United States v. Blixt’s Empirical Analysis
548 F.3d 882 · 2008
Citation profile
10 federal appellate ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently December 2023 · most notably LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka (2009), United States v. Ali (2010)
10 federal appellate ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998) · 18 U.S.C. § 1028A · 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002) · 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004) · 18 U.S.C. § 3553 · 28 U.S.C. § 1291
Relies on Neder v. United States · United States v. Carty · Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons · John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States · United States v. Halbert
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual, including any— (A) name, social security number, date of birth, official State or government issued driver’s license or identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number; (B) unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation; (C) unique electronic identification number, address, or routing code; or (D) telecommunication identifying information or access device.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[Defendant] contends that, because the statutory definition of “access device” excludes “transfer^] originated solely by paper instrument,” the conduct of falsifying a signature on a stolen check and cashing the check does not constitute the knowing transfer, possession, or use, without lawful authority, of “a means of identification of another person.” The flaw in [Defendant’s] argument is that an “access device” is only one of several items that Congress listed, in the disjunctive, as a “means of identification.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (d)(7). Thus, simply failing to satisfy the definition of “access device” does not end the analysis with respect to whether a signature on a stolen check is a “means of identification.” Any name that may be used to identify a specific individual, including the individual’s “name,” will satisfy the definition of “means of identification,” even if it does not satisfy the definition of “access device.” Id. As the signature of an individual’s name specifically identifies that individual, we conclude that forging another’s signature constitutes the use of a “means of identification.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“includes the use of a name, alone or in conjunction with any other information, as constituting the use of a means of identification so long as the information taken as a whole identifies a specific individual. There is nothing in the language of the statute that suggests the use of another’s name in the form of a signature is somehow excluded from the definition of “means of identification.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.