Fednav, Ltd. v. Chester’s Empirical Analysis
547 F.3d 607 · 2008
Citation profile
7 federal appellate · 1 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 22 later decisions — most recently September 2022
7 federal appellate · 1 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 16 U.S.C. § 4701 (National Invasive Species Act of 1996) · 16 U.S.C. § 4711 · 16 U.S.C. § 4725 · 46 U.S.C. § 2101 · 46 U.S.C. § 3702 · 46 U.S.C. § 3703
Relies on Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife · Warth v. Seldin · Allen v. Wright · Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The state laws now in question bear upon national and international maritime commerce, and in this area there is no beginning assumption that concurrent regulation by the State is a valid exercise of its police powers. Rather, we must ask whether the local laws in question are consistent with the federal statutory structure, which has as one of its objectives a uniformity of regulation for maritime commerce. No artificial presumption aids us in determining the scope of appropriate local regulation under the PWSA, which, as we discuss below, does preserve, in Title I of that Act, the historic role of the States to regulate local ports and waters under appropriate circumstances. At the same time, as we also discuss below, uniform, national rules regarding general tanker design, operation, and seaworthiness have been mandated by Title II of the PWSA.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““[T]he first step in analyzing any law subject to judicial scrutiny under the negative Commerce Clause is to determine whether it ‘regulates even-handedly with only “incidental” effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce.’ As we use the term here, ‘discrimination’ simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter. If a restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid. By contrast, nondiscriminatory regulations that have only incidental effects on interstate commerce are valid unless ‘the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Field preemption occurs when “the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for supplementary state regulation.” Ohio Mfrs. Assoc. v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824, 828 (6th Cir.1986) (quoting Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 , 105 S.Ct. 2371 , 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985)). Conflict preemption occurs when a provision of state law “actually conflicts with federal law.” City of Akron, 801 F.2d at 828 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.