547 So. 2d 607 - Staten v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"However, we wish to clarify that, just as we do not liberally extend the exceptions to the rule of exclusion [of other offenses] in sex crime prosecutions, neither do we intend that their applicability be more narrowly restricted in such cases, notwithstanding dicta in Anonymous to the contrary. The same factors for determining the admissibility of collateral acts of misconduct by the accused in other types of prosecutions are to be applied in determining the admissibility of collateral acts of sexual misconduct in the prosecution of sex crimes. Which is to say that, provided the test for materiality is met, evidence of collateral crimes or misconduct may be admitted. Of necessity, this analysis is case by case."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 580 So. 2d 97 - Jones v. State · 570 So. 2d 724 - Reeves v. State

2. “" ' " ' "This is a general exclusionary rule which prevents the introduction of [collateral] criminal acts for the sole purpose of suggesting that the accused is more likely to be guilty of the crime in question. This rule is generally applicable whether the other crime was committed before or after the one for which the defendant is presently being tried. " ' " ' "This exclusionary rule is simply an application of the character rule which forbids the state to prove the accused's bad character by particular deeds. The basis for the rule lies in the belief that the prejudicial effect of [collateral] crimes will far outweigh any probative value that might be gained from them. Most agree that such evidence of [collateral] crimes has almost an irreversible impact upon the minds of the Jurors." ' " ' " Cofer , 440 So.2d at 1123 (quoting C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 69.01(1) (3d ed. 1977). . . ." " 'See also Hill v. State , [Ms. 7 Div. 844 , June 28, 1988] [538] So.2d [436] (Ala.Cr.App. 1988); Watson v. State , [Ms. 5 Div. 56 , September 8, 1987] [538] So.2d [1216] (Ala.Cr.App. 1987).' "”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 596 So. 2d 47 - Mothershed v. State

3. “" ' "The general evidentiary principle, long adhered to in Alabama, which must be applied in this case may be stated as follows: In a prosecution for one offense, evidence of collateral crimes or acts is generally inadmissible to prove the guilt of the accused. See Ex parte Cofer , 440 So.2d 1121 (Ala. 1983); Ex parte Killough , 438 So.2d 333 (Ala. 1983); Brasher v. State , 249 Ala. 96 , 30 So.2d 31 (1947); Haley v. State , 63 Ala. 89 (1879); Ingram v. State , 39 Ala. 247 (1864). In fact, it has been stated that such evidence is prima facie inadmissible. See Cofer, supra; Brasher, supra, Allen v. State , 380 So.2d 313 (Ala.Crim.App. 1979), *Page 49 cert. denied , 380 So.2d 341 (Ala. 1980).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 596 So. 2d 47 - Mothershed v. State