Mattis v. Schnarr’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

29 federal appellate · 5 district · 9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 58 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Subdivision 1. For the purposes of this section, ‘deadly force’ means force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing, or which the actor should reasonably know creates a substantial risk of causing, death or great bodily harm. The intentional dischárge of a firearm in the direction of another person, or at a vehicle in which another person is believed to be, constitutes deadly force. “Subd. 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 609.06 or 609.065, the use of deadly force by a peace officer in the line of duty is justified only when necessary: “(1) To protect himself or another from apparent death or great bodily harm; “(2) To effect the arrest or capture, or prevent the escape, of a person whom the peace officer knows or has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or attempted to commit a felony involving the use or threatened use of deadly force; or “(3) To effect the arrest or capture, or prevent the escape, of a person whom the officer knows or has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or attempted to commit a felony if the officer reasonably believes that the person will cause death or great bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Ryder v. City of Topeka · Schumann Ex Rel. Peterson v. City of St. Paul

2. ““The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless: “(i) the arrest is for a felony; and “(ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace officer or is assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized to act as a peace officer; and “(iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and “(iv) the actor believes that: “(1) the crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly force; or “(2) there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Garner v. Memphis Police Department · Schumann Ex Rel. Peterson v. City of St. Paul

3. ““The majority opinion recognizes that the Missouri statutes at issue here are merely a codification of the common law dating from Fifteenth Century England and that at least 24 states have similar codifications of the common law currently in force. *** Thus, after a background of five centuries of the common law and two centuries of this country’s existence, lo and behold the majority, ipse dixit, has held that the common law principles embodied in these Missouri statutes are violative of the Due Process Clause of our Constitution. While acknowledging that other courts have reached a contrary decision, the majority shows no interest in the direction taken by other judicial authorities and turns elsewhere for guidance.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 118 Ill. App. 3d 676 - Simmons v. City of Chicago