55 Md. App. 261 - Offutt v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1983
Citation profile
12 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently August 2011
12 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Illinois v. Gates · Schneckloth v. Bustamonte · Johnson v. Zerbst · Edwards v. Arizona
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The evidence was legally sufficient to support the finding of guilt in two separate ways. The law is settled that at least two separate permitted inferences may follow from the predicate fact of possession of recently stolen goods. “In the present case, the evidence was, therefore, legally sufficient to support a jury finding that the appellant was the thief within the contemplation of the common law of larceny. That is now one of the forms of criminal conduct rendering him eligible for conviction under Maryland’s new Consolidated Theft Statute. Art. 27, § 342(a) [now CR Article, § 7-104(a) ] provides: “A person commits the offense of theft when he willfully or knowingly obtains control which is unauthorized.... ” In the alternative, the evidence was also legally sufficient to support a jury finding that the appellant was a receiver of stolen goods within the contemplation of the common law of receiving. That is also now one of the alternative forms of criminal conduct rendering him eligible for conviction under Maryland’s new Consolidated Theft Statute, Art. 27 § 342(c) [now CR Article, § 7-104(c) ] provides: “A person commits the office of theft if he possesses stolen personal property knowing that it has been stolen.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[J]oint possession does not negate the notion of exclusive possession as that term is used in reference to the permitted inference that may be drawn from such possession.... It is ... clear that the evidence with respect to the appellant’s residence in the apartment (including keeping his clothes there, having his own keys, using it as his address of record ... and sleeping in the very master bedroom wherein the stolen gun was found) was a legally sufficient predicate for a jury finding that he was, at least, in joint possession of the stolen gun.... [T]he evidence was, there fore, legally sufficient to support a jury finding that the appellant was the thief[.]”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“The common thread running through all of these cases affirming joint possession is 1) proximity between the defendant and the [stolen property], 2) the fact that the [stolen property] was within the view or otherwise within the knowledge of the defendant, 3) ownership or some possessory right in the premises or the automobile in which the [stolen property] is found, or 4) the presence of circumstances from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the defendant was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the [stolen property].”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.