547 So. 2d 1367 - State v. Davis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A fair reading of the Sokolow opinion indicates that the specific and articulable facts to which a law enforcement officer must be able to point in justifying an investigatory stop are to be evaluated in light of all circumstances surrounding the particular incident. A court's inquiry into the existence of reasonable suspicion should entail practical consideration of the cumulative effect of all facts articulated by the officer, further taking into account the probative value of such facts to the trained law enforcement official observing them.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Barre · State v. Swaingan

2. “In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-85 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), we held that the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity “may be afoot,” even if the officer lacks probable cause. The officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’.” Id., at 27 , 88 S.Ct. at 1883 . The Fourth Amendment requires “some minimal level of objective justification” for making the stop. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 , 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1763 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984). That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. We have held that probable cause means “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 , 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 544 , 105 S.Ct. 3304, 3312 , 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985). The concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not “readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Gates, supra, 462 U.S., at 232 , 103 S.Ct., at 2329 _ In evaluating the validity of a stop such as this, we must consider “the totality of the circumstances — the whole pic”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Garriga · State v. Barre

3. “A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense and may demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. White · 575 So. 2d 521 - State v. Vanderlinder