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← 55 KAN 367 - Lynch v. Chase

Lynch v. Chase’s Empirical Analysis

1895

Citation profile

41
cited by 41 later decisions
10
states following
July 1991
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 38 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 41 later decisions — most recently July 1991 · most notably Taylor v. Beckham (1900), Leek v. Theis (1975)

1 federal appellate · 38 state decisions — followed in 10 states

10018951900191019201930194019501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Donahue v. County of Will · Conner v. . the Mayor, C. of New York · Wright v. Defrees · State v. McGarry · Keenan v. Perry

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"It is not necessary that the title should be an abstract of the entire act, but it is deemed to be sufficient if the title fairly indicates, though in general terms, its scope and purposes. Everything connected with the main purpose and reasonably adapted to secure the objects indicated by the title may be embraced in the act, without violating the constitutional inhibition.””
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Although the power to hear and determine is of a judicial nature, it is such a power as is frequently conferred on executive and administrative officers. It does not follow that, because the Governor or other functionary hears, considers, and decides, he performs a judicial function which belongs exclusively to a judicial officer or tribunal. . . . An officer is the mere agent of the publiq, who, by virtue of his election or appointment, acquires the right to exercise the functions of the office, and receive the prescribed compensation, until the end of his term, or until such time as there may be a resignation or forfeiture of and removal from the office in the manner provided by law. . . . The decided weight of authority is that, while the proceeding to remove from office for cause involves the examination of facts and the exercise of judgment and discretion by the executive officer, his action is not judicial in the sense that it belongs exclusively to the courts.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““As the committee does not constitute a court, and as the incidents and common-law rights of a court trial are not required, the objections made in regard to certain informalities and irregularities are unavailing. . . . The evidence was heard and considered by a tribunal created for that purpose, and the duty of determining its sufficiency belongs to that tribunal, and not to the court. Testimony was offered to sustain and refute the charges, and the weight and sufficiency of that testimony, as well as. the fact of whether cause was shown, were concluded by the determination of the committee and the action of the governor.” (Lynch v. Chase, 55 Kan. 378, 40 Pac. 669 .)”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.