Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson’s Empirical Analysis
547 F.3d 1237 · 2008
Citation profile
18 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 35 later decisions — most recently March 2024 · most notably Abernathy v. Wandes (2013), Doe v. City of Albuquerque (2012)
18 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 16 · 18 U.S.C. § 4248 · 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (§ 241 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))
Relies on Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · United States v. Salerno · United States v. Mead Corp. · Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Enrico St Cyr · Addington v. Texas
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“We recognize that this holding leads us to conflict with the results reached by the two other circuits to consider the Attorney General’s revised construction of § 1231(a)(6). See Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir.2008); Thai v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.2004). In those cases, the Fifth Circuit and Ninth Circuit reached a conclusion similar to that reached by the district court in this case: that the Attorney General’s interpretation of § 1231(a)(6), as construed through 8 C.F.R. § 241.14 , is unreasonable. See Tran, 515 F.3d at 485 ; Thai, 366 F.3d at 798-99 . Both courts based their conclusions on the premise that the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas represented a final, definitive interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6). See Tran, 515 F.3d at 484 (“While it is true that Zadvydas found that § 1231(a)(6) was ambiguous ..., the Government ignores the fact that the Zadvydas court resolved this ambiguity by imposing a requirement that the detention last no longer than reasonably necessary to effectuate removal.”); Thai, 366 F.3d at 798 (“[BJecazise Zadvydas construed § 1231(a)(6) to forbid the post-removal-period detention of an alien once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable ..., we hold that Thai’s continued detention is not authorized under § 1231(a)(6).”) (emphasis added). We believe that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits erred by concluding that the Supreme Court could authoritatively and finally interpret § 1231(a)(6). Brand X makes clear that even after”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent“In Zadvydas , the Supreme Court did not purport to 'resolve' the statutory ambiguity in § 1231(a)(6) once and for all. ... In no way, ... did the Court signal that its interpretation was the only reasonable construction of § 1231(a)(6).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.