546 U.S. 6
Schriro v. Smith
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided October 17, 2005
Supreme Court of the United States · decided 2005-10-17
Held: The Ninth Circuit exceeded its limited habeas authority in commanding the Arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve Smith’s mental retardation claim. Atkins makes clear that “the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [States’] execution of sentences” falls to the States in the first instance. 536 U. S., at 317. Certiorari granted; vacated and remanded.
Key passage — most relied on by later courts
“Atkins stated in clear terms that “we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.” States, including Arizona, have responded to that challenge by adopting their own measures for adjudicating claims of mental retardation. While those measures might, in their application, be subject to constitutional challenge, Arizona had not even had a chance to apply its chosen procedures when the Ninth Circuit pre-emptively imposed its jury trial condition.”
quoted by 2 later decisions, including State v. Laney, Commonwealth v. Bracey
“[t]he Ninth Circuit erred in commanding the Arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve Smith's mental retardation claim.”
quoted by 2 later decisions, including State v. Laney, People v. Skinner
Relies on Atkins v. Virginia · Ford v. Wainwright · Stewart Director Arizona Department of Corrections v. Smith
Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know
Vacated and remanded · 9–0 · Decided 2005-10-17
How this case has been cited
Cited by 78 later decisions — most recently June 2020 · most notably Hooks v. Workman (2012), Commonwealth v. Sanchez (2011)
34 federal appellate · 3 district · 33 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
View the full empirical analysis of this case →
SCHRIRO, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS v. SMITH
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 04—1475. Decided October 17, 2005
Respondent Smith was convicted of murder, kidnaping, and sexual assault
and was sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed
on direct appeal, and state postconviction relief was denied. In none of
these proceedings did Smith argue that he was mentally retarded or
that such retardation made him ineligible for the death penalty. Smith
then sought federal habeas relief. After this Court’s decision in Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, Smith began to assert that he is mentally
retarded and cannot, under Atkins, be executed. The Ninth Circuit
ordered suspension of all federal habeas proceedings, directed Smith to
institute proceedings in the proper Arizona trial court, and ordered that
the issue whether Smith is mentally retarded be determined by jury
trial.
Held: The Ninth Circuit exceeded its limited habeas authority in commanding
the Arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve Smith’s
mental retardation claim. Atkins makes clear that “the task of developing
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon
[States’] execution of sentences” falls to the States in the first instance.
536 U. S., at 317.
Certiorari granted; vacated and remanded.
Per Curiam.
In 1982, an Arizona jury convicted respondent Robert
Douglas Smith of first-degree murder, kidnaping, and sexual
assault. He was sentenced to death. The convictions
and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and Smith’s
state petitions for postconviction relief proved unsuccessful.
Smith then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona. In
none of these proceedings did Smith argue that he was mentally
retarded or that his mental retardation made him ineligible
for the death penalty. Smith had, however, presented
Per Curiam
evidence in mitigation during the sentencing phase of his
trial showing that he had low intelligence.
The District Court denied Smith’s petition for habeas corpus
in 1996. Following several rounds of appeals, remands,
and petitions for certiorari to this Court (including one successful
petition by the State, see Stewart v. Smith, 536 U. S.
856 (2002) (per curiam)), and after we had issued our decision
in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 (2002), the case
returned to the Ninth Circuit. Shortly thereafter, Smith
asserted in briefing that he is mentally retarded and cannot,
under Atkins, be executed. The Ninth Circuit ordered suspension
of all federal habeas proceedings and directed Smith
to “institute proceedings in the proper trial court of Arizona
to determine whether the state is prohibited from executing
[Smith] in accordance with Atkins.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
A—2. The court further ordered that the issue whether
Smith is mentally retarded must “be determined . . . by a
jury trial unless the right to a jury is waived by the parties.”
Ibid.
The State’s petition for certiorari is granted,* the judgment
of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is
remanded. The Ninth Circuit erred in commanding the Arizona
courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve Smith’s mental
retardation claim. Atkins stated in clear terms that “ ‘we
leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways
to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution
of sentences.’ ” 536 U. S., at 317 (quoting Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 416—417 (1986); modifications in
original). States, including Arizona, have responded to that
challenge by adopting their own measures for adjudicating
claims of mental retardation. While those measures might,
in their application, be subject to constitutional challenge,
Arizona had not even had a chance to apply its chosen proce
*Smith’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is also granted.
Per Curiam
dures when the Ninth Circuit pre-emptively imposed its jury
trial condition.
Because the Court of Appeals exceeded its limited authority
on habeas review, the judgment below is vacated, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.