¶1(specially concurring).
¶2I concur in the reversal of the conviction but inasmuch as the failure to provide a speedy trial results in a complete disposition of the case consider it unnecessary and therefore inappropriate for the opinion to go into the intricacies of what instruction should be given on specific intent. However important that question may be to the jurisprudence of our state, and without in any way denigrating the conclusions reached by the majority, I am of the opinion that we should adhere to the general rule recognized by this court in denying rehearing in Chicago and North Western Railway Co. v. Town of Riverton, 70 Wyo. 119, 127, 247 P.2d 660, 663 (1952) that
“ … It is true that this court will not pass upon moot questions, nor, generally upon questions not necessary to be decided, and which are not likely to arise again in the further proceedings in the case." (Emphasis supplied)
¶3While the original opinion in that case did-'' pass upon a question which was not necessary for the disposition of the immediate appeal, it is clear that this was because if “we should not decide it, it is bound to arise again, and would, it would seem, require another appeal. In such a case it is our right, if it is not our duty, to decide the question.” Id.
¶4To me, this means that the court in reversing a judgment on one ground may and should properly consider other assignments of error which are pertinent to the retrial of the particular case then at issue, thus perhaps obviating the necessity of a new appeal. I subscribe to that philosophy and would on a proper occasion join in any opinion that does that. But the mere fact that an issue is important and may, or probably will, arise in some future case does not to my way of thinking present a proper excuse for a proper exercise of the judicial review. I ask myself why, if in this case it is proper to consider the matter of specific intent, was it not also proper to consider the questions of arrest, search and seizure, and delay in bringing the defendants before a magistrate, all of which were raised and argued in the briefs and oral argument.
¶5I realize that this represents a policy question for the court, and I do not wish to raise any question as to the future weight or authority that will be accorded such expressions, but I do not want my concurrence in the reversal of the conviction to indicate either an agreement or disagreement with the views expressed in the majority opinion. Conceding that the question has been properly presented in this case, I would nevertheless wait for a case where the question was not only properly presented but was necessary for the disposition thereof. Otherwise it seems to me that we are issuing or not issuing opinions on important points of law merely as a majority of the court may at that particular time consider them of future importance. To me, this amounts to the issuance of advisory opinions, a procedure that we *887ordinarily reject. See West v. Willey, Wyo., 453 P.2d 883 (1969); Brimmer v. Thomson, Wyo., 521 P.2d 574 (1974); and Cranston v. Thomson, Wyo., 530 P.2d 726 (1975).
¶6GUTHRIE, C. J., concurs in the concurring opinion of McCLINTOCK, J.