Office of the
New Mexico
Director Compilation
Commission
2024.03.22
'00'06- 13:28:19
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: 2024-NMCA-033
Filing Date: January 23, 2024
No. A-1-CA-39971
MANUEL GONZALES III, a
candidate for Mayor of Albuquerque,
Appellant-Respondent,
v.
ETHAN WATSON, in his official
capacity as Albuquerque City Clerk,
Appellee-Petitioner.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Bryan Biedscheid, District Court Judge
Harrison, Hart & Davis, LLC
Carter B. Harrison IV
Daniel J. Gallegos
Albuquerque, NM
for Respondent
Peifer, Hanson, Mullins & Baker, P.A.
Mark T. Baker
Matt M. Beck
Matthew E. Jackson
Albuquerque, NM
for Petitioner
OPINION
BUSTAMANTE, Judge, retired, sitting by designation.
{1} This case presents an issue of first impression concerning the administration of
the City of Albuquerque’s (the City) public campaign financing ordinance. The City
appeals from the district court’s ruling that candidates have a due process right to a
hearing before the City Clerk enters a decision denying them public financing.
Concluding that a predecision hearing was not constitutionally required, and that the
post-decision hearings provided here were sufficient, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
{2} Then Bernalillo County Sheriff Manny Gonzales III (Sheriff Gonzales) filed as a
candidate in the City’s 2021 mayoral election. As part of his filing, Sheriff Gonzales
opted to apply for public financing 1 pursuant to City’s Open and Ethical Elections Code
(OEEC). Albuquerque, N.M., Charter of the City of Albuquerque, Open and Ethical
Elections Code, art. XVI (2021, amended 2023). 2 On April 4, 2021, Sheriff Gonzales
signed and delivered two forms required by the City as part of its public financing
process. The first form was the “Candidate Acknowledgment of Familiarity with Codes
and Required Disclosures” in which Sheriff Gonzales acknowledged that he was familiar
with the City’s Election Code, the rules and regulations of the Board of Ethics and
Campaign Practices for the Election Code, the OOEC and the Code of Ethics of the
Charter of the City, and the 2021 regulations promulgated by the City Clerk. The second
form was the “Designation of Representatives” in which he agreed that he was “fully
responsible for the statements made and materials submitted by [three listed]
representatives on behalf of [his] campaign.”
{3} Sheriff Gonzales signed and filed his “Application for Certification as a
Participating Candidate for the Office of Mayor” (the Application) on June 19, 2021. The
Application required him to “swear or affirm” that he had complied with all requirements
of the OEEC and had met all of the City’s requirements with regard to raising qualifying
contributions.
{4} On July 9, 2021, the City Clerk denied the Application, citing two complaints he
had received from an opposing candidate asserting improprieties on the part of Sheriff
Gonzales’s campaign in connection with its handling of qualifying contributions.
{5} The first complaint—filed June 7, 2021—asserted that, at a meeting with
Salvation Army Advisory Board members, Sheriff Gonzales personally solicited a fivedollar qualifying contribution from a person, asked the person to sign the qualifying
contribution book, but then told the person, “we[ will] cover that,” when asked by the
person if he “needed to give five dollars?” (the Salvation Army incident). Sheriff
Gonzales signed the qualifying contribution book as the collecting representative. The
complaint asserted that Sheriff Gonzales’s actions were contrary to the OEEC
Regulations that require that qualifying contributions be paid by the contributor and
stipulates that if “funds are provided by any person other than the contributor who is
listed on the receipt, the [q]ualifying [c]ontribution will be deemed fraudulent.” See 2021
Regulations of the Albuquerque City Clerk for the Open and Ethical Elections Code
(OEEC Regulations), Part C(6.), at 7-8, https://www.cabq.gov/vote/documents/2021-
regulations-for-the-open-and-ethical-election-code.pdf. The complaint also asserted that
1Sheriff Gonzales’s actual declaration is not included in the record provided to this court.
2All references in this opinion to the Charter of the City of Albuquerque are to the 2021 version of the
charter.
Sheriff Gonzales’s actions were contrary to other, more general provisions prohibiting
campaign contributions by one person in the name of another person. NMSA 1978, § 1-
19-34.3(A) (2019); OEEC Regulations, Part C(6.).
{6} The City Clerk forwarded the complaint to Sheriff Gonzales on June 9, 2021, and
notified him that the complaint had been referred to the Board of Ethics. The Board of
Ethics—created in Article XII of the City’s charter—is charged with receiving and
investigating complaints regarding possible violations of the OEEC and rules
promulgated by the “Board and/or City Clerk.” Albuquerque, N.M., Charter of the City of
Albuquerque, Code of Ethics, art. XII § 3(c).
{7} The second complaint—filed on June 29, 2021—asserted that a number of the
qualifying contribution receipts submitted by Sheriff Gonzales’s campaign included
forged contributor signatures. The City Clerk forwarded this complaint to Sheriff
Gonzales on the same day he received the complaint, and again informed Sheriff
Gonzales that this complaint had also been referred to the Board of Ethics. 3
{8} On July 11, 2021, Sheriff Gonzales appealed the City Clerk’s July 9, 2021 denial
of certification. On July 15, 2021, in accordance with the City’s Charter, a City hearing
officer (the Hearing Officer) held a full day hearing (the July 15 Hearing), during which
Sheriff Gonzales and the City Clerk presented documentary evidence and live testimony
through direct and cross-examination. See Albuquerque, N.M., Charter of the City of
Albuquerque, Open and Ethical Elections Code, art. XVI, § 18(B). Neither party makes
any argument here that they were prevented from presenting any evidence or
argument, or that the July 15 Hearing was otherwise inadequate. The parties submitted
written closing arguments on July 16, 2021, and the Hearing Officer issued his ruling on
July 18, 2021. The Hearing Officer upheld the City Clerk’s decision, rejecting Sheriff
Gonzales’s arguments across the board. The Hearing Officer specifically noted that
Sheriff Gonzales admitted that many of the signatures on the qualifying contribution
receipts were forgeries. The Hearing Officer also found that the Salvation Army incident
occurred as asserted in the June 7, 2021 complaint, and evidenced “direct knowledge of
fraud and falsification” on the part of Sheriff Gonzales.
{9} Invoking Rule 1-074 NMRA, Sheriff Gonzales filed a notice of appeal from the
City Clerk’s decision in the district court on July 19, 2021. Sheriff Gonzales’s statement
of appellate issues included a number of arguments that the district court summarized
into three primary issues: “(1) whether [the City Clerk’s] certification denial decision was
procedurally improper; (2) whether substantial evidence existed to warrant the
certification denial decision; and[] (3) whether the regulations on which the certification
denial decision was made were ultra vires.”
{10} The district court concluded that the City Clerk “failed to provide [Sheriff]
Gonzales with minimum due process protections before declining certification” and
3Though not referenced in the City Clerk’s July 9, 2021 letter, another campaign submitted an additional
100 or so qualifying contribution receipts originally filed by the Sheriff’s campaign that assertedly also
included forged contributor signatures.
reversed the Hearing Officer’s decision on that basis alone. As such, the district court
did not address the other two issues. The district court concluded that the City Clerk
“failed to: (a) notice [Sheriff] Gonzales that [he] intended on denying certification based
upon OEEC Regulations, Part C, Section 15(a)(iii) and [](v); (b) provide [Sheriff]
Gonzales with an adequate explanation of the evidence upon which [he] was
considering denial; (c) provide [Sheriff] Gonzales with an adequate opportunity to be
heard and present any pertinent claim or defense before [he] denied certification.” The
district court remanded the case to the City Clerk to cure the due process violation it
recognized. The district court gave the City Clerk three options: (1) find yet again that
Sheriff Gonzales had violated the OEEC Regulations and deny certification again; (2)
set forth a process by which Sheriff Gonzales would be provided “minimum procedural
due process protections” within 72 hours from the date of its ruling; or (3) certify Sheriff
Gonzales as a participating candidate entitled to public financing.
{11} The City Clerk chose the second option and sent Sheriff Gonzales a “Notice of
Contemplated Action [R]egarding Certification for Public Finance” on August 30, 2021.
The notice set a hearing for September 1, 2021, before the City Clerk (the September 1
Hearing). Sheriff Gonzales appeared for the September 1 Hearing with counsel, but did
not participate substantively in that he did not present any testimony or submit any
documentary evidence. Rather he used his time to protest the timing and structure of
the September 1 Hearing asserting that it itself constituted a violation of his due process
rights.
{12} The City Clerk entered his “Notice of Final Action [R]egarding Certification for
Public Finance” on September 2, 2021, again denying certification. The notice included
specific factual findings concerning forged qualifying contribution receipts. The notice
also related that the Board of Ethics had found that Sheriff Gonzales “violated the
OEEC and OEEC Regulations when [Sheriff Gonzales] covered the contribution of
Dean Zantow and submitted a qualifying contribution signed by him to the Clerk’s
Office.”
{13} On the same day, Sheriff Gonzales filed a motion for rehearing with the district
court requesting that it order the City Clerk to certify him for public financing. The motion
argued that the original order entered by the court failed to adequately circumscribe the
hearing on remand in that it did not address the need for an impartial decision maker—
i.e., not the City Clerk—and also failed to describe the nature of the hearing to be held
on remand. In essence, Sheriff Gonzales argued that the City Clerk should not have
been allowed to be the decision maker and the hearing should not have been allowed to
be structured as that which was held: effectively a Loudermill predetermination hearing.
See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (holding that a
public school employee who could be terminated only for cause was entitled to a
pretermination hearing or “opportunity to present [their] side of the story”).
{14} The district court entered its “Final Order Affirming [the City Clerk]’s Decision to
Deny Public Funds” rejecting Sheriff Gonzales’s arguments in toto. The City Clerk filed
a petition for writ of certiorari asking the court to resolve “whether application for public
campaign financing creates a constitutionally-protected property right in the public funds
that entitles the applicant to the same panoply of special procedural protections required
for governmental deprivations of an already-vested property right.” Sheriff Gonzales did
not file a counter-petition for certiorari or otherwise appeal the district court’s order. This
Court granted certiorari.
DISCUSSION
{15} The issue before us is narrow: what process—if any—is due to candidates
seeking public campaign funds prior to the time the administrative authority decides
whether a candidate will not be approved for funding? Applying the analysis articulated
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) we conclude that a predecision hearing is
not constitutionally required in this specific context. In so concluding, however, we do
not follow the path laid in the parties’ briefing.
{16} The parties argue long and earnestly whether candidates have a property
interest sufficient to support any process. Their arguments seem to assume that a
finding that a property interest exists leads inexorably to a conclusion that a predecision
hearing “of some kind” is constitutionally required. The district court seemingly shared
this assumption in that it did not engage in the time honored analysis articulated in
Mathews. Given the flexible and contextual nature of due process, that assumption is
neither useful nor warranted. The United States Supreme Court has “never held that
applicants for benefits, as distinct from those already receiving them, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment.” Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986) (citing Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of
Radiation Survivors,
473 U.S. 305, 320 n.8 (1985)). But, at least as of 2005, every
federal circuit that had addressed the issue had concluded that “applicants for benefits,
no less than current benefits recipients, may possess a property interest in the receipt of
public welfare entitlements.” Kapps v. Wing,
404 F.3d 105, 115 (2nd Cir. 2005). There
are no cases applying these concepts in the public campaign financing arena, and we
see no reason to undertake the task to resolve this case. It would be more efficient and
more utile to assume—without deciding—the City’s candidates who have met the purely
objective minimum requirements for participation in public financing have a sufficiently
reasonable expectation of public financing to render them more than mere supplicants,
thus implicating due process concerns. The discussion that follows is based on that
assumption. The constitutionality of the procedures followed by a governmental entity
presents a question of law, and, thus our review is de novo. N.M Dep’t of Workforce
Sols. v. Garduño,
2016-NMSC-002, ¶ 9,
363 P.3d 1176.
{17} In Mathews the United States Supreme Court held that the concept of due
process did not require the Social Security Administration to provide an evidentiary
hearing prior to terminating a person’s disability benefits. 424 U.S. at 349. The Court’s
canvass of the case law provides a concise summary of due process concepts
applicable to governmental deprivations of property interests.
Id. at 332-36. The most
basic idea is that “some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is
finally deprived of [their] property.” Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974)
(citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 165-66 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The requirement of a hearing serves the fundamental
requirement of an opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 551-52 (1965) (reversing a state court
decree confirming a prior adoption procedure of which petitioner had admittedly never
been provided notice). The different outcomes in cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly,
397
U.S. 254 (1970)—requiring a hearing approximating a judicial proceeding before
terminating welfare benefits—and Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134 (1974)—approving a
more informal process of notice and an opportunity for written and oral responses in
federal employee dismissals—prompted the Court to note “the truism that due process
. . . is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances.” Mathews,
424 U.S. at 334 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and
citation omitted). “[D]ue process is flexible[] and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). In
sum, flexibility “is a recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards
call for the same kind of procedure.”
Id.
{18} New Mexico has long recognized that “[t]he Mathews test is the appropriate
analytical framework for a due process issue.” Archuleta v. Santa Fe Police Dep’t ex rel.
City of Santa Fe, 2005-NMSC-006, ¶ 31,
137 N.M. 161,
108 P.3d 1019; City of
Albuquerque v. Chavez,
1998-NMSC-033, ¶ 13,
125 N.M. 809,
965 P.2d 928. Mathews
distilled three factors that courts should generally consider: (1) “the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the [g]overnment’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirements would entail.”
424 U.S. at 321. In assessing the
second factor, we are to consider the administrative proceedings as a whole. Garduño,
2016-NMSC-002, ¶ 11; see Chavez,
1998-NMSC-033, ¶ 14 (same).
{19} The City’s process for handling complaints of violations of the OEEC is described
in Section 4 of the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Ethics & Campaign Practices
for the Election Code, the Open and Ethical Election Code, and the Code of Ethics of
the City Charter. City of Albuquerque Office of the City Clerk, Rules and Regulations of
the Board of Ethics & Campaign Practices for the Election Code, the Open and Ethical
Election Code, and the Code of Ethics of the City Charter (Board of Ethics and
Campaign Practices Regulations), § 4 Enforcement, at 4,
https://www.cabq.gov/clerk/documents/proposed-boe-rules-2020.pdf. Complaints in the
form of a “notarized statement attesting to the truth of its contents” are required to be
filed with the City Clerk on a form approved by the Clerk. Bd. of Ethics & Campaign
Practices Reguls., § 4(A)(1), at 4. The regulation provides detailed requirements for the
content of the complaint, including the name and address of the complainant, the nature
of the asserted violation, the names and contact information of persons who have
personal knowledge of the allegations, and any evidence supporting the allegations. Bd.
of Ethics & Campaign Practices Reguls., §§ 4(A)(2)(a)(i), (v), (vi), at 4-5. Upon review
by the City Clerk and their finding that it meets the requirements of the regulation, the
regulation requires that the City Clerk “immediately’ notify the [r]espondent and provide
the [r]espondent a copy of the complaint using the best means practicable.” Bd. of
Ethics & Campaign Practices Reguls., § 4(A)(5), at 5. The City Clerk is also required to
simultaneously refer the complaint to the Board of Ethics and set the complaint for an
evidentiary hearing by the Board of Ethics. Bd. of Ethics & Campaign Practices Reguls.,
§§ 4(A)(3), (5), (6), at 5. Section 4(E) of the Board of Ethic’s regulations include detailed
instructions for the Board of Ethic’s hearings that provide for a robust adversarial
process. Bd. of Ethics & Campaign Practices Reguls., § 4(E), at 7-10. The Board of
Ethics can request an investigation of complaints. See Albuquerque, N.M., Charter of
the City of Albuquerque, Code of Ethics, art. XII, § 9(a).
{20} As noted above, the City Clerk received complaints on June 7 and June 29, 2021
asserting violations of the OEEC by Sheriff Gonzales personally and by his campaign.
The record before us does not include details of the hearings conducted by the Board
as a result of the complaints. The record does indicate that after a hearing the Board
upheld the June 7 complaint concerning the Salvation Army incident. Sheriff Gonzales
has never argued that the Board of Ethic’s process was improper or inadequate.
{21} The OEEC and associated regulations do not include any provision for a
predetermination process in connection with the City Clerk’s decision to deny
certification as a participating candidate. Rather, the OEEC provides for an expedited
appeal process. Section 19 of the OEEC allows a candidate to file an appeal of a
decision to deny within three days. Albuquerque, N.M., Charter of the City of
Albuquerque, Open and Ethical Elections Code, art. XVI, § 19. Within five days of the
notice of appeal the “City [h]earing [o]fficer shall hold a hearing, [and] the City [h]earing
[o]fficer shall rule on the appeal within three days after the completion of the hearing.”
Albuquerque, N.M., Charter of the City of Albuquerque, Open and Ethical Elections
Code, art. XVI, § 19(B)(2). As noted above, this process was followed and resulted in a
ruling upholding the City Clerk’s decision. Sheriff Gonzales has never argued that he
was not given a full and fair opportunity to present witnesses and evidence or otherwise
make his evidentiary and legal arguments to the Hearing Officer or that the Hearing
Officer was not a neutral decision maker. Sheriff Gonzales argued below that there was
not substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer’s ruling and that he applied an
improper standard of proof, but those issues are not before us.
{22} We now turn to the Mathews factors. The first factor assesses the private
interests affected by the official’s action. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321. This case does not
involve the type of individual interest involved in Mathews and cases such as Goldberg,
397 U.S. at 255 (welfare benefits) or Loudermill,
470 U.S. at 535 (public employment).
Goldberg and Loudermill address situations in which a deprivation of public benefits
have potentially immediate and devastating effects on the lives and wellbeing of
individuals and their families. In that context, the courts have been understandably
willing to intrude on and impose limitations on governmental discretion.
{23} The interest here is no doubt important, but of a different order. The stated aim of
public financing of campaigns is to reduce undue influence by large donors, ease the
public perception of corruption, strengthen public confidence in government and provide
well qualified candidates the financial wherewithal to run effective campaigns.
Albuquerque, N.M., Charter of the City of Albuquerque, Open and Ethical Elections
Code, art. XVI., § 2. These are worthy goals, but they do not involve the potential for
personal harm that motivated the holdings in Goldberg, Loudermill, and similar cases.
And, as our Supreme Court noted in Montoya v. Herrera, the decision to pursue public
financing is a voluntary choice. 2012-NMSC-011, ¶ 18,
276 P.3d 952, ¶¶ 17-19
(affirming denial of public financing where the candidate personally exceeded seed
money limitations and holding that the limit did not constitute a burden on the
candidates’ First Amendment rights). Having chosen to seek public financing, the
candidate is subject to the substantive requirements of the program, but failure to
qualify does not necessarily result in the death knell of a campaign, much less the
potential personal privation inherent in the loss of welfare benefits, unemployment
compensation, and job security. In short, the initial denial of certification here does not
evoke a need for the sort of predecision check on administrative action that loss of basic
life benefits does.
{24} The second Mathews factor involves assessment of the risk of erroneous
deprivation of an interest and the probable value of additional procedures. Mathews,
424 U.S. at 321. Discussion of this factor is clouded in this case by Sheriff Gonzales’s
approach to the issue and the district court’s response thereto. In his statement of
appellate issues in the district court, Sheriff Gonzales asserted that he was due not just
some predecision opportunity to present his side of the story as contemplated by
Loudermill,
470 U.S. at 546, but a full on adversarial hearing as described in Board of
Education of Carlsbad Municipal Schools. v. Harrell,
1994-NMSC-096, ¶ 25,
118 N.M.
470,
882 P.2d 511. Without explicitly saying so, the district court rejected the argument
and remanded the matter for the City Clerk to provide the type of opportunity for
dialogue that Loudermill and its progeny require. In the final order affirming the City
Clerk’s decision to deny public funds, the district court explicitly explained that he had
framed his prior order on the concepts of pretermination due process explained in
Loudermill. It also noted the basic problem posed by Sheriff Gonzales’s arguments:
“The [c]ourt notes that [Sheriff] Gonzales has wanted two things throughout this
proceeding: (a) nearly instantaneous decision-making, and (b) the most elaborate
trappings of full criminal prosecution. These are mutual[ly] exclusive concepts.” We
agree with this observation.
{25} The question yet remains whether any type of predecision process is required in
this context as a check on potential error. We conclude that none is required for two
reasons. First, Sheriff Gonzales was made fully aware of the complaints upon which the
City Clerk based his initial decision. Both of the complaints were immediately referred to
the Board of Ethics and that process was ongoing when the City Clerk entered his
denial. We fail to see how “some kind of hearing” with the City Clerk outside of the
Board process would aid in avoiding error or further the search for accuracy as to the
allegations in the complaints.
{26} Second, the City provides a very prompt avenue for checking the accuracy of
complaints and the City Clerk’s action through its appeal process. Albuquerque, N.M.,
Charter of the City of Albuquerque, Open and Ethical Elections Code, art. XVI, § 19.
The appeal process is robust and quick. Albuquerque, N.M., Charter of the City of
Albuquerque, Open and Ethical Elections Code, art. XVI, § 19. It allows a hearing with a
full opportunity to produce evidence, call and cross-examine witnesses and argue the
facts and the law to as neutral a decision maker as can be mustered in that time
frame—all within eleven days. Albuquerque, N.M., Charter of the City of Albuquerque,
Open and Ethical Elections Code, art. XVI, § 19. The potential torpidity of the
administrative review process is an important factor in assessing the impact of official
action on private interests. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 342 (citing Fusari v. Steinberg,
419
U.S. 379, 389 (1975)). That factor is not at play here. We conclude that the robust and
rapid post-decision process made available by the City was sufficient to adequately
protect Sheriff Gonzales’s interests.
{27} The third Mathews factor assesses the governmental interests at work, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional
procedural requirements would entail. The City Clerk is placed on a tight schedule to
approve requests for certification. The office is required to check all requests for
certification within twenty days of receipt. Albuquerque, N.M., Charter of the City of
Albuquerque, Open and Ethical Elections Code, art. XVI, § 7(A). Section 7 of the OEEC
requires the office to “determine whether the [a]pplicant [c]andidate has:
(1) signed and filed a declaration of intent to obtain fund revenue;
(2) submitted the appropriate number of [q]ualifying [c]ontributions;
(3) qualified as a candidate pursuant to other applicable [c]ity and
[s]tate election law;
(4) complied with [s]eed [m]oney contribution and [e]xpenditure
restrictions;
(5) otherwise met the requirements for obtaining financing pursuant to
the [OEEC];
(6) otherwise met any additional criteria for certification set forth in
rules by the [c]lerk;
(7) been qualified as a [c]andidate by the [c]ounty [c]lerk; and
(8) there are not pending challenges to the [c]ounty [c]lerk’s
qualification of the [c]andidate.
Albuquerque, N.M., Charter of the City of Albuquerque, Open and Ethical Elections
Code, art. XVI, § 7.
{28} We take Sheriff Gonzales at his word that he prefers what would amount to a full
trial proceeding in advance of the City Clerk arriving at decision related to his
qualification for public finance. The implications for the schedule of approval and the
administrative disruption and expense are obvious. This factor weighs in favor of our
conclusion that the quick appeal process described above is the process City
candidates are due.
{29} To sum up, assuming a property interest indeed exists regarding access to public
financing under the OEEC, the process available to swiftly and fully challenge an
adverse determination in the days after such a decision is made comports with due
process. We perceive no need for any additional predetermination opportunity by which
Sheriff Gonzales could have challenged the future adverse decision regarding his
qualification for public financing.
CONCLUSION
{30} For the reasons stated, we reverse the district court’s decision that the City’s
candidates seeking public campaign funding are entitled to a predecision hearing with
the City Clerk. We affirm the district court’s judgment affirming the City Clerk’s decision
denying Sheriff Gonzales’s certification as a participating candidate.
{31} IT IS SO ORDERED.
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge,
retired, Sitting by designation.
WE CONCUR:
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge
JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge
