United States v. Felder’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

37 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The functional basis for the “clearly erroneous” standard has long been recognized in the proposition that "the trial court’s customary opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and thus the credibility of witnesses ... is the rationale behind Rule 52(a), United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 , 141 n. 16 [, 86 S.Ct. 1321 , 1328 n. 16, 16 L.Ed.2d 415 ] (1966), a rule that by its terms adverts to the "opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). The functional underpinnings of the Rule are also suggested by the principle that not all factual findings are entitled to equal weight upon review: "The conclusiveness of a ‘finding of fact’ depends on the nature of the materials on which the finding is based,” Baumgartner, supra, 322 U.S. at 670-71 [ 64 S.Ct. at 1243 ,] and has less significance in what is "essentially a ‘paper case,' ” General Motors, supra, 384 U.S. at 141 n. 16 [, 86 S.Ct. at 1328 n. 16] (being accessible to resolution by a reviewing court). Nevertheless, the Rule superintending review of findings of fact is not wholly delimited by a functional perspective. For ‘‘[t]he same ‘clearly erroneous' standard applies to findings based on documentary evidence as to those based entirely on oral testimony, ... [even though] the presumption has lesser force in the former situation than in the latter, Bose, supra, 466 U.S. at 500 [, 104 S.Ct. at 1959 ] (emphasis supplied). Therefore, we know that "[t]he rationale fo”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Davis v. United States

2. “a standard of review embodies either or both the following considerations: (1) which judicial actor logically should be entrusted to be the primary decisionmaker about a particular issue, in light of conceptions about the nature and significance of that issue in our legal system, and (2) which forum is, as a purely practical matter, more likely to render the decision with the higher degree of accuracy. The first approach, which we call “analytical,” depends on an a priori categorization of the nature of the matter under review. The second approach, which we term “functional,” focuses instead on which court, original or reviewing, has the best access to the tools and materials necessary to deciding the matter in question. To be sure, the analytical and functional approaches are not unrelated. Indeed, what separates law and fact as analytical categories may, in actuality, reflect a recognition of divergent roles between an appellate court and trial court. In other words, questions that analytically would most likely be regarded as questions of fact are ordinarily those that can be answered by hearing testimony — a function in which only trial courts engage. On the other hand, questions that are regarded quintessentially as questions of law are precisely those to be resolved through reasoning, comparison with like cases, and review of a trial court record — tasks that the appellate court is principally designed to undertake.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Davis v. United States

3. “Felder, through [Public Defender Service] counsel, in urging us to use a deferential measure of review referred to Judge Walton as an experienced trial judge. Indeed, Judge Walton's experience in the criminal law is broad, deep, and often insightful. We think the best tribute we can give to Judge Walton, is to hold, as we do, after our de novo review of the question, that his ruling was eminently correct.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Belton v. United States