Volume 55 — Maryland Reports

<p> When a Sale of Mortgaged premises will he set aside on account of Inadequacy of Price and Injurious Representations hy the Mortgagee. </p> <p>"Where it appeared from the testimony taken under exceptions to the ratification of an attorney’s sale of mortgaged property under a power contained in the mortgage, that the property, which sold for $4550, was worth largely over $6000, and that at least one bona fide bidder, willing, able and anxious to buy, and who would have bid a much larger sum than that at which the properly sold, was kept away from the sale by the direct agency of the mortgagee’s president, and in consequence of representations and an agreement which he made, but which he afterwards failed to carry out, it was Held :</p> <p>That the sale should be vacated and a new one made.</p>

<p>Trespass on a Burial Lot — Punitive Damages.</p> <p>An action of trespass quare clausum fregit can be maintained for breaking and entering a burial lot; the trespass complained of being the digging a grave in the lot and burying therein the covpse of a child without the consent of the plaintiff, who had acquired the privilege and right to make interments in the lot to the exclusion of others, so long as the ground belonging to a society of which the plaintiff was a member, (in which ground was the lot purchased by the plaintiff,) remained a cemetery; and which right or privilege had not been forfeited or lost at the time the action was brought, though the plaintiff had withdrawn from the society, which was subsequently incorporated by the Act of 1867, ch. 343.</p> <p>There being evidence before the jury from which they could find that the defendant was actuated by malice in committing the trespass, the plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages.</p>

<p>Evidence in a Trial for Murder — Gruber's Almanac.</p> <p>The State, in a trial of M. for murder, proved by K., that W., the alleged deceased, left K’s house where W. was making his home, on Tuesday morning, August 5th, 1879, and proceeded up the public road towards Emmittsburg; that on the Sunday following W. not having made his appearance, K. went to the house of R., where M. was then staying, and inquired of M. whether he had seen anything of W.; that M. said he saw him on Tuesday, talked with him on the hill, when he left, saying he was going to Tom Shorb’s and from there to town, and that he, M., then went to Motter’s Station; that on Tuesday, the 19th, W’s body was found buried in Myers’ woods, with a wound in the back of the neck, two holes close together, as though both barrels of a gun had been fired at once into the neck, and the face was torn away; that about sixteen feet from the grave was a small ravine, which presented marks and the appearance of having been first used for the burial of the body; that there were leaves in it, and leaves had been raked out. The State then proved by S. that on the afternoon of August 4th, he saw M. in Knode’s woods sitting near the road; that he went to him and talked with him, and he asked S. if S. had seen anything of W. S. replied no, and said, why don’t you go to the house; to which M. replied, I am not going there, Sarah, (meaning K’s wife, and W’s sister,) makes such a fuss; she knows my business better than I do; that a short time afterwards M. met S. near the barn on Kane’s place, and asked S. if he was going to Zacharia’s, and they then went together as far as Tom’s creek; on the way they had some talk about the gun M. was carrying; M. shot a squirrel with the left hand barrel of the gun, reloaded it and remarked, that he kept the right hand barrel for long range, it shot better. Upon cross-examination, S. was asked whether on Monday, the 11th, before W’s body was found, he had in a conversation with one <3., in the public road, near the house of J. McC., told <3. that W. had been murdered and buried under leaves in Myers’ woods, and that his head had been mashed in. The State objected and the Court below refused to allow the question to be answered. On exceptions by M., it was Held :</p> <p>That the objection was properly sustained.</p> <p>The State offered in evidence “ Gruber’s. Almanac for 1879,” for the purpose of proving at what hour the moon rose on the night of Saturday, August 9th, 1879, but M. objected to the admissibility of the almanac for said purpose. The Court below overruled the objection, and allowed the almanac to be offered in evidence. On exceptions by M., it was Held :</p> <p>That the evidence was admissible.</p> <p>The State proved by F. that he was a witness at the coroner’s inquest on August 13th, 1879; that, after all the witnesses had testified, M. was brought in and was told that if he desired it he could have the witnesses re-called; that the testimony of those who had been sworn was read over to M., and that, when that of F. was read over, to the effect that he had seen M. at Motter’s Station on August 5th, between 10.30 and 11 A. M., M. turned to F. and said, I think you are mistaken about that, I was at the station about 9 o’clock that morning, and if you consult Mr. N., you will find that I am right, and I can prove that by H. R. and S. D. The State also proved by other witnesses, declarations of M. that he had arrived at Motter’s Station at 9 A. M., on August 5th. M. then called H. R., and asked him whether he had been a witness on the inquest, to which he replied yes, and then further asked him whether he had not testified, on that occasion, that he saw M. at Motter’s Station on the morning of August 5th, about 9 o’clock, offering to show that H. R. had, previously to the statements and declarations by M., told a brother-in-law of M. that he had seen M. at said station at that hour, which was mentioned to M. by the brother-in-law ; that this offer was made to show that the statement made by M. to F. was based upon the statement of H. R., and that H. R. was, in point of fact, mistaken about the time; the object being to rebut the charge that M. had attempted to set up an alibi, and to show that his mistake was the result of the error of H. R. The State objected, and the Court below refused to allow the question to be asked and answered, and the evidence to be offered. On exceptions by M., it was Held :</p> <p>That the objection was properly sustained.</p>

Appeals from the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County, in Equity.

The defendant in error was, in 1879, one of the officers of registration of the State of Maryland, duly appointed and qualified in and for the thirteenth election district of Baltimore County, and while such officer, he was in December, 1879, indicted in the Circuit Court for said county, for an alleged violation of sec. 12 of the Act of 1876, ch. 249.

The former appeal in these proceedings is reported in 52 Md., 582. After the cause was remanded, the final report of sales made hy Israel Reiff and John Horst, surviving trustees, was filed the 12th November, 1879, and on the 17th December, 1879, account No 2, mentioned in-the report in 52 Md., was re-stated, and also special auditor’s accounts, as per the instructions of the solicitor of Reiff and Horst as creditors, were stated.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. Exceptions. — At the trial it was admitted that the defendant was a corporation incorporated under the Act of 1868, ch. 471, the General Incorporation Law of the State of Maryland.

This case originated in the Baltimore City Court, and was' removed on affidavit of the plaintiff to the Circuit Court for Howard County; whence, on affidavit of the defendants, .it was removed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Allegany County.</p>

On the 30th of August, lS^T, the appellant applied to the Court below, for an injunction to restrain the appellee from-erecting obstructions on a strip of ground, which is described in the opinion of this Court, and that the appellee might be enjoined from interfering with the complainant’s ingress and egress over this strip of ground to and from his property. On the filing of the bill and exhibits the injunction was granted.

<p>Appeal from the Orphans’ Court of Washington County.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.</p>

<p>Pleading — Construction of Art. 38, sec. 1, and Art. 18, sec. 32, and Art. 57, sec. 12, of the Code.</p> <p>To an action on a sheriff’s bond for fees placed in his hands for collection by a former clerk of the Circuit Court for Allegany County, the defendants, among other pleas, pleaded that the sheriff was unable to collect the fees sued for by distress, execution or otherwise, on account of the plaintiff’s failure to make them out in a fair and clear manner, and in words at length as required by law; and that the said fees did not accrue within three years before the sheriff received the same. To these pleas the plaintiff demurred. Held :</p> <p>1st. That the plea first mentioned was not sufficient; and that a plea to this action should have alleged under Art. 38, sec. 1, and Art. 18, sec. 32, of the Code, that the sheriff was unable to collect the fees, because the persons against whom such fees were chargeable required the accounts to be made out in words at length, of which the plaintiff had notice, and that he had failed within a reasonable time to furnish such accounts as required by law.</p> <p>2nd. That the other plea would be good under Art. 57, sec. 12, in a suit against a fee debtor; but that as a plea to this action it was defective, as it should have averred not only that the fees did not accrue within three years, but that the parties against whom they were charged refused to pay the same, because they were barred by the statute.</p>

<p> Priority of a Judgment over Mechanics’ Liens in the Distribution of an Insolvent’s Estate. </p> <p>The appellee on the 3rd October, 1874, leased certain lots of ground in Baltimore to J., he contemplating the borrowing of money from the appellee to erect houses on the ground, and in pursuance of an agreement whereby the appellee was to advance from time to time money to him for the erection of the houses, J. did, at the time of accepting the lease, confess a judgment in favor of the ax>pellee for $4500 on terms, whereby the same was to be held as security for the re-payment of all moneys the appellee might advance to J. (not to exceed the amount of the judgment,) between its date and the 1st January, 1876. At the same time J. mortgaged the ground to the appellee to secure the advances mentioned in the terms of the judgment. After the judgment had been entered up and the mortgage made, J. commenced the houses; and after the commencement of the houses the appellee in pursuance of the terms of the judgment, advanced to J. an amount exceeding $693. The appellants furnished materials for and about the erection of the houses, also for an amount exceeding $693, for which they filed liens against the property. On the distribution in insolvency of $693, proceeds from the sale by the trustee of J., an insolvent debtor, of the property leased to him by the appellee, it was Held :</p> <p>That the judgment to the appellee had priority over the mechanics’ liens filed by the appellants.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Washington County, in Equity.</p>

<p>Writ of Error on Judgment quashing an Indictment — Indictment for Receiving Stolen Goods — Contra Pacem — Common Law Offence — Punishment for Receiving Stolen Goods prescribed by the Code.</p> <p>A writ of error lies on a judgment quashing an indictment on demurrer, such judgment being a final judgment.</p> <p>The offence of receiving stolen goods is in this State, a misdemeanor. In such a case, it is not necessary to allege in the indictment that the property in question was feloniously received; nor need such indictment charge that the traverser received the stolen goods for the purpose of converting them to his own use.</p> <p>It is not necessary that the receiving should be lucri causa. If one receives stolen goods knowing them to be stolen, for the mere purpose of concealment without deriving any profit at all, or merely to assist or aid the thief, such a receiving is within the statute.</p> <p>But an indictment for receiving stolen goods, a common law offence, should charge that the same were unlawfully received.</p> <p>Where one is charged with a common law offence, the mere averment that it was done contra pacem, does not dispense with the necessity of setting out in proper terms, the circumstances necessary to constitute the alleged common law offence.</p> <p>In this State the Code merely prescribes the punishment for receiving stolen goods, and does not in any manner change the nature or character of the offence itself.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Criminal Court of Baltimore.</p>

<p>Acts of 1868, ch. 407, 1870, ch. 311 and 1872, ch. 377, relating to Public Education — Board of County School Commissioners, a Corporation — Suits should be brought in its Name — Injunction—Estoppel—Bill in behalf of Citizens.</p> <p>In 1869, J. was elected a member of the Board of County School Commissioners of Montgomery County, under the Act of 1868, ch. 407, and in 1872, 1874, 1876 and 1878, he was appointed a member of that Board by virtue of the Acts of 1870, ch. 811, and 1872, ch. 377, by the Judges of the Circuit Court for that County. He acted as president of the board for those years, till displaced by the appointment of some one else in his stead, as a member. A. was elected as the secretary, treasurer and examiner of the same board with J. in 1870, and appointed to that office in the same way and for the same years as J., and acted as such officer for those years, till displaced by the appointment of some one else in his stead. He never gave bond under his new appointments, but discharged the duties of the office. On a bill filed by J. and A. claiming to be respectively president, and secretary and examiner of the board, suing for themselves and in behalf of citizens of the county interested in the promotion of education, for an injunction against the board composed of the appellees appointed by the Judges in 1879, alleging the unconstitutionality of the Acts of 1870, ch. 331, and 1872, ch. 377, and claiming that the said J. and A. and the board elected in 1869, held over under the Act of 1868, ch. 407, it was Held :</p> <p>1st. That the Board of County School Commissioners being a corporation under the Acts relating to Public Education, suit could only be brought in its name.</p> <p>2nd. That J. and A. were equally estopped from repudiating the authority and title under which they acted after their appointment under the Acts of 1870 and 1872, and from setting up independent and paramount titles to their offices by reason of their election in 1869.</p> <p>3rd. That as parts of and as representing the community at large of the county, they were not entitled to the Courtis interposition.</p>

<p>Appeal — Receivers—Interlocutory Order of Sale — Code, Art. 5, sec. 21 — Injunction.</p> <p>The discharge of a receiver furnishes no ground of appeal. Nor does the rescission of an interlocutory order of sale, which determined no right.</p> <p>An appeal will lie, under Art. 5, sec. 21, of the Code, from an order directing a sale, but not from an order refusing to authorize a sale before final decree, or from an order suspending or rescinding an interlocutory order of sale.</p> <p>Where one creditor cannot be injured by the dissolution of an injunction granted on the filing of a bill by creditors against a corporation, and its continuance would defeat the plans for the re-organization of the corporation entered into by the creditors, and would be inconsistent with previous orders in the cause, there is no equity that would justify the Court in maintaining the injunction at the sole instance of one creditor as against all the other creditors, as well as the corporation.</p>

<p>Construction of the Act of 1878, ch. 192 — Injunction.</p> <p>Under the Act of 1878, ch. 193, entitled, an Act to enlarge the powers of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company in Maryland, the appellant had the power, upon complying with the requirements of that Act, to construct its road across the Potomac Wharf Branch of the Cumberland and Pennsylvania Railroad, on the west side of Wills’ Creek, and then to cross over the creek to its east side. But as the appellant was not justified in making its crossing over the Potomac Wharf Branch forcibly, and against the consent of the appellees, without a written agreement between them conferring the easement on the appellant, which agreement was not executed', the appellees were entitled to an injunction restraining the appellant from using said crossing over the Potomac Wharf Branch.</p>

<p>Liability of a Bankrupt for a Debt due by him as Executor— Eiduciary Debts — Remedy of a Surety on such Executor’s Bond against whom judgment has been obtained and paid, by Action of Indebitatus Assumpsit against the Brincipal Debtor — Remedy on the Bond in Equity — Construction of the TJ. S. Bankrupt Act, and of Art. 9 of the Code.</p> <p>Suit was brought on the bond of 0., as executor of H., to recover an amount claimed to be due the equitable plaintiff as legatee under H’s will. Shortly after suit brought, O. was adjudged a bankrupt, and among other claims proved against the estate was that sued on. Subsequently the Court below directed a stay as against C. pending the proceedings in bankruptcy. The suit was entered to the use of M. E. H., and judgment recovered against the sureties on the bond. The amount recovered was paid by W., one of the sureties, and the equitable plaintiff’s assignee assigned the judgment and cause of action to W. On motion of the plaintiff the suit was brought forward and the stay as to C. stricken out. Pleas were filed by 0., to some of which the plaintiff demurred, and upon others issues were joined. Held:</p> <p>1st. That C’s discharge in bankruptcy did not release him from liability for the debt due by him as executor to the equitable plaintiff as legatee.</p> <p>2nd. That neither at common law nor under Art. 9 of the Code, could ~W. maintain an action on the bond against C. to recover the money paid by him, as the payment operated at law as an extinguishment of the bond; that his remedy at law was an action of indebitatus assumpsit against B. for money paid to Ms use.</p> <p>3rd. That in equity the payment by W. did not operate as a satisfaction or extinguishment of the bond, and that by such payment W. was entitled in equity to be subrogated to all the rights and remedies and securities which the plaintiff as creditor held against C.</p> <p>The fact that money due to a cestui que trust is allowed to remain in a trustee’s hands with the consent of the cestui que trust, does not change the nature of the debt itself. It still remains a debt due by the trustee in his character as trustee.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. Exception. — At the trial of the case before the Court without a jury, the plaintiff offered four prayers, and the defendant, two. The substance of these prayers with their modifications is stated in the opinion, and also the instruction given by the Court below (Miller and Hammond, J.) in lieu of the plaintiff’s first prayer.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. Exception. — At the trial, the plaintiff offered three prayers, which were rejected by the Court below, (Hayden, J.,) and which need not he set out; the defendant offered one prayer which was granted, and which is stated in the opinion.

<p>Acts of a Trustee without Order of Court — Right of Trustees to maintain a Suit without Order of Court, first obtained— Setting Aside a Release of Mortgage — Breach of Trust.</p> <p>By an order of the Superior Court of Baltimore City, passed in a cause in equity the 8th February, 1869, E. W. B. who had, in September, 1863, been duly appointed trustee therein, was authorized to loan to W. G. R. the husband of B., one of the eestuis que trust, $13,000, of the trust fund of said cause, secured by the bond of W. G. R. and Mrs. S. C. R., and a mortgage of a farm in Baltimore County. On the 33rd December, 1869, E. W. B., trustee, without order of or report to the Court, and without its approval, released the mortgage of the farm, and on the same day took in lieu thereof to secure the same loan, a mortgage from Mrs. S. C. R. of another tract of land in said county. On the 38th April, 1870, E. W. B., trustee, without order of or report to the Court, and without its approval, united with Mrs. S. C. R. in executing a deed to P., conveying to him a part of the tract of land included in the mortgage last mentioned in consideration of $5036.88, paid by P. but not to the trustee, thereby releasing from the mortgage the parcel so conveyed. On the 6th January, 1871, this parcel was, for a valuable consideration, conveyed by P. and wife to A. In November, 1871, Mrs. S. C. R. made a deed of trust of all her property for the benefit of her creditors. Her estate paid a very small dividend. W. G. R. died insolvent in February, 1878. After the death of E. W. B. in October, 1877, F. J. B. and the late F. W. B. were by order of the Superior Court, appointed trustees in E. W. B’s stead. Default having been made in paying the interest on the loan, and in paying the principal, after due notice, the new trustees proceeded under the power contained in the mortgage of the 33rd December, 1869, to sell all such part of the tract of land as remained unreleased. The sale was duly reported to and ratified by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The proceeds Horn the sale were $5306, leaving a balance still due the trustees of $8614.43, with interest from the day of sale, the 30th April, 1878. On the 17th May, 1878, without authority from the Superior Court, for that purpose first obtained, the trustees filed their bill in the Circuit Court for Baltimore-County, to set aside the release executed by E. W. B., late trustee, to P., and to obtain a decree for the sale of the parcel of the land (not worth more than than the balance due,) conveyed by P. and wife to A., for the purpose of satisfying the said balance. Held :</p> <p>1st. That the trustees had authority to institute the suit; and that the Circuit Court for Baltimore County had jurisdiction.</p> <p>2nd. That they were entitled to the relief prayed.</p>

<p>Credibility of Evidence — Aclenoioledgment of a Mortgage before a Justice of the Peace, repudiated by the Mortgagors and affirmed by the Justice who to ole it.</p> <p>Where, in a proceeding to obtain an injunction against the sale of mortgaged premises under a decree, on the ground that the mortgage, though regular on its face, was not acknowledged as it purported to be before a justice of the peace, and the justice being examined as a witness, and looking at the original mortgage filed in the case, identified his signature as a witness and said, he saw each of the parties sign the same, and identifying his signature as a justice of the peace to the certificate endorsed on the mortgage, said he took the acknowledgment of the mortgagors, husband and wife, at their house on a certain street, naming it, and the mortgagors denied that the justice was ever at their house, and the mother of the wife corroborated, them, credit should be given to the justice, rather than to those who would repudiate their own acts.</p>

<p> Bill to Reform a Policy of Fire Insurance. </p> <p>The appellant by its agent S. underwrote for B. a policy insuring against fire certain buildings and property in Cumberland, to the ' amount of $2500. The property being destroyed by fire the appellant refused to pay the insurance, alleging non-compliance by the assured with the following condition of the policy: “ If the interest of the assured in the property be any other than the entire, unconditional and sole ownership of the property, for the use and benefit of the assured, or if the building insured stands on leased ground, it must be so represented to the company, and so expressed in the written part of the policy, otherwise the policy shall be void.” The following condition was also in the policy: “ If the interest of the assured in the property, whether as owner, trustee, consignee, factor, agent, mortgagee, lessee or otherwise, be not truly stated in the policy, then and in every such case the policy shall be void.” The property was insured as K’s property; but before the time the the policy was written, B. having borrowed $6000 from H., had, instead of a mortgage, created a ground rent in his favor of $420 per annum, redeemable on payment of the sum advanced, being in effect a lease for ninety-nine years. This fact was not written on the policy. B. sued at law; and the Court having decided, that he could not maintain his action on the policy unless H’s interest was described in it, he dismissed his suit at law and' filed a bill in equity to reform the policy, on the ground that the statement of the existence of an incumbrance on the property and the real interest of the parties intended to be insured was omitted by the inadvertence and mistake of S. agent of the appellant, and of J., B’s agent, to whom, the bill alleged, the nature of H’s interest was known. In their testimony S. and J. both denied all knowledge of H’s interest. Held :</p> <p>That the relief prayed could not be granted.</p>

Henry A. Turner, a resident of Charles County in 1819, raised a crop of tobacco ; of this crop he packed one hogshead, marked the same with his full name and place of residence and shipped it to Baltimore. On 31st August, 1880, this hogshead was exported by him to Bremen, never having been taken to the State tobacco warehouse.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. Exceptions. — At the trial the plaintiffs offered one prayer and the defendant offered two prayers: the substance of these prayers is stated in the opinion. The Court (Brown, J.,) granted the plaintiffs’ prayer and refused the defendant’s prayers; the defendant excepted, and the verdict and judgment being for the plaintiffs, the defendant appealed.

<p>Jurisdiction of the Orphans’ Court to enquire into Administration Accounts — Laches—Distribution—Code, Art. 93, secs. 138-113 and 230-231.</p> <p>So long as assets can be found which properly belong to the estate of a decedent which have not been brought in and accounted for, the estate is not fully closed, and the Orphans’ Court on proper application has jurisdiction to compel a surviving executor to return such assets, or recover them when they can be recovered, even where an account, called final, had been passed and some fourteen years had elajised since such account.</p> <p>The Orphans’ Court has jurisdiction to correct an account within a reasonable time, which depends upon the peculiar circumstances of each case and the character of the correction to be made.</p> <p>Where the petitioner to the Orphans’ Court to have the accounts of a surviving executor enquired into, fourteen years after the passage of a final account, was a married woman when the accounts were passed and distribution made, no laches can be imputed to her in respect to the time of her petition filed within fifteen months after becoming a widow.</p> <p>To make a distribution an entire protection to an executor or administrator, it is necessary that such action be taken and such notice be given as the Code, Art. 93, secs. 138-143, provides to justify the Orphans’ Court in making it.</p> <p>The Orphans’ Court under Art. 93, secs. 230-231, of the Code, has authority on application, to determine who are the next of kin, for the purposes of distribution.</p>

<p>Appeal from tbe Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. By the deed from Clarke to Foos in December, 1878, therein mentioned, Clarke granted, bargained, sold, assigned, transferred, set over, quit-claimed and released, unto the said Foos, his executors, administrators and assigns, all the right, title and interest which he, the said Clarke, might have in and to the lot and premises described in the deed of August, 1851, from Clarke to Robinson set out in the opinion.

<p>Charge on a Wife’s Separate Estate — Notice.</p> <p>In 1866, real estate belonging to H., was sold to H’s wife by the sheriff under a fi. fa., issued on a judgment against H. and a deed duly executed by the sheriff to H’s wife. Afterwards, H. mortgaged the same property to C., trustee for H’s wife, to secure to her money derived from her father’s estate and borrowed by H. In 1875, C., as trustee for H’s wife, and H. conveyed as grantors, the same property by way of mortgage to a building association to secure payment of money loaned to H’s wife. This instrument containing the usual mortgage conditions and covenants on the part of H’s wife, was signed, sealed and acknowledged by C., H’s wife and H. and duly sworn to and recorded. In proceedings by the building association to sell the property described in the alleged mortgage, it was Held:</p> <p>That this instrument constituted in equity'a charge upon H’s wife’s . estate; and-that the building association was entitled to enforce the mortgage, against the property.</p> <p>A second mortgagee with actual notice of a first mortgage is not in a position to question the equities of the first mortgagee.</p>

The case is stated iu the opinion of the Court. Exceptions. — At the trial the plaintiff took four exceptions, which are substantially stated in the opinion. The evidence being all in, the plaintiff offered the following prayers: 1.

The former appeal in .this case is reported in 51 Md., 162. The subsequent proceedings are stated in the opinion. The judgment entered in the Court below was “for the plaintiffs for $ 1053.83, with interest thereon from date until paid, and costs” on a verdict “for the plaintiffs for |1053.83.”

Appeals from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. Joseph C. and Samuel Merritt owned the land on Wolfe street, oh which the four houses mentioned in the opinion of the Court were afterwards erected. They entered into two agreements with John W. Phillips, both dated the 13th December, lSII.

The appellee instituted this suit to recover from the appellants for work done and materials furnished by him as a plumber and gas fitter, at their request and by their order and direction. The record in this case shows that Michael Roche, a builder, in 1877, executed to the appellants a deed in trust of all his estate and property for the benefit of his creditors.

The appellee was indicted in the Circuit Court for Cecil county for assaulting one Samuel L. Welde with intent to murder. He made a suggestion and affidavit that he could not have a fair and impartial trial in that Court, and thereupon his case was removed to the Circuit Court for Harford .County. In the Court last named, he filed five pleas to the indictment.

<p>Practice in Criminal Cases — Bule 1, of the Court of Appeals— Appeal under the Act of 1872, ch. 316 — Finding of Facts under an Issue raised on a Plea in Abatement — A Plea in Abatement without Affidavit, a Nullity — Making up the Panel — Admissibility of Evidence — Act of 1872, ch. 329, relating to Defaulters — Art. 21, of the Declaration of Bights— Challenge of Juror — Objection to the Panel as made up.</p> <p>Where there was a demurrer to an indictment which was overruled, and after verdict of guilty, a motion in arrest of judgment, also overruled, and the traverser appealed under the Act of 1872, ch. 816, there being no final judgment, those rulings cannot be reviewed (not being brought into this Court as provided by Rule 1,) but only what is presented by the exceptions as allowed under the Act.</p> <p>After the demurrer to an indictment had been overruled by the Court below, the traverser pleaded in abatement (not verified by affidavit,) that the grand jury by whom the indictment was found, had not been legally drawn, and was therefore not lawfully constituted, setting forth the particulars. The plea was traversed by the State, and the issue of fact tried before the Court. Evidence was offered in support of the averments, set out in an exception on an appeal by the traverser under the Act of 1872, ch. 316, but on the trial of that particular issue, no question appeared to be raised as to the admissibility of evidence or any distinct proposition of law made on which the Court was required to rule, there was no statement of facts in the record as having been found by the Court, but at the close of the evidence as set out in the exception, it is stated, the Court overruled the plea in abatement, and decided that the grand jury drawn from the box mentioned by a witness was legally constituted, and that the traverser should plead to the indictment. Held :</p> <p>1st. That it was not the function of this Court to review the evidence contained in the exception, and find the facts that may have been the basis of the rulings of the Court below, and that it could not therefore review the rulings, there being no special finding of the facts spread upon the record, either in the form of a special verdict, or a special finding by the Judge.</p> <p>2nd. That the plea in abatement, being a mere nullity for want of affidavit, was properly overruled.</p> <p>It is no ground of objection by a traverser that the persons drawn or summoned as jurors or talesmen were not called to the book in the order in which their names appear in the list, or the order in which they may have been drawn or summoned. It has been the uniform practice of the Courts of this State, to proceed to make up and swear the panel from such jurors or talesmen, as have been found attending the Court, without waiting for or directing process against others, who may have failed to attend, and whose names may have been first drawn, or who may have been first summoned.</p> <p>At the trial of the traverser on an indictment as a defaulter to the State, under the Act of 1872, ch. 329, the State offered to prove by a former clerk to the Commissioners, an entry on a ledger or book that had been kept by him as such clerk, showing the amount of State taxes that had been levied and placed in the hands of the traverser, as collector for 1878; and then proposed to ask the witness whether the taxes mentioned in the entry were placed in the hands of the traverser for collection, to this offer the traverser objected, and proved by the witness that he had made out and delivered to the traverser, as collector, a book containing items of the State taxes for that year, and that the delivery of the book was all that was done in the matter of placing the taxes, mentioned in the entry, in the hands of the traverser for collection; and further, that there was no special written order of the Commissioners, directing the placing of the taxes in the hands of the traverser. Held :</p> <p>That the objection was properly overruled, and that the evidence was admissible.</p> <p>By the Act of 1872, ch. 329, relating to defaulters, the certificate of the comptroller of the State, attached to the statement of the account of a person indicted under that Act, showing the amount for which he was in default as collector of State taxes, is admissible as prima facie evidence in his prosecution for such defalcation; and the admissibility of such evidence does not contravene the Declaration of Rights, Art. 21, which is not to be understood as excluding all other evidence except oral evidence of witnesses produced in Court.</p> <p>At the trial of the traverser on an indictment as a defaulter under the Act of 1872, ch. 329, in not paying over county taxes, in the course of empanelling the jury, a talesman was called to the book and sworn on his voir dire, and was asked whether he had formed or expressed an opinion, as to the guilt or innocence of the traverser; to which he replied, that he had not, that his sympathies were with the traverser, but his prejudices were against him; and he did not think himself an impartial juror. The traverser, without requesting the' juror to be further interrogated, objected to his being sworn, but the objection was overruled, and the traverser then peremptorily challenged the juror. The empanelling of the jury then proceeded, and after the traverser had exhausted his twenty peremptory challenges, another talesman was called, who had been drawn in an earlier stage of the proceeding, but who did not appear to be sworn until after the traverser had exhausted his challenges. This latter talesman was sworn, against the objection of the traverser. It does not appear that the traverser offered to challenge this last juror sworn, or that he was in any manner objectionable to him as a juror, or that he would have challenged him if his peremptory challenges had not been exhausted. The objection made was not to the particular juror, but, as stated in the exception, to the panel as made up; and the Court below having overruled the objection, the traverser excepted. Held :</p> <p>That the objection was properly overruled.</p>

This was a proceeding in equity, on the part of the appellee, to obtain a construction of the will, and codicil thereto, of Dr. H. Willis Baxley, late of the City of Baltimore, who died in that city on the 13fch of March, 18*76, having executed the testamentary papers in controversy.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Carroll County.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The cross-interrogatory to the appellee, alluded to in the opinion, was as follows: Have you paid State and City taxes for 1876, 1877 and 1878, on the property in question? Ans. No, sir. The exceptant objected to this cross-interrogatory, because, as he alleged, there was no proof that the taxes therein referred to were due and payable.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. Exception. — At the trial the plaintiffs offered three 'prayers, none of which is it necessary to set forth. The defendant offered thirteen prayers, of which the following only need he stated : 9.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The bond of conveyance therein mentioned was executed on the 1st September, 1877; the proceedings on their vendor's lien were instituted by the Mandersons on the 27th February, 1880. Eobinson obtained his judgment on the 12th February, 1880.

<p>Personal Responsibility of Directors of a Corporation — Transactions between Corporations where Directors in the one are Directors in the other — Form of 'Proceeding on the part of Stockholders to call Directors to an Account — Evidence— Powers of a Corporation — An absolute Bill of Sale intended as a Mortgage.</p> <p>In proceedings in equity by shareholders, of the stock of a corporation, for the purpose of. obtaining redress for what was alleged in the bill, to have been their loss in the value 0_fth.eirj3kares.Qf stock, by reason of certain wilful and fraudulent mismanagement of the affairs of .the corporation by spme.of its directors.,. (against .whom and the corporation .itself, and^another corporation, of which they were also_directors, and in whose interest it was alleged, they had so acted, the bill was filed) — to accomplish objects and purposes adverse to the interest of the stockholders of the corporation first mentioned, it was Held :</p> <p>That to render the directors personally liable for alleged injuries occasioned by conduct wilfully fraudulent, in intent and purpose, amounting to breaches of trust, the proof in support of the allegations must be other than mere constructive fraud or breaches of trust; that” there must be affirmative proof of the misconduct charged, going to establish the fraud in fact.</p> <p>In equity, directors of a corporation are personally liable for the consequences of frauds or malfeasance they may be guilty of, or for such gross negligence as may amount to a breach of trust, to the damage of the corporation or its stockholders; but they are not liable for the consequences of unwise or indiscreet management, if their conduct is entirely due to mere default or mistakes of judgment. And the onus of proof of fraud, combination or gross negligence, to render directors personally liable, is upon the party making the charges; which must be distinctly made, and fully supported by proof.</p> <p>There is no legal presumption of illegality or unfairness, in transactions between two corporations, from the mere fact, that a portion of the board of directors in the one company' constitute a part of the board" of directors in the other at the same time, and participated in the dealings between the two corporations. It is only when their dealings are shown to be prejudicial to the one or other of the corporations represented by them, that their conduct will be subject to a strict and severe scrutiny by the Courts.</p> <p>The corporation is the proper and primary party to call the directors to an account in a Court of equity for fraud or breaches of trust in the management of its affairs. To enable a shareholder, either for himself alone,' ór for himself and others, to maintain a bill against directors for such fraud or breaches of trust, lie must allege and show noirSnly the violations of duty or breaches of trust on the part of the directors, but that he as stockholder has been damnified thereby, and that the corporation has failed or refused to take the proper legal steps for the redress of the wrong. But if on a bill filed by stockholders, the proof should sustain its allegations, that a majority "of the shares of the corporation are owned by another alleged rival company, and that a majority of the directors of the - alleged fraudulently managed corporation are adverse to the interest of the complainants, and are combined against them, and would by means of the control that they exercise, frustrate and defeat any attempt to induce the corporation to take action for the redress of the wrongs alleged; such facts would be a sufficient excuse for not making or alleging a formal demand upon the corporation to take action, especially where the rival company and the alleged fraudulently managed corporation are both made defendants.</p> <p>A corporation may invest in the .stock of other corporations as well as in any other funds, provided it be done tona fide and with no sinister or unlawful purpose, and there be nothing in its charter or in the nature of its business that forbids it.</p> <p>Corporations, like individuals, may borrow money for the conduct of their affairs, without express authority therefor, whenever the nature of their business may render it proper or expedient. And the power to borrow carries with it very generally, unless expressly restrained, the power to secure the loan by mortgage. If there is no such exj)ress'’pq\vfir found in the charter of a corporation, but power is conferred onjts directors to make all necessary contracts, and to sell" or'otherwise dispose of any portion of its property whenever in their judgment, it should be found to be to the interest of the company, the exercise of the power to borrow and to secure the loan by mortgage from the company would be valid.</p> <p>Tn equity, where it appears that while a transaction was made to assume the form of an absolute bill of sale, it was in substance, and according to the understanding and intent of the parties, a mere loan of money, and that the instrument taken, being an absolute bill of sale, was but as security, and therefore a mortgage, any evidence, whethm-"wrIEieñ or oral, tending to show that the transaction was really' oiie'óFsecurity is admissible, not for the purpose of contradicting'the terms of the instrument, but of raising an equity paramount to the mere form of the instrument.</p>

By an order of the Court below, dated the 25th February, 18T0, the appellants wére appointed trustees of the estate of Mrs. Emily L. Dimmock, deceased, acquired under the will of her mother, Mrs. Juliet A. Moale, deceased, in the place and stead of the trustees named in the will, and “with the same rights, powers and duties as were bestowed and imposed on the trustees under the will, and with the satae allowance to them for commissions on receipts and collections, and also…

<p>Taxation of Property in Ships — Constitution of the United States — Limitations—1861, eh. 94, and Art. 81, see. 92, of the Code — 1874, eh. 483, see. 82.</p> <p>The interest of a citizen of Maryland, and resident of Baltimore, as. part owner of vessels employed in foreign commerce, registered as vessels of the United States in the office of the Collector of Customs at Baltimore, the home port of the vessels, and the domicil and usual place of residence of their acting and inanaging owners, is liable for annual taxes levied on it for municipal purposes by the authorities of that city; and such taxation does not contravene the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>An action of assumpsit by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore against a delinquent tax-payer, to recover unpaid taxes, is withdrawn from the operation of Art. 57, sec. 1, of the Code, relating to Limitations, by the Act of 1861, ch. 94, which extended the period for the collection of taxes levied in that city, from three to four years. Sec. 92 of Art. 81 of the Code, which required the collection of taxes within three years, (extended to four years by the-Act of 1874, ch. 488, sec 82,) did not apply to the City of Baltimore.</p>

<p>Peremptory Challenges — 1872, ch. 40 — Evidence—1864, ch. 109, and 1876, ch. 357.</p> <p>At the trial of the appellant for murder, one of the panel of jurors was called, and being sworn and examined upon his voir dire, it was determined by the Court that he was an impartial juror; the prisoner then moved the Court to require the State’ to exercise its right of peremptory challenge before he should be required to exercise that right. But the Court overruled the motion, and in conformity to its uniform practice required the prisoner to exercise his right of peremptory challenge before the State was called on to exercise its right. Whereupon the prisoner excepted. Heed :</p> <p>That this ruling furnished no cause for reversal.</p> <p>The Act of 1872, ch. 40, relating to peremptory challenges, does not prescribe the order in which challenges shall be made, or direct whether the State or the prisoner shall first exercise the right. It would seem, therefore, that the course of proceeding in this respect is left to the discretion of the Circuit Court. It appears, that the practice in the circuits has not been uniform, while in several of them the practice has been to require the State to challenge first, in the City of Baltimore, and in the first and fourth circuits a different rule has prevailed.</p> <p>Evidence offered by the defence on an indictment for murder, which was mere matter of inducement, and not part of the res gestae, and would be mere hearsay and immaterial to the issue in the cause, was properly excluded.</p> <p>Evidence offered by the defence on an indictment for murder, to the effect that the deceased prior to the homicide, threatened the defendant’s life is inadmissible, unless proof be first given that there was an overt act of attack, and that the defendant at the time of the collision, was in apparent imminent danger.</p> <p>On an indictment for murder, the prisoner’s wife was called for the defence, but was properly not permitted to testify. A wife has not been made competent in such a case by the Acts of 1864, ch. 109, and 1876, ch. 357.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The affidavit therein mentioned was made before a notary public and certified by him at Cincinnati, the place of residence of the plaintiffs.

Appeal for the Court of Common Pleas, on removal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. Exceptions. — At the trial the defendants took three exceptions, which are substantially stated in the opinion. The third exception contains the four prayers offered hy the defendants, which on being rejected hy the Court, (Brown, J.,) the defendants excepted, and the verdict and judgment being for the plaintiff, the .sureties appealed.

<p>Construction of the Act of 1S78, ch. 106, relating to Insurance Companies — Exemption from Taxation — An Investment in City Stock, a loan, and not a Purchase.</p> <p>An amount of gross premiums received in this State in 1879, by a foreign insurance company, doing business in this State under license, and invested in certificates of indebtedness of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, known as Water Stock, with the intention of holding the same for not less than two .years, was exempted from taxation by the 31st sec. of the Act of 1878, ch-106, relating to insurance companies.</p> <p>The purchase of certificates of Water Stock of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, is a loan, within the meaning of the Act of 1878, ch. 106, sec. 31.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, in Equity.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.</p>

<p>Marshalling of Securities — Right of Mortgagor to sell any of the Parcels of Real Pístate aliened subject to a Mortgage— Contribution when Mortgage Debt paid by One of the Purchasers of the Parcels.</p> <p>On the 15th December, 1874, O. L. H. and others conveyed to J. P. two leasehold lots in Baltimore City. On the same day J. P. mortgage both lots to O. L. EL to secure $2000. On the 28th December, 1874, J. P. sub-leased a part of the second lot to P. B. On the 14tb September, 1876, J. P. assigned all his interest in both lots to G.,. subject to the mortgage for $2000, and another mortgage of even date given by J. P. to a building association. On the 24th April, 1878, G. mortgaged the first lot to M. G. and L. G. to secure $1500. On the 5th November, 1878, G. assigned all his interest in both lots to B. P., subject to the mortgage for $2000. The mortgage to M. G. and L. G. was foreclosed, M. G. became the purchaser at $1150, and a deed for that lot was executed to him, on the 29th January, 1879, by the trustee who made the sale. At the time of sale, the trustee stated, that the lot was sold subject to the effect and operation of a first mortgage for $2000. It was afterwards shown that this lot was worth from $8000 to $3500. On the 10th February, 1879, C. L. EL assigned his mortgage on both lots and the mortgage note to D. On the llthFebruary, 1879, B. P. conveyed the second lot to P. B. Oh the 7th March, 1879, D. obtained a decree for the sale of all the mortgaged property described in the mortgage to O. L. EL, and a trustee was appointed to make the sale. After the property was advertised, M. G. offered to pay the mortgage debt if D. would assign the mortgage for $2000 to him. This offer D. and the trustee declined. On the 15th March, 1879, M. G. filed his bill against D., P. B. and the trustee, charging among other things, that he was entitled to an assignment of the mortgage and decree after paying the mortgage debt, and praying that if sold, the lots should be sold in the order designated in his bill, and that the sale of the property of M. G. under D’s decree should be enjoined until a sale of the other parts of said property should have first been made The Court ordered the two cases to be consolidated, and that, on payment into Court of the mortgage debt, interest and costs, the trustee be enjoined from making sale of the property. In this pro ceeding it was Held :</p> <p>1st. That all the purchasers of the two lots having bought subject to the mortgage for $2000, and the obligation of each to pay the mort gage forming part of the consideration of his purchase, they all stood upon equal footing and the mortgagee’s assignee D. had the right to sell any part he might think proper for the payment of his debt; and that the party whose property might be sold, had a right to a proceeding to compel contribution from the other purchasers.</p> <p>2nd. That M. G. had no right to an assignment of the mortgage and decree, on payment of the mortgage debt, interest and costs; but that such payment would entitle him to have contribution from the other parties, who had bought parts of the mortgaged premises-</p>

John Gavin died in 1861, leaving a widow and four •children, Michael, Mary, Margaret and John. In 1864, the widow, Mary Gavin, was appointed by the Orphans’ ■Court of Baltimore City, administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, and on the 16th July, 1869, she passed an account, taking to herself the whole of the leasehold property and personal chattels of the deceased, at its appraised value. The children were then all under •age.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The rules of the Circuit Court referred to in the opinion are as follows: On sales under decrees or orders of this Court, the following allowances shall be made to trustees: On the first 500 dollars, 7 per centum. “ second “ U (¡I U Cl “ third “ cc g cc cc “ fourth “ cc g cc cc “ fifth ■ “ cc 4.1 cc cc “ sixth “ CC 4 cc cc —and four per centum upon all amounts above the The auditor shall allow in each case where a decree or…

<p>Marshalling of Securities — Defective Mortgages to secure Coupon Bonds — Notice—Judgments—Coupons Attached, to, and, Detached from Bonds — Coupons lifted by a Banlc, as Agent.</p> <p>The Md. F. M. and M. Co., on the 1st July, 1868, executed a mortgage of all its property to B., and others, to secure the payment of $100,000 of coupon bonds, issued at the same time by the company^ On the 1st January, 1870, the company executed to the same parties another mortgage of the same property, to secure the payment of other $100,000 of coupon bonds, issued at the same time by the company. On the 30th October, 1873, the company executed to S. and T., a mortgage of the same property, to secure the payment of two promissory notes in favor of K. and C., amounting to $30,000. On the 38th March, 1873, U. D. obtained judgment. against the company for $1179.07, and issued execution, which was levied on the company’s property. D. assigned the judgment on the 36th August, 1873, to H., president of the company. On the 14th October, 1874, B. levied an attachment on the company’s property, for $3687.73. It being discovered in 1874, that the mortgages were defective, in consequence of their not having been acknowledged in accordance with the requirements of the Code, and not having the required affidavit of consideration, nor the corporate seal affixed, on the 13th October, 1874, a resolution of the company, authorized deeds to be executed, confirming what was contained in each of the mortgages, which deeds were accordingly duly executed on the 16th, 19th and 30th October, 1874, respectively, and acknowledged and recorded the first on the 30th, and the other two on the 33nd October, 1874. Default having been made in the payment of the coupons of the first series of bonds, B., trustee, at the request of the holders of some of the said bonds and overdue coupons, filed a bill in equity, on the 4th November, 1874, to obtain a sale of the property of the company, and to determine how the proceeds should be distributed. Held :</p> <p>That the property should be sold for the payment of the claims against it, in the following order:—</p> <p>1st. The costs of the proceedings and the trustee’s commissions.</p> <p>3nd. H. assignee of TJ. D’s judgment less $185-79, part of said ' judgment; as it appeared, that in 1873 the company executed two notes to W. H. D. one for $600 and the other for $347.73 afterwards endorsed to U. D.; that W. H. D. had. no notice of the mortgages; that in 1873 TJ. D. had dealings with the company by which it became indebted to him $185.79, balance due him on a settlement of accounts on the 1st August 1873, on which causes of action lié obtained the judgment for $1179.07; and as the $185.79 was a debt incurred by the company after U. D. had heard from common report that the company had issued bonds and executed mortgages to secure them, which report was sufficient to put him on enquiry, and notice should be imputed to him.</p> <p>3rd. B’s judgment of condemnation, as the debt was contracted before the deeds of 1874 were recorded, and without notice of the defective mortgages.</p> <p>4th. O. having filed in the proceedings second mortgage bonds to the amount of $5000 with the coupons, and there being no evidence, that he had notice of the first series of bonds or of the defective mortgage to .secure them, nor anything appearing on the face of the second series of bonds or their coupons to indicate that a first series had been issued and a mortgage executed to secure their payment, and if it should further appear, that O. purchased the bonds filed by him before the recording of the confirmatory deed, his $5000 worth of bonds and coupons would be entitled to payment next in order; but if it should appear that they were obtained by him after the confirmatory deed was duly recorded, then their payment should be deferred until the holders of the first series of bonds and their coupons shall have been paid.</p> <p>5th. The bonds secured by the first mortgage and their coupons, whether attached to, or severed from the bonds and transferred and held tona fide, should be paid piari passu.</p> <p>6th. The bonds secured by the second mortgage with their coupons, whether attached or detached and transferred, the holders having taken them with knowledge of the prior mortgage, should be paid pari passu.</p> <p>7th. The notes secured by the third mortgage C. and K., having had knowledge of the bonds and of the two prior mortgages.</p> <p>■8th. All other claims against the company payable ratably, including the claim of coupons filed in the proceedings by the receiver of a bank, it appearing that the bank did not purchase the coupons but redeemed them as agent for the company and on its account, the bank being the place where the coupons were payable.</p>

<p>Practice in Criminal Cases — Petition under Pule 1, as upon Writ of Drror — The Discretion of a Court to Quash an Indictment — Review of its Judgment — Variation in Counts of an Indictment alleging Ownership of Property charged to he Stolen — When Indictment quashed, or the Prosecution required to Vlecton which Count to Proceed — Art. 30, sec. 82, of-the Code.</p> <p>'The defendants were indicted in the Court below for stealing three bushels of wheat. The indictment contained three counts. The first count described the wheat as the property of the N. C. R. C. The second count described it as the property of the said N. C. R. C., in its capacity as common carrier and bailee of said wheat. The third count described it as the property of certain persons doing business under the name of M. & Co., the alleged consignees of the said wheat. The defendants moved to quash the indictment for defects, which they alleged, were apparent on its face, but which were not stated in the motion. The Court below quashed the indictment. Whereupon the attorney for the State, desiring to have the record removed into this Court, as upon writ of error, filed a petition in the Dame of the State, designating the questions of law, by the decision of which the State was aggrieved; namely, the quashing of the indictment. The petition stated that the point of the defendants was, that the ownership of the property, alleged in the indictment to have been stolen, could not be properly charged, in the same indictment, as being in different persons; inasmuch as this was, in effect, holding the defendants to answer upon several and distinct charges. The record being by order of the Court below, brought into this Court, it was Held:</p> <p>1st. That the State’s petition met the requirements of the rule of this Court as to petitions in the nature of writs of error, and that the decision of the Court below was properly before this Court for review, as the action of the Court below in quashing the indictment did not depend upon its arbitrary discretion, but its discretion should have been governed by rules, and having acted in violation of them, its judgment could be reviewed and reversed.</p> <p>2nd. That the indictment was sufficient in law, and the variation in the different counts, in alleging the ownership of the property charged to be stolen, formed no Valid objection to it.</p> <p>3rd. That if the objection to the indictment had been valid, it was not one for which a demurrer lay under Art. 30, sec. 82, of the Code, but it would have been competent for the Court in its discretion either to compel the prosecutor to elect upon which count he would proceed, or in a clear case to quash the indictment.</p>

<p>Selling Beer on Sunday — 1866, eh. 66 — Licenses, Art. 57 of the Code.</p> <p>The Act of 1866, ch. 66, known as the Sunday Liquor Law, does not apply to The Concordia, a club of Baltimore City.</p> <p>Selling beer on Sunday is not Sabbath-breaking within the meaning-of the Act of 1866, ch. 66.</p> <p>The License Laws for sale of liquors in Art. 57, of the Code, do not apply to social clubs.</p>

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court. The judgment of the Court below was, for the plaintiff for $162, with interest thereon from date until paid and costs, subject to the defendant’s discharge in insolvency.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Baltimore City Court.</p>