to sit near a child witness while the child is testifying is so patently unfair to a defendant as to render a jury verdict untrustworthy. Unlike other courtroom practices condemned in the past, such as prison clothing or shackles and gags, see, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, (1970), 397 U.S. 337 , 90 S. Ct. 1057 , 25 L. Ed. 2d 353 , there is nothing about a person sitting quietly to the side of a witness which is particularly distracting or likely to arouse intense feeling among jurors for a witness or against a defendant. Indiana decisions attest the presence of a mother in the courtroom during a victim’s testimony, is not, of itself, inherently prejudicial.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 18 Kan. App. 2d 772 - State v. Rowray · 149 Cal. App. 4th 1175 - People v. Ybarra

3. “Where, as here, the method of eliciting testimony permits jury, witness, and defendant all to see and hear each other and possesses the added virtue of actually facilitating the truthfinding function at the trial, positioning the witness away from the defendant is but a reasonable limitation on the defendant's interest in physical confrontation. As the Court noted with respect to cross-examination, confrontation does not mean in whatever way and to whatever extent a defendant might wish.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Smith v. State