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← 545 P2D 1145 - Williamson v. Wanlass

Williamson v. Wanlass’s Empirical Analysis

1976

Citation profile

15
cited by 15 later decisions
6
states following
November 2011
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 12 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently November 2011

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 12 state decisions

7019761980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on 3 Utah 2d 59 - Jacobson v. Swan · Perkins v. Spencer · 28 Utah 2d 231 - Wingets, Incorporated v. Bitters · 26 Utah 2d 96 - Jensen v. Nielsen · 24 Utah 2d 351 - U-Beva Mines v. Toledo Mining Company

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “... acceleration is a harsh remedy which should be allowed only if there is some reasonable justification for doing so, such as a good faith belief that the prospect of payment is impaired. There was no such showing made in this case.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““The ‘acceleration’ clause involved in this matter is on the reverse side of the Security Agreement dated January 9, 1973. “The pertinent parts insofar as this case is concerned are: “ ‘Debtor shall be in default under this agreement upon the happening of any of the following events or conditions: 1. Default in the payment or performance of any obligation, covenant or liability contained or referred to herein; 5. Any time the Bank believes that the prospect of payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or the performance of this agreement is impaired. Upon such default and at any time thereafter Bank may declare all obligations secured hereby immediately due and payable . . . ’ “The law of this state provides that the above provisions for acceleration shall be construed to mean that the Bank shall have the power to accelerate only if it in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired. The burden of establishing lack of good faith is on Knittel. “ ‘Good faith’ means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. ““The clause which allows for acceleration in case of default, if strictly enforced, is a severe covenant, the invocation of which has similarity to other forfeitures. The imposition of such severe conditions is not favored in the law; and one who seeks to impose them must not, either by acts or omission permit another to assume that the covenant will not be strictly enforced, then ‘crack down’ on the obligor by rigidly insisting on enforcement, without giving some reasonable notice and opportunity to comply. This is a doctrine of equity which is firmly established in our law * * *.” [Footnote omitted]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.