Miera v. George’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 federal appellate · 2 district · 40 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A]n act is within the “course of employment” if (1) it be something fairly and naturally incident to the business, and if (2) it be done while the servant was engaged upon the master’s business and be done, although mistakenly or ill advisedly, with a view to further the master’s interest, or from some impulse of emotion which naturally grew out of or was incident to the attempt to perform the master’s business, and did not arise wholly from some external, independent, and personal motive on the part of the servant to do the act upon his own account.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Nichols v. United States · Los Ranchitos v. Tierra Grande, Inc.

2. ““Use of Force. “A master who authorizes a servant to perform acts which involve the use of force against persons or things, or which are of such a nature that they are not uncommonly accompanied by the use of force, is subject to liability for a trespass to such persons or things caused by the servant’s unprivileged use of force exerted for the purpose of accomplishing a result within the scope of employment. "Comment: “a. Nature of employment. Whether or not an employment involves or is likely to lead to the use of force against the person of another is a question to be decided upon the facts of the individual case. To create liability for a battery by a servant upon a third person, the employment must be one which is likely to bring the servant into conflict with others. The making of contracts or the compromise, settlement, or collection of accounts does not ordinarily have this tendency. On the other hand, • the employment of servants to recapture property, to take possession of land, or to deal with chattels which are 'in the possession of another, is likely to lead to altercations, and the master may become liable, in spite of instructions that no force shall be exerted against the person of the possessor.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Gibson v. Helms · Gonzales v. Southwest Security & Protection Agency, Inc.

3. ““It has been held, in a great variety of cases, that the master is liable for the wanton or malicious acts of his servant if they were committed while the servant was acting in the execution of his authority and within the course of his employment. Mechem on Agency (2d Ed.) § 1960; Elliot on Railroads, § 1265. Some of the earlier cases, it is true, announced the contrary rule; but this doctrine no longer prevails. The difficult question is to determine what acts may be deemed to be within the course of the servant’s employment, within the meaning of the rule. Me-chem on Agency, § 1960, states the rule as follows: “ ‘But in general terms it may be said that an act is within the “course of employment” if (1) it be something fairly and naturally incident to the business, and if (2) it be done, * * * although mistakenly or illadvisedly, with a view to further the master’s interests, or from some impulse of emotion which naturally grew out of or was ' incident to the attempt to perform the master’s business, and did not arise wholly from some external, independent, and personal motive on the part of the servant to do the act upon his own account.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. McFatridge v. Harlem Globe Trotters