Volume 55 — South Carolina Reports

Before Gage, J., Marion, May, 1898. Action by J. D. Montgomery against The Delaware Insurance Co. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. cite: There is no such thing as a contract to insure personal property anywhere unless specifically set out in contract: 3 Am. R., 142; 54 lb., 631, 377; 23 Mich., 486; 70 N. Y., 593. If no place was agreed upon,'there was no contract: 14 Am. R., 249; 55 N. Y., 265.

Before Aldrich, J., Charleston, August, 1898. Held: and correctly, I think, that the mortgages to Della Torre and Whitridge were valid, and that provision in this action should be made for their payment. No exceptions have been taken to this ruling, in so far as the mortgage to Della Torre is concerned; but this ruling as to Whitridge has been excepted to.

Before Townsend, J., Lexington, February, 1898. Indictment against Charles C. Summer for murder. From verdict and sentence, defendant appeals. cite: As to right to raise objection to a witness: 12 S. C., 89. cites: As to examination of witnesses: 5 Strob., 36; 4 Rich., 463; 29 S. C., 231. cite: Reasonable doubt: 30 S.C., 441'; 32 S. C., 392. Self-defense: 13 S. C, 464. As to charge excepted to as on facts: 51 S. C., 235; 48 S. C., 253.

Before Aldrich, J., Orangeburg, May, 1898. Action by Isaac Brown, as administrator of Lawrence Brown, against Orangeburg County for damages for the lynching of intestate by a mob. From directed verdict in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. The former cite: Similar provisions to art. 6, sec. 6, Con., have been elsewhere enacted: 7 and 8 Geo. IV.; 9 Kan., 356; 47 Ala., 118; 52 Ala., 115.

Appellant’s attorney moved for further time to make up and serve his “Case” upon the ground that at the time he should have done so he overlooked the fact on account of the worry incident to moving into a new house. This motion. was made on notice served after expiration of time for service of proposed “Case.”

<p>Appeal — Recommittal of.' — After printed “Case” is served, this Court may, on motion, under Rule IX., remand the “Case” to Circuit Judge for his statement of what occurred at hearing.</p>

Before Watts, J., Sumter, June, 1898. Action to declare a deed a mortgage by Lilie H. Brown and Robert O. Purdy, as trustees and representatives of Albertus S. Brown and W. Alston Brown, individually and as surviving partner of A. S. and W. A. Brown, against The, Bank of Sumter and Marion Moise, on'the following complaint : I. That the defendant, the Bank of Sumter, is a corporation duly created under and by the laws of the State of South Carolina. II.

<p>Before Townsend, J., Richland, June, 1898.</p> <p>Creditor’s bill by C. M. Efird and H. A. Lorick, as executors of Geo. W. Lorick, against Piedmont Land Improvement and Investment Co., and the original subscribers to the capital stock and transferees. The master’s report, omitting formal parts, is as follows :</p> <p>This is an action brought by the plaintiffs, as executors of the estate of G. W. Lorick, deceased, for the purpose of having the stockholders of the Piedmont Land Improvement and Investment Company pay into the hands’ of a receiver to be appointed by the Court, the thirty per’ cent, dividend due by them as subscription to the capital stock of said corporation, which was duly chartered under and by the laws of this State, for the purpose of meeting the liabilities of said corporation to the plaintiffs, as executors, and others who might establish their demands before the Court. To this complaint the resident stockholders file their answers, none admitting their liability, while others set up counter-claims, and some denying any liability whatever. All of which will clearly appear by their answers filed in this case. The absent and non-resident stockholders, B. B. Ford, Chas. C. Wilson, Chas. Ellis, jr., and Walter M. Gorham, were duly served by publication, none of whom answered, except Chas. Ellis, jr., who filed an answer during the reference, in which he set up a counter-claim, which will be hereafter more clearly set forth. * * * At the hearing of said case, attorneys for several of the defendants filed their stated grounds of demurrer to the complaint, in that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. After a careful consideration of the grounds upon which they are based, I consider them untenable, in view of the allegations of the complaint, and, therefore, hold the complaint sufficient, and overrule the said motion.</p> <p>My findings of fact are as follows : i. That the defendant corporation was duly incorporated, under the general incorporation law of 1886, by a charter from the secretary of State. 2. That books of subscription to the capital stock of said corporation.were regularly opened in the city of Columbia, on the 19th day of March, 1888, and that the amounts subscribed by the persons indicated in paragraph 3 of- the complaint are correct. 3. That the subscribers and stockholders of said corporation met and organized the same by the adoption of a constitution and by-laws and the election of a president, directors and all other necessary officers, in the city of Columbia, on the 20th day of March, 1888. 4. That the subscription to the capital stock was made upon the condition that twenty per cent, should be paid in at once, and that the directors should call for the balance in such instalments as would be necessary. 5. That the directors of said corporation from time to time levied assessments upon the stockholders until seventy per cent, thereof had been levied and paid in. 6. That on the 30th day of December, 1892, the board of directors of said corporation issued a call for the remaining thirty per cent, due upon said subscription, a portion of which was paid in by several subscribers, but upon failure of others to pay, the amount so paid in was returned to them, and that the directors have failed and neglected to collect the same. 7. On the 19th day of May, 1888, the defendant corporation executed its bond to the said Geo. W. Lorick, obligating itself to pay to him the sum of $4,786.25 on or before the 19th May, 1889, with interest from date, and a like sum on or before the 19th day of May, 1890, with interest from date, and a like sum on or before the 19th day of May, 1891, with interest from date, and to secure payment of the same executed and delivered a mortgage on a tract of land in Lexington County. 8. In May, 1892, said G. W. Lorick brought an action in foreclosure against the defendant corporation in Lexington County, for the sum of $8,772.59, and costs, upon which he obtained a judgment at the September Court for said county, on the 24th day of. September, 1892. 9. That in November, 1893, G. W. Lorick died, and the plaintiffs in this action duly qualified as his executors a short time thereafter, and are such now. xo. That the lands covered by the said mortgage were duly sold under said order of foreclosure, and the proceeds credited upon said mortgage and the report of sales confirmed on the 29th September, 1894, which order embraced permission to the plaintiffs, as executors, to enter up judgment against the defendant corporation for the balance, the sum of $3,804.94. 11. That the said judgment was duly entered up on the 26th January, 1895, execution duly lodged, and the sheriff of Lexington returned the same “nulla bona” May 15th, 1895. 12. I find that B. B. Ford originally subscribed five shares to the capital stock of said corporation, paid in $350, after-wards surrendered his certificate of stock, which was can-celled by the corporation on the day of , and a new certificate of stock was issued to F. FI. Hyatt on the day of , who surrendered his certificate on the 28th day of May, 1894, and which was cancelled by the said corporation, and a certificate issued to W. J. May on the 28th of May, 1894, who now holds the same. 13. That R. S. DesPortes originally subscribed for twenty shares of the capital stock of said corporation. On the 2d day of May, 1889, he surrendered his certificate for the said twenty shares, which was cancelled by the said corporation, and upon the same day a certificate was issued to R. S. DesPortes for fifteen shares and to W. H. Lyles a certificate for five shares, which was sold to him by R. S. DesPortes, and said Lyles now holds the same. That on the 20th day of June, 1889, R. S. DesPortes surrendered his certificate for fifteen shares to said corporation, which was cancelled by said corporation, and a certificate for ten shares was issued to R. S. DesPortes and five shares to John T. Sloan, jr., sold to him by R. S. DesPortes, and said Sloan now holds the same. That on September , 1890, R. S. DesPortes, through T. J. Gibson, a broker, sold to C. J. Iredell his ten shares of stock, which stock was surrendered to the company and can-celled, and ten shares were issued to C. J. Iredell on October 3, 1890. 14. That Godfrey Leaphart subscribed five shares to the capital stock of said company; that his executors sold the same at public auction in the city of Columbia, on the 4th day of-December, 1893, to John T. Sloan, jr., to whom the same was, on that day, transferred, and who is now the owner and holder of the same, but which has never been transferred on the books of the said company to- said Sloan. 15. That Dr. Á. N. Talley originally subscribed ten shares to the capital stock of said corporation, and on October 3, 1890, he surrendered the same, which was cancelled by the corporation, and a certificate for ten shares issued to C. J. Iredell. 16. That W. G. Childs originally subscribed for six shares, and on October 17, 1890, he surrendered his certificate for the said six shares, which was cancelled by the corporation, and a certificate for six shares was issued to Martin Stork. 17. That W. A. Clark originally subscribed for six shares of the capital stock, and on July 27, 1892, he surrendered his certificate for six shares, which was cancelled by the said corporation, and a certificate issued for six shares to G. W. Lester. 18. Certificates for all other stock subscribed, as set forth in paragraph 3 of the complaint, were duly issued to the subscribers thereof, who are now the owners and holders thereof, except that E. W. Screven subscribed for ten shares, which subscription was assumed by James Woodrow, and to whom the stock was issued for ten shares, who now holds the same. 19. The following claims have been offered in evidence and proven before me as existing valid claims against said defendant corporation: * * * 20. That the defendant corporation is insolvent, and that there are no funds out of which the debts of the said corporation can be paid except the balance of the thirty per cent, due by the stockholders upon their original subscription to the capital stock of said corporation. 21. The sale of the certificates of stock by B. B. Ford, R. S. DesPortes, A. N. Talle}'’, W. G. Childs, and W. A. Clark were made in the mode prescribed by the by-laws of the company under the authority of its charter, was bona üde and in the usual course of business trade and not collusive, and the transferers retain no interest whatever in the stock then transferred by them.</p> <p>My conclusions of law are: ist. That B. B. Ford, R. S. DesPortes, Dr. A. N. Talley, W. G. Childs, and W. A. Clark are not due the corporation or the creditors anything further upon their original subscription, and I recommend that the complaint be dismissed as to them, with costs. 2d. That F. H. Plyatt, the purchaser of the Ford stock, having transferred his stock to W. J. May after the call by the directors for thirty per cent, still due, and notice to him thereof, he is liable for the thirty per cent. 3d. That the certificate held by the executor of Godfrey Leaphart was sold to John T. Sloan, jr., after the call was made by the directors and notice to them thereof, and his estate is, therefore, liable for the thirty per cent. This said stock was never transferred to said Sloan on said books. 4th. That Martin Stork, who bought the stock of W. G. Childs before the call of the directors, and also G. W. Lester, who before said call bought the stock of W. A. Clark, and W. H. Lyles, and John T. Sloan, jr., both of whom bought each five shares of R. S. DesPortes before the call, and Mrs. Emma J. Anderson, who* bought the R. M. Anderson stock before the call, are liable for the thirty per cent. 5th. That the following original subscribers are liable for the thirty per cent.’ upon the amounts of their subscription: * * * The following purchasers of stock are liable for the thirty per cent, upon their stock: * * * 6th. The defendants, Geo. S. Mower, J. H. Counts, M. A. Carlisle, John T. Sloan, jr., James Woodrow, Thos. T. Moore, H. C. Moseley, W. A. Moseley, J. M. Wheeler, W. H. Lyles, and Chas. Ellis, jr., set up in their answer various claims against the defendant corporation in which they are stockholders, and they ask that they be allowed as counter-claims against any amount that may be found due by them to said corporation or creditors thereof. After a careful consideration of the law in reference thereto, I have concluded, and so find, that these creditor stockholders are not entitled to set up these demands held by them as a counterclaim against any liability due by them to the said corporation or its creditor, and find that they are merely creditors of the corporation, and that they must pay in full the thirty per cent, due upon their subscription, and must then set up their claims against the corporation as any ordinary creditor.</p> <p>I, therefore, recommend that a receiver be appointed to , collect the balance due upon the stock, as hereinbefore indicated, of such of the stockholders as are not parties to this action, and to do and perform such acts as he may by this Court be directed, and that judgment herein be given against the defendant stockholders who have been held liable for the amounts as hereinbefore indicated, and that they be required to pay the same to the master for distribution; and that the master be instructed to call in, in the usual way, all of the creditors of the said corporation, and that he hear and determine all questions as to- the priority of the claims established before him.</p> <p>From Circuit decree modifying master’s 'report as indicated in the opinion, the defendants, M. A. Carlisle, Geo. S. Mower, executors of R. S. DesPortes, H. C. Moseley, W. A. Moseley, Charles Ellis, jr., John H. Counts, James Woodrow, Thos. T. Moore, John S. Hughson, executors Dr. A. N. Talley, W. G. Childs, W. A. Clark, John T. Sloan, J. M. Wheeler, and Piedmont Land Improvement and Investment Co., appeal.</p> <p>cite: Stockholder is liable to corporation, and that only, on his subscription: 6 Rich. Eq., 234. Under allegation charging defendant as transferee,he cannot be held liable as original subscriber: 41 S. C., 331. Stockholder may set off claims held by him against the corporation against its claims upon him: 24 N. E. R., 13; 45 Mo., 109; 60 Ga., 174; 40 Fed. R., 413; 43 N. W. R., 290; 121 N. Y., 107; 24 „ Pac. R., 1111; 90 N. Y., 353.</p> <p> refers to authorities of Id. W. Shand by permission. </p> <p> also refers to authorities of Messrs. Shand and Muller. </p> <p>cites: Stockholders not liable for instalments called in on stock after transfer in good faith, but transferee is liable: 16 S. C, 529: 7 T. R„ 36; 91 U. S., 45, 56, 65; 96 U. S., 328; 49 N. Y., 216; 54 Penn. St., 227.</p> <p>cite: Stockholder should be permitted to set off claims against his liability: 6 Rich. Eq., 227; 3 Mason, 308; 33 S. C.,-47; 72 N. Y., 106; 21 S. C., 346; 25 S. C., 82; 73 N. Y., 620; 90 N. Y., 253.</p> <p>cite: Does complaint state a cause of action: 22 S. C, 292. Nulla bona return shows insolvency: 22 S. C., 321; 53 S. C., 364. Stockholder cannot set off liabilty on stock by claim against corporation: 43 S. C, 480; 27 S. C., 340.</p>

Before Watts, J., Charleston, March, 1898. Action for damages by Elliott L. Mew against Charleston and Savannah Railway Co. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. cite: Error not to grant motion to make complaint more definite and certain: 30 S. C, 113; 24 S. C., 270; 37 S. G, 55; 42 S. G, 119. The causal relation between the negligent act of the defendant and the injury is not set out in the alleged cause of action: 48 A. & E. R. R. G, 87; 76 Mo., 288; 21 S. G, 466.

Before Gary, J., Chesterfield, July, 1898. Action by Iredell Meares and P. B. Manning, receivers of the Carolina and Interstate Building and Loan Association, against Plenry W. Finlayson. The contract under which defendant borrowed from plaintiff corporation provided for payment of six per cent, interest and six per cent, premium.

<p>Before Buchanan, J., Barnwell, July, 1898.</p> <p>Motion by L. A. Ashley and the heirs of Mary C. Bush, in case of Wm. Ashley, the younger, a lunatic, by his committee, L. A. Ashley, and in his own right, against W. A.Holman and W. A. Bailey, executors of Wm. Ashley, the elder, and in their own right, and all of the devisees of Wm. Ashley, the elder. The clause of the will in question is as follows: “I consider that my afflicted son, William, is sufficiently provided for in the estate he derived from his grandfather, Jósiah Stallings, and therefore make no provision for him in my will; but should the estate derived from his grand-father in any manner fail him, or should he from any other cause lack a proper support and maintenance, I direct my executors by a fair and equal assessment upon the property given to my children and grand-children by this will to raise a sum sufficient for a decent support of my son, William.”</p> <p>From order of Circuit Judge all defendants, except heirs of Mary C. Bush, appeal.</p> <p>cite: Circuit Judge had no power to require master to make assessment: Bail. Eq., 509; 31 S. C., 183.</p> <p>cite: Court should have dismissed the action, because the cause of action had not accrued — the “Stallings fund” not being exhausted: 54 111. App., 644; 60 Miss., 733; 85 Ala., 61; 17 Mo, App,, 481; 4 Wis., 300; 57 111. App., 139; 8 Atl. R., 826; 7 Tenn., 296. Error to require an assessment until Stallings fund was exhausted: 30 N. H., 50; 55 Ga., 329; 22 Mo. App., 12; 5 N. H., 225; 6 Johns., 44; 94 N. C., 447.</p> <p>cite: The power, of assessment is a limited and special power: 1 Rich. Eq., 38; Bail. Eq., 527; 11 Rich. Eq., 199; 1 Rich. Eq., 324.</p>

Before Gage, J., Marlboro, August, 1898. Foreclosure by Katie M. Newton against Jonathan Woodley.

Before Watts, J., Charleston, December, 1897. Action by Willis Johnson against Charleston and Savannah Railway Co. From judgment overruling demurrer to defendant’s second affirmative defense, the plaintiff appeals. cites: The contract is null and void as against public policy: 20 S. C., 438; 17 Wall., 337; 32 N. Y., 337; 2 Rich., 286; 8 Fed. R., 782; 8 N. E. R., 467; 11 S. E. R., 829; 8 S. R., 776; 1 Kan., 226; Con. 1895, art. IX., sec. 15; 29 Kan., 169; 58 Am.

<p>Before Rlugh, J., Spartanburg, July term, 1898.</p> <p>Action for damages by Fred Rinake against Victor Manufacturing Co. From order of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals.</p> <p>cite: 48 S. C., W5; 53 S. C., 538; 21 S. C., 93.</p> <p>cite: 45 S. C., 282; 19 S. C., 510: 37 S. G, 33: 44 N. Y., 372; 7 111. R., 130; in U. S., 313; 44 Fed. R., 855; 43 S. G, 388.</p>

<p>Before Buchanan, J., Charleston, February, 1898.</p> <p>Action for damages by Thomas G. Disher against South Carolina and Georgia R. R. Co. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p> <p>cites: Rules as to contributory negligence: 11 East., 60; 10 M. & W., 546; 15 S. C., 443; 23 S. C., 531; 51 S. C.,222. Statutes regulating crossings: Rev. Stat., 1684; 33 S. C., 136; 18 S. E. R., 119.</p> <p>cite: Incompetent testimony not objected to when offered becomes competent: 14 S. C., 502; 20 S. C, 343; 21 S. C, 323; 24 S. C., 592; 48 S. C., 136; 51 S. C, 58. Defendant responsible if physician was incompetent: 1 Strob. L.; 525. Exception too general in form, and zvill not be considered: 51 S. C., 488, 534, 55; 44 S. C, 485.</p>

Motion in case of State against Warley Wine and Major Green to reinstate appeal, and to require stenographer to furnish copy of testimony and Judge’s charge to appellant.

Before Klugh, J., York, April, 1898. Action to set aside conveyance by D. E. Finley, as receiver of A. Y. Cartwright & Co., and of A. Y. Cartwright and W. M. Allison as individuals, against Walter B. Moore and A. Y. Cartwright. From judgment dismissing complaint, plaintiff appeals. cites: Error to admit parol testimony to shozv different consideration than that expressed in deed: 53 S. C, 483; 42 S. C., 8; 31 S. C, 259.

Before Kuugh, J., York, April, 1898. Action to set aside a deed by D. E. Finley, receiver of A. Y. Cartwright & Co., and of A. Y. Cartwright and W. M. Allison as individuals, against Carrie J. Cartwright and A. Y. Cartwrig-ht. From Circuit decree, defendant, Carrie J. Cartwright, appeals.

Before Benet, J., Chesterfield, April term, 1897. Indictment against Charles Holleyman and Charles Mixon for transporting liquors in night time.

Before Benet, J,, Greenwood, March term, 1898. Indictment against Randolph McGee. From verdict and sentence defendant appeals. Mr. Ellis G. Graydon cites: Discretion of continuance may be abused: 50 S. C., 403. Ordering whiskey for personal use is not a crime: 170 U. S., 438. cites: As to what' exceptions can be considered on appeal by this Court: 39 S. C., 13; 22 S. C., 309; 1 S. C., 29; 2 S. C., 238; 35 S. C., 609; 4 S. C., 544; 18 S. C., 545.

Before Buchanan, J., Union, September, 1897. Action by Elizabeth DeLoach, as survivor of herself and her husband, against M. P. Sarratt and A. A. Sarratt, to set aside certain conveyances and transactions as frauds upon the creditors of A. A. Sarratt. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. The two latter firms cite; Order continuing case against heirs at law of defendant, error: 42 S. C., 383; Code, 11; 36 S. C, 562, 174.

Before Gary, J., Fairfield, March, 1899. Action by John Moore against Thos. J. Spurrier, as administrator of F. Ad. Spurrier, and John D. Harrison, on the following complaint: 1. That Francis Ad.

<p>Before Klugi-x, J., Greenville, March, 1899.</p> <p>Foreclosure by The Mutual Aid, Loan and Investment Co. of Atlanta, Ga., against Eliza Logan. The 'Circuit d&cree, omitting the formal parts, is as follows :</p> <p>This action was commenced on the 15th day of June, 1898. The defense interposed is usury. The master decided that the contract was governed according to1 the laws of Georgia, and under the cases of Association v. Vance and other subsequent decisions following it, that the defense of usury should not be sustained, tie, 'therefore, recommended a judgment of foreclosure for the entire amount claimed1, with interest and attorneys’ fees. The defendant excepted to the master’s report, and the question is before me for decision. The contract in question was to. be performed at the home office o:f the company, Atlanta, Georgia; the .dues were payable there, and the local agent was designated a's the agent of the borrower to> transmit the funds there when paid to him. I db> not lay much stress on this last palpable evasion and subterfuge, but according to< the terms of the contract it was ten be performed in Georgia, and this is controlling to a certain extent, a's we shall see. If this were all to be considered, the cases cited by the plaintiff’s counsel and referred to in the master’s report, would be conclusive of the point, at issue.</p> <p>The General Assembly of South Carolina, at its session in 1898 (see XXII. Stat.), passed an act requiring- the Courts to construe all contracts secured by a mortgage of real estate situated in South 'Carolina, by the laws of South Carolina. It specifically refers to 'the question of interest, and, coming so- soon after the decision of Association v. Vance, the inference is plain that the intention of the legislature was to change the policy indicated) by the Supreme Court in that case. The plaintiff contends that the act of 1898 was passed after the contracts in 'question were entered into, and that to allow that act to affect the contract sued upon would divest vested rights and violate the obligations of the contract. At first blush the plaintiff appears to be right, but a careful analysis of the question has convinced me that it does neither. 'So far as this question is concerned, I can see very little distinction between, divesting vested rights and violating the obligation of the contract. The right which would be divested and the obligation of the contract which would be violated are almost inseparable. The right of the plaintiff was to come into' a South Carolina Court and1 demand, that the mortgage be foreclosed1; at the same time, asking that the Sooth Carolina Court give due effect to 'the statute of Georgia, which declares that contracts like the one under discussion are not usurious. So far as this statute is concerned, the plaintiff, even before our act of 1898, would come into our Courts as a suppliant and not as one clothed with a strict legal right. It is well settled that statute law can in no case have any force or effect, ex proprio vigore, beyond the limits of the enacting State. It halts at the State line, and can only enter the foreign State by the latter’s consent. (3 Am. and Eng. Ene. L., 1st ed., 504, 509.) Whatever extra territorial force or effect it may have is referable solely to the doctrine of comity of nations. The vested right about to be divested is then solely the right on the part, of the plaintiff to force a South Carolina Court to give effect to a Georgia statute in construing this contract, which, as we shall see, is no right at all, in the strict sense of the term. That which the plaintiff claims to be a part of the obligation of the contract is simply an incident of the contract, depending upon the will of the foreign State. The obligation of a contract is its binding force, that element founded on strict legal right which a party to the contract may demand; not a feature of the contract depending for its enforcement upon the imperfect obligation of comity o-r courtesy. As Judge Story says: “Like that of beneficence, humanity and charity.” “The laws of a country can have nO' intrinsic force, proprio vigore, except within the territorial limits and jurisdiction of that country, and can bind only its own subjects and such others as are within the jurisdictional limits while they remain therein. No other nation, nor the subjects of any other nation, are bound to yield the slightest obedience to those laws; and whatever extra-territorial force they may have, is not the result of any inherent power to extend them abroad, but of that respect which from motives of public policy other nations yield to them.” 3 Am. and Eng. Ene. L., 509. Or as stated bjr the Supreme Court of the United States: “No law has any elfect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent to which the law of one nation, as put in force within its territory, whether by executive order; by legislative act or by judicial decree, shall be allowed tO' operate within the dominion of another nation, depends upon what our greatest jurists have been content to call the ‘comity of nations.’ ” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S., 163. “All the effect which foreign laws can have in the territory of a State depends absolutely on the express or tacit consent of that State.” Wharton Int. Law, sec. 78. Depending, then, entirely upon the comity of the nation or State whose Courts are asked to enforce the foreign statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into' the extent, the efñcacy and the binding force or characteristics of that comity. What is it? The Supreme Court of the United States says: “Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will on the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or to the persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Hilton v. Guyot {supra). Judge Story says: “It has been thought by some jurists that the term comity is not sufficiently expressive of the obligation of nations to give effect to foreign laws when they are not prejudicial to their own rights and interests. And it has been suggested that the doctrine rests upon a deeper foundation — that it is not so much a matter of comity or courtesy as a matter of paramount moral duty. Now, assuming that such a moral duty does exist, it is clearly one of imperfect obligation, like that of beneficence, humanity and charity. Every nation must be the final judge for itself, not only of the nature and extent of the duty, but of the occasions on which its exercise may be justly demanded. * * * There is, then, not only no impropriety in the use of the phrase ‘comity of nations,’ but it is the most appropriate phrase to express the true foundation and extent of the obligation of the laws of one nation within the territories of another.” Story C'onfl. Laws, secs. 33-38. .Quoted with approval in Hilton v. Guyot {supra). “It is in the strictest sense simply a' matter of the comity of nations, and not of any absolute paramount obligation superseding all discretion on the subject.” 3 Am. and Eng. Ene. L., 508. “The enforcement of a foreign law and contracts dependent thereon for validity within another jurisdiction and by the courts of another nation, is not to be demanded as a matter of strict right. It is permitted, if at all, only from the comity which exists between States and nations. Every independent community must judge for itself how far this comity ought to extend.” Flag v. Baldwin, 38 N. J. Ecp, 219: Same case, 48 Am. Rep., 308. It must be borne in mind that the principle invoked is a comity of nations and not a comity of courts. The Courts of South Carolina are not supposed to entertain sentiments of comity toward the State of Georgia. That can only be done by the State of South Carolina. It often'happens that the Courts act on what is supposed or presumed to be the comity of one- State toward another, in the absence of an express declaration of policy by the State. That at best is but a presumption, and when the legislative will is made known, the presumption necessarify vanishes. “This comity, it has beeen well reasoned, is the comity of Stales and not the comity of Courts. In other words, the power of determining whether, how far, with what modification, or on what conditions, the laws of one State, or any rights dependent upon them, shall be recognized in another State, is a legislative power. The conclusion, then, is that the judiciary must be guided in determining the question by the practice and policy adopted by the legislature.” 6 Thomp. Corp., sec. 7884. “In the silence of any positive rule, affirming or denying or restraining the operation of foreign laws, Courts of justice presume the tacit adoption of them by their own government, unless they are repugnant to its policy or prejudicial to its interests. It is not the comity of the Courts but the comity of the nations which is administered and ascertained in the same way, and guided by the same reasoning by which all the principles of municipal law are ascertained and guided.” Story Confl. L., secs. 36-7. Quoted in Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet., 589. “And when (as without doubt must occasionally happen) the interest or policy of any State requires it to restrict the rule, it has but to declare its will and the legal presumption is at once at an end.” Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet., 590. The legislature has spoken the express will of the State of South Carolina upon this question, and in no uncertain terms declares what is the policy of this State. The act is remedial in its nature, and is intended to cut up, root and branch, the immunity enjoyed by foreign corporations which is denied to a citizen or corporation of this State. It cannot be doubted — in fact, it was admitted by plaintiff’s counsel at the hearing — that the contract under South Carolina law would be usurious. Association v. Dorsey, 15 S. C. Shall the Courts of this State, in view of the positive legislation of 1898, intended to cover all cases and conform all parties to South Carolina law, allow the statutes of Georgia to' have full efficacy in South Carolina? Our own Court has spoken in no uncertain way: “The laws of a State are limited to its territory. As a rule, it administers its own laws. But it sometimes happens that the judiciary of one State is called upon to administer the laws of another. Certain rules of comity have been adopted by common consent, and are generally followed. * * * The rule is clearly stated by Chancellor Kent with its qualifications: Then it may be laid down as the settled doctrine of public law that personal contracts are to have the same validity, interpretation and obligator}'' force in any other country which they have in the country where they are made. * * * It is, however, a necessary exception to' the universality of the rule, that no people are bound or ought to enforce or hold valid in their Courts of justice any contract which is injurious to their public rights, or offends their morals, or contravenes their policy, or violates a public law.” Thornton v. Dean, 19 S. C. R., 587. “The enforcement by one nation of contracts made under the laws of another, rests on the principle of comity, which can-mot be SO' far extended as to- violate the positive legislation of the nation called on to enforce such contracts.” Gist v. Tel. Co., 45 S. C. R., 369. “It is the voluntary act of the nation ■by which it is offered, and is inadmissible 'when, contrary to its policy or prejudicial to its interests.” Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet., 589. “The enforcement by one nation of contracts made tinder the laws, of another rests on the principles of comity, which cannot be so far extended as to' violate the positive legislation of the nation called on to enf orce such contract.” Ivey v. Lalland, 42 Miss., 444. “This comity is the purely voluntary act of the nation: or State, and is totally inadmissible when the laws of the foreign State or nation are contrary to its policy or prejudicial to its interests.” 3 Am. and Eng. Ene. L., 505. I feel impelled, therefore, by the act -of 1898, to' construe 'this contract according to the laws of Sooth Carolina. Thus construed, it is -clearly usurious.</p> <p>From this decree, plaintiff appeals.</p> <p>cite: Contract is free from usury under laws of Ga.: 46 Ga., 166; 94'Ga., 562; 96 Ga., 206, 803; 30 S. E. R., 9.11. And should be construed under Ga. lazvs: 49 S. C., 402; 50 S. C., 303; 51 S. C., 33. Act of i8p8 does not affect this contract: ant. 1, sec. 10, Con. U. S.; 15 Mass., 447; 16 How., 432; 1 Wall., 175. Principles of comity cannot be so altered as to affect contracts previously made: 13 Pet., 589-; 4 Wheat., 122. Is act of i8p8 intended to be retroactive? 18 S. C, 481; 22 S. C, 504; 7 Johns., 477; 13 Rich. L., 277.</p>

<p>Before Watts, J., Marion, November, 1898.</p> <p>Action by E. Lide Berry against Mary E. Berry and other heirs of Elihu Berry, and H. C. Graham. From Circuit decree, defendant Graham appeals.</p> <p>cites: Sec. 32, art. II., Con.; Rev. Stat., 2133; 5 Stat., 111.</p> <p>cite: Rev. Stat., 2048, 2049; Strob. Eq., 59; 33 S. C., 259.</p>

<p>Before Gary, J., York, April, 1899.</p> <p>Taxation of costs in R. N. McElwee against William Dickson and Dave Clarke. From order on Circuit, plaintiff appeals.</p> <p>cite: 21 Stat., 30; 16 Stat., 627; 17 Stat., 296; Gen. Stat., 2425; 22 Stat., 429; 51 S. C, 305.</p> <p>cite: 21 Stat., 30; Rev. Stat., 2552; 22 Stat., 429; 51 S. C., 305.</p>

Before Townsend, J., Anderson, March, 1899. Proceeding under agricultural lien by D. C. Brown & Bro. against Janies A. Young. From Circuit decree affirming judgment of magistrate, defendant appeals. cites: By denial of amount claimed to be due, defendant raises validity of lien: 33 S. C., 234; 14 S. C., 476. Not necessary to frame issue: 13 S. C., 403.

Before Gary, J., Richland, January, 1899. Foreclosure by Interstate Building and Loan Association of Atlanta, Ga., against Fannie C. Powell. From decree in foreclosure, defendant appeals. cites: Error to hold that contract was to be performed in Ga.: 22 la., 194; 20 S. E. R., 457; 18 S. E. R., 131; 84 Ga., 481; 112 N. C., 842. Attorney’s fee should not have been included in interest-bearing fund: 48 la., 52; 6 Neb., 56.

Before Gagé, J., Newberry, February, 1899. Indictment against George Langford for stealing a dog, and for burglary in breaking and stealing from a dog house. From order quashing the indictment on demurrer pf defendant, the State appeals. The latter cites: In indictment for burglary, it is not necessary to specify particular goods stolen: 24 S. C., 116. Old rule that dog was not subject of larceny has been dispelled by eminent Courts: 15 Am.

Before Watts, J., Marion, November, 1898. Foreclosure by B. S. Ellis against W. T. Cribb and children of Mary Jane Cribb, and James Norton. From Circuit decree granting foreclosure, defendant, James Norton, appeals. cite: A married woman has no power to mortgage her separate estate to secure debt of her husband or other person: 28 S. C., 303; 36 S. C, 563; 24 S. C., 461; 26 S. C., 517; 27 S. C, 500, 525.

Before Gary, J., Lexington, September, 1898. Action by H. W. Richardson against Florida Central and Peninsular R. R. Co. for damages for killing a dog. From order of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals. cite: Negligence is presumed from act of killing: 78 Tex., 300; 75 Ga., 444; 95 Tenn., 413; 86 N. Y., 365; 10 Rich., 52; 2 Kan., 481; 41 Ark., 479; 40 Fed., 281.

Before Watts, J., Charleston, December, 1897. Foreclosure by M. H. Collins against E. A. Hall and E. B. Hall. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant, E. B. Hall, appeals. The latter cites: Motion for nonsuit improperly refused: 20 Stat., 1121; art. 14, sec. 8, Con.; Gen. Stat., 2037; 39 S. C., 525; 52 S. G, 497; 24 S. G, 461; 26 S. G, 517; 27 S. G, 525; 30 S. G, 242; 32 S. G, 455; 37 S. G, 354; 42 S. G, 339; 52 S. G, 121.

Before Klugh, J., Greenville, November term, 1898. Indictment against Wm. Davis for murder. From verdict of guilty with recommendation to mercy and sentence thereon, defendant appeals. cite: Admission of testimony as to whether the gun had appearance of being recently fired improper, because witnesses were not shown to be experts: 10 S. E. R., 965; 14 lb., 262, 998; 80 N. Y., 301; 42 N. Y., 282; 16 S. W., 31.

Before Townsend,- J., Laurens, January, 1899. Action by Jefferson Sullivan against B. W. Ball and T. H. Henderson, to set aside deed. From Circuit decree, plaintiff appeals. cites: Declarations of Miss Shockley competent, because made while in possession of land, and she reserved a life interest and a beneficial interest — payment of expenses of last illness: 3 S. C., 577; 19 S. C., 477.

Before Gary, J., Saluda, December term, 1898. Indictment against Prince Bouknight for housebreaking and larceny. From order quashing first count in the indictment, and ordering solicitor to elect under which count he would go to trial, the State appeals. As to requiring solicitor to elect: 15 S. C., 434; Crim. Code, 142. Section 142, Crim. Code, contains no exception and requires no negative averment: 37 Am. Dec., 81; 18 Tex.

Before Buchanan, J., Aiken, June, 1898. Foreclosure by James C. Garvin against Robert Garvin, Emanuel Garvin, Melvina Garvin, and T. A. McCreery & Co. The following is the Circuit decree, less the… Held: too, that a judgment or other security may be taken for future responsibilities or future advances.

Before Buchanan, J., Charleston, March, 1898. Indictment against Cyrus Washington, jr., for buying seed cotton without license. From judgment of magistrate, defendant appealed to Circuit Court, and from judgment affirming magistrate he appeals to this Court. cite: Act under zvhich defendant is indicted is unconstitutional: 18 Repr., 667; 75 Mo., 340; 51 S. C, 51.

Before Watts, J., Kershaw, February, 1899. Information against W. R. Roberts for violating ordinance of the city of Camden by selling beef without license. From conviction by mayor and jury he appealed to- Circuit Court, and from affirmation of judgment below he appeals to this Court. cites: 22 Stat., 91; 6 W. & S., 279. cites: 22 Stat., 91; 17 Wend., 265.

Before Benet, J., Beaufort, January, 1899. Foreclosure by the Bank of Hampton against Rhoda L. Fennell and H. J. Addison. From order of reference to take testimony on amounts due plaintiff and defendant, H. J. Addison, the defendant, Rhoda L. Fennell, appeals. cite: Did Judge have jurisdiction at chambers to pass the order? 45 S. C., 8; Rev. Stat., 2247; 47 S. C, 33.

Before Gary, J., Saluda, December, 1898. Claim by Wm. Maxwell against County of Saluda. From judgment by county board against the claim, plaintiff appealed to Circuit Court. From order of Circuit Court allowing claim, the county appeals. cites: Account was not properly proven: Rev. Stat., 691; 25 S. C., 100; 27 S. C, 9. cites: If affidavit was defective, such defect was cured by testimony: 42 S. C, 321, 270; 26 Mich., 422.

Before Aldrich, J., Florence County, winter term, 1899. Action for damages’ for negligent killing of James M. Mayo by J. W. McCown, as administrator of James M. Mayo, against Northeastern Railroad Company. From order granting change of venue, defendant appeals. cite: Granting the motion is discretionary, hut essential facts must appear: 3 McC., 383. Order based on issue of fact rarely disturbed: 38 S. C., 399; 54 S. C., 368; 46 S. C., 317.

Before Gary, J., October term, 1898. xAction for damages received while riding on a freight train by W. M. Steele against Southern Railway. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. The latter cites: The rule that negligence should be presumed from injury on railroad has been modified: 20 S. C, 254; 19 S. C, 59; 16 N. W. R., 388. Rule as to liability of railroads to passengers on freight trains: 93 U. S., 295; 11 S. E. R., 555; S3 Mo.

Before Buchanan, J., Clarendon, October, 1898. Action for damages for killing a cow by Morgan L. Sauls against D. M. Alderman & Sons Co. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. cite: On contributory negligence: 50 S. C., 49. Refusal to charge upon point supported by any evidence is error: 19 Conn., 506; 9 Rich., 92. cites: Refusals to charge not considered, when requests appear only in exceptions: 21 S. C., 261.

Before Watts, J., Sumter, June, 1898. Action for possession of real estate by Ben Anderson, Nero Anderson, and Frank James, against Jordan M. Dicks and Hope Miller. From judgment for defendants, plaintiffs, Ben and Nero Anderson, appeal. cite: Dicks is mortgagee in possession: 37 S. C., 489; 21 S. C, 400; 52 N. Y., 251. Power of sale under mortgage dies with mortgagor: 27 S. C., 309; 47 S. C., 410.

<p>Before Gary, J., Lexington, September, 1898.</p> <p>Action by George W. Miles against The Postal Telegraph Cable Co., for damages for loss of storehouse through negligent maintainance and construction of its wires, and another by PI. B. Setzler against same, for loss of stock of goods in same house from same cause. The charge is much the same in both cases, and in the first case is as follows:</p> <p>The plaintiff’s cause of action is set out in these words, omitting the formal part of the complaint — you will have the complaint before you, and you can see it — the cause of action is set out in these words : “That the defendant carelessly and negligently permitted and allowed- one of its telegraph wires to become loose on one of the insulators attached to the telegraph pole just in front of plaintiff’s storehouse, said insulator being also defective, unsafe and insecure, and carelessly and negligently permitted said telegraph wire to become detached from said defective insulator and telegraph pole, and to swag and fall upon a frame attached to the front of plaintiff’s storehouse, which was used for an awning, and on the night of the said 20th of June, 1897, at about half-past 9 o’clock, said telegraph wire conveyed a current or currents of electricity on and into plaintiffs said storehouse, and thereby caused said storehouse to ignite and burn down.” And the 7th allegation: “And the plaintiff further shows that the defendant erected said telegraph pole at the place aforesaid without the knowledge and consent of the owner of the land on which said pole was erected.” Now you will see from the outset that the gist of this action is negligence on the part of the telegraph company; the telegraph company denies •that it was negligent, denies that its wire conveyed a current or currents of electricity to the store of plaintiff, and caused it to ignite. That makes the issue. The defendant sets up an affirmative defense in these words : “And by way of affirmative defense this defendant alleges: That the cause of action set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint herein was due to no fault on the part of this defendant, but to an act of God, over which this defendant had no control, and could not reasonably anticipate. And by way of further affirmative defense this defendant alleges: That the plaintiff herein contributed to the accident complained of in the complaint, by reason of having constructed and built the building and frame attached thereto, described in the complaint, encroaching upon the line of the public road and post road of the United States, as hereinbefore set forth, and too near to the poles, wires and lines of this defendant, which were lawfully constructed, and had been so constructed and in successful operation long previous to the erection of the premises referred to in the complaint, and anterior to the period at which the alleged accident occurred, as set forth in said complaint, and that the plaintiff herein contributed to the injury complained of in said complaint.” Now you see that is the issue. I have read what the complaint alleges as the cause of action; the defendant denies that, and sets up the further defense that it was an act of God, over which the defendant company had no control; and further, that plaintiff so negligently constructed his house, so near the pole of the telegraph line, as to contribute himself to the negligence. So your first inquiry will be, was the loss or damage to the plaintiff, if any, due to the fact that the Postal Telegraph Company, the defendant in this case, “carelessly and negligently permitted one of its telegraph wires attached to the telegraph pole in front of plaintiff’s store to become detached from a defective insulator, and to swag and fall upon the frame in front of plaintiff’s store, which caused it fi> ignite and burn down” — was the fire due to that cause, or was the fire due to an act of God? And in determining this issue, you will determine whether the store caused the wire to break by reason of the fact that the store was on fire, and heated the same, and caused it to break and become defective, or whether the wire, by reason of the defects complained of, caused the store to ignite. You will observe the defendant claims, contends, that the storehouse caught on fire through no fault of its management or its line of wires, but that by reason of the fact that the storehouse was on fire, it heated the wire, and caused the wire to come back. That is the defendant’s contention. The plaintiff’s contention is that the wires were carelessly and negligently constructed, that they failed to carry off such currents of electricity as would be reasonably anticipated, and by reason of that defect it became detached from a defective insulator, and conveyed the current or currents of electricity into the storehouse of plaintiff, which caused it to ignite and burn down.</p> <p>Now, what was the cause of the fire? In order for plaintiff to recover, he must show by the preponderance of the evidence, not that the fire occurred by lightning, but that it was due to defects in the manner in which the defendant, the Postal Telegraph Company, either constructed its wires, or being properly constructed, in not being kept in proper repair; by reason of defective construction, or not keeping it in proper repair, it failed to .carry the current or currents of electricity that might be reasonably expected that they would carry off, and by reason of that defect it caused it to fall down, and caused the storehouse of the plaintiff to burn. Now, with reference to determining that question, I charge you as matter of law that the Postal Telegraph Company gets its authority to erect its line of wires from the General Assembly of the State, and if it is chartered, it has the right to construct and operate a line of telegraph wires; but the law enjoins upon it this duty, that the wires must be so constructed, and must be kept in such repair, as to withstand all such ordinary storms, or such changes in the weather occasioned by heat or cold, as a man of ordinary prudence and reason would foresee under the circumstances. Now, if it did that, there is no negligence; if it didn’t do that, was it defective ? and from that you determine whether it was negligent, careless in its construction or maintenance. The gist of this action is negligence; you must find negligence to make the company liable. If there was negligence, then did that negligence cause the storehouse of this plaintiff to ignite and burn down? As I take it, the gist of this action is negligence. If you find there was no negligence, then, of course, the cause of action has failed, and the plaintiff could n'ot recover; if there was negligence in the construction of the wire, or in not having it in proper repair, and the injury or damage complained of was occasioned by that defect, then the company would be liable for whatever damage was sustained by reason of that act of negligence.</p> <p>Now, as to the act of God. Of course, it would be a preposterous proposition to say that where one operates a telegraph wire or a railroad wire, that they necessarily become insurers. Lightning frequently ■ strikes ' barns, dwelling houses, when there is no telegraph wire near by. By reason of the fact that a telegraph company erected a wire, they do not necessarily become insurers of property .adjacent; but they are called upon to so construct them that they will not break down, that they will not give way by reason of the fact that a rain storm, or wind storm, or any condition of the weather, that a man in erecting these wires might, with proper prudence, proper forethought, proper care, anticipate; it would be his duty to so erect them as to withstand any such wind storm or changes in the weather, that a man 'of ordinary prudence and foresight could see. But if the accident was due to an act of God, if it was such that a prudent man, of ordinary reason and foresight, could not reasonably anticipate, then negligence could not be attributed to the defendant company; that would be an act of God, for which no one is responsible. A corporation or private individual is not responsible for an act of God, unless the act of God has been induced, the injury or damage contributed to, 'by reason of some defect — in this case, the erection or maintenance of the telegraph line. I mean by that, this: If a telegraph line is so constructed as not to be properly insulated to carry off a current of electricity, and by reason of the defect and the close proximity to the property of another, induced the agency of any force, by the act of God, to destroy this property — in this case, say through the careless management, or careless erection or maintenance of this line —then the party would be responsible, would be indirectly conveying the act of God to this particular property, under these circumstances; but if so erected, that a man of ordinary caution, and prudence, and foresight could not reasonably foresee that this damage would be occasioned by that, there would be no negligence under these circumstances.</p> <p>You have heard considerable about this telegraph wire and its construction, both on the part of the plaintiff and on the part of the defendant. Form your conclusion. Was it constructed in such manner as a man of ordinary foresight and prudence would so construct as to anticipate such casualties, as have been complained of here? If it was so constructed as to reasonably foresee and guard against those, it would not be negligence; if not so constructed, it would be negligence in the party if damage occurred, by reason of that construction. Now, in all cases, both on the criminal and civil side of the Court, each party, plaintiff or defendant, has a right to submit what propositions of law he desires the Court to pass upon, as he deems pertinent or applicable to his side of the case; that is a legal right he has. Counsel have availed themselves of that right; defendant’s counsel has sent up the following requests to' charge — some of which I have allowed, and others I have disallowed. Those of them I think applicable and will aid you in coming to' a conclusion in this case, I am going to give you, and those I don’t think will aid you, I will refuse. In this case, from counsel’s argument on the propositions of law, I have derived a great deal of information, just as you frequently derive information from arguments on the facts of a case; but after all you must determine the facts for yourselves, and I must determine the law for myself. You hear arguments on the facts, and you draw your own conclusion. I hear arguments on questions of law, and I draw my conclusions, and give you those that are properly stated.</p> <p>In reference to this allegation of the complaint: “7th. And the plaintiff further shows that the defendant erected said telegraph pole at the place aforesaid without the knowledge and consent of the owner of the land on which said pole was erected.” Now, with reference to their right to erect this telegraph line at this particular point, I charge you this proposition of law: “If the jury find that the defendant in this case, the Postal Telegraph Cable Company, was, at the time of the injury complained of, and previous thereto, a telegraph company duly incorporated and organized under the laws of the State of New York, and that it had accepted the provisions of the act of Congress of .July 24th, 1866, and that under the provisions of that act, and the acts of Congress amendatory thereof, it had erected its poles and wires along the continuation of Center street, just outside of the corporate limits of the village of New Brookland, and that the said continuation of Center street was used by the public as a highway, upon which they traveled to and fro at will, then I charge you that the defendant lawfully erected its lines upon said continuation of Center street, and that it had a right to work and operate said lines of poles and wires upon said continuation of Center street.” Plaintiff contends it was put there without the authority of the owner of the land. That is in reference to that allegation of the complaint. “2. If the jury find that the defendant in this case, the Postal Telegraph Cable Company, was, at the time of the injury complained of, and previous thereto, a telegraph company duly incorporated and organized under the laws of the State of New York, and that it had accepted the provisions of the act of Congress of July 24th, 1866, and' that under the provisions of that act, and the acts of Congress amendatory thereof, it had erected its poles and wires along the continuation of Center street, just outside of the corporate limits of the village of New Brookland, and that the land upon which it erected its poles and strung its wires was the property of John R. Shuler, and that he gave permission for the erection of the said lines, and has never revoked such permission, then I charge you that the defendant lawfully erected its lines upon said continuation of Center street, and that it had a right to work and operate said lines of poles and wires upon said continuation of Center street.” I charge you further, that if this is the land of Mr. Shuler, whether he gave the company permission to erect a telegraph line on his line or not, if it is erected there and in operation, no third party can punish the telegraph line upon the ground that it is on land of Mr. Shuler without his consent; Mr. Shuler is the party to make that objection, and not the third party.</p> <p>The third request I refuse. The fourth I give you: “If the jury reach the conclusion that the injury complained of was due to an act of God, over which the defendant had no control, and could not reasonably anticipate, then I charge you that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.” I have already charged you that if it was an act of God over which the defendant had no control, and could not reasonably anticipate, then I charge you the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.</p> <p>The fifth I charge you: “I charge you that the plaintiff in this action, whose suit is founded on the alleged negligence of the defendant, must not only establish the negligence by competent evidence, but he must show that such negligence was the cause of the injury for which he sues.” That I charge you, as I have already done.</p> <p>The sixth I charge you in part only: “The question for you is, were these lines erected so as to anticipate any ordinary occurrence in the weather? Was it the act of God, or was it the careless or loose manner in which the wires were erected, which caused this alleged wire to break ? If the testimony satisfied you that it was broken, and that the breaking of the wire was the cause of the injury complained of; if it was-the act of God — that is, such an act that a business man of ordinary forethought and prudence could not anticipate — then the company would not be liable under these' circumstances. But, on the other hand, the company is charged with so placing their wires, and so keeping them in repair, as to withstand the ordinary weather, rain, heat, cold and wind.” That I charge you. The balance I refuse.</p> <p>The seventh I refuse. The eighth I refuse. The ninth I refuse. The tenth I refuse.</p> <p>The eleventh I give you: “I further charge you that an injury that could not have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated as the probable result of an act of negligence, is not actionable.” That I charge you to be the law.</p> <p>The twelfth I give you: “I further charge you that an injury that is not the natural consequence of an act of negligence, and that would not have resulted from it, but for the interposition of a new and independent cause, is not actionable.”</p> <p>The thirteenth I refuse.</p> <p>The fourteenth I charge you: “I further charge you that if the plaintiff fails to show that the negligence with which he charges the defendant was the proximate cause of the injury, he cannot recover.” The negligence complained of must be the proximate cause of the injury. * * *</p> <p>From judgment for plaintiff in both cases defendant appeals.</p> <p>cite: As to charge on the facts: Art. V., sec. 26, Con. 1895; 47 S. C., 488; 49 S. C., 497, 558, 294; no U. S., 582; 51 S. C, 453; 25 S. C., 30; 53 S. C, 448. As to injuries arising from “many fortuitous circumstances:” 55 Fed. R., 949; 94 U. S., 469; 85 Pa. St, 293; 1 Strob., 525; 8 Taunt., 535; 8 East., 1; 7 Bing., 211; 20 Wend., 223. As to refusal to admit the rules of the Society of American Electrical Engineers: 4 R. I., 528;''36 Eng. L. & E., 510.</p> <p>cite: In considering errors in charge, it must be considered as a whole: 22 S. C., 191; 23 S. C., 199; 29 S. E. R., 259. Charge contains all the law applicable to case of this kind: 22 S. E. R., 767. No error to state issues raised by pleading: 28 S. E. R., 193; 27 S. E. R., 555; 27 S. E. R., 613; 24 S. E. R., 291; 24 S. E. R., 812. No error to refuse request when substance has been given: 30 S. E. R., 697, 617; 29 S. E. R., 233; 20 S. E. R., 745. Nor when already given: 26 S. E. R., 669; 28 S. E. R., 301; 24 S. E. R., 812. Nor when it assumes existence of a fact: 23 S. C., 110,284. Nor when it contains unsound proposition of law: 30 S. C., 602; 22 S. E. R., 771. Stating hypothetical case is not charging on facts: 22 S. C., 164; 25 S. E. R., 797; 27 S. E. R., 555; 27 S. E. R., 613; 28 S. E. R., 193.</p>

Before Townsend, J., Laurens, October, 1898. Action by Augustus Blakely, by his guardian ad litem, Thad. Blakely, against Laurens County, for damages resulting from defective repairs in bridge on public highway. From order granting nonsuit, plaintiff appeals. cites: As to proximate cause: 3 Wils., 403.

Before Aldrich, J., Barnwell, November, 1898. Action for possession of real estate by Augusta A. D. Bostick against Eloise Chovin. From order overruling demurrer to answer, plaintiff appeals. cites: 25 S. C., 481; 36 S. C., 576; 25 S. C., 99; 19 S. C, 242; 20 S. C., 248. cite: 27 S. C., 109; 42 S. C., 138; 25 S. C., 481; 21 S. C., 127; 41 S. C, 117; 45 S. C, 51; 49 S. C, 54; 19 S. C., 243.

Before Klugh, J., Lexington, January, 1898. Action by Joseph W. Eargle against Julius E. Lorick, J. H. Amick, C. M. Efird, and G. J. Slice. The Circuit decree is as follows: The defendant, J. H. Amick, was indebted upon a mortgage to Julius E. Lorick, and also upon a junior mortgage of the same land to J. W. Eargle. Lorick brought suit to foreclose his mortgage and made Eargle a party.

Before Watts, J.’, Marlboro,' October, 1898. Action on note by John T. McNair against James G. Moore, executor of Henry Moore.' From order sustaining demurrer to answer, defendant appeals. cite: Holder of note can only recover principal, when maker is at place of payment on date of maturity offering to pay: 13 Pet., 150; 11 Wheat., 175; 17 Johns, 24; 6 Whar., 330; 6 Barb., 258; 2 S. C., 253; 3 Rich., 313.

Before Townsend, J., Anderson, March, 1899. Motion by J. N. Willingham, administrator of John Willingham, in case of W. A. Willingham v. A. L. Willingham and J. N. Willingham, as administrator of John Willing-ham, for certificate on execution that process was issued on purchase money contract.

<p>Before Townsend, J., Laurens, October, 1898.</p> <p>Motion by W. P. Hill, W. E. Hill, Florence Hill, James S. Hill, Elizabeth Ann Harris, Mary Francis Hill, John Allgood, Alice Allgood, Hattie Allgood and Minnie All-good, petitioners. In re John Allgood against V. B. Robertson, as administrator of Wiley Hill, deceased, and others, to vacate judgment. From order refusing motion, movers appeal.</p> <p>cite: After expiration of date for deposit of costs, complaint stood dismissed: 30 S. C., 458; 2 Bail., 606. Judge Hudson could not modify Judge Witherspoon’s order: 9 Rich., 411; 2 S. C., 39031 S. C., 427.-</p> <p>cite: Circuit decree not appealed from is final: 40 S. C, 189; 18 S. C., 602; 38 S. C., 193. Parties had a right to zvaive the provisions of the order requiring deposit for costs, and such waiver nullified the order: 2 Rich., 10; 31 S. C, 432; 8 Rich., 258. Order of nonsuit may he waived, and case redocketed and tried: 4 Strob., 193; 29 S. C., 239.</p>

Before Klugh, J., Abbeville, October, 1898. Action by Julia E. Norris against Hartford Fire Insurance Co. and Agnes L. La wing.

Before Buci-ianan, J., Florence, September, 1898. Action by C. Wulbern & Co. against Mattie E. Timmons and John T. Nissen, administrators of L. R. Timmons. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. cite: Trust may be declared by parol: 23 Am. Rep., 447; 14 S. C., 216. Identiñcation of trust funds by special marks not necessary, when same can be followed: 57 Am. R., 290; 96 N. Y., 32; 30 Kans., 156; 52 Am. R., 802; 44 Am. Dec., 400.

Before Klugh, J.. Greenville, December, 1898. Motion in case of William Bryson against Gilbert Whilden by defendant to set aside judgment by default onground of excusable neglect. From order refusing motion, defendant appeals. cite: Facts show excusable neglect in serving answer: 29 S. E. R., 68; 17 S. C., 445.

Before Klugh, J., Anderson, October, 1898. Action by Thomas H. Prater against J. S. Wilson and W. K Williams for conversion of cotton. Held: or which Wilson held. Therefore, they claim that the seizure of the cotton and conversion of it was legal, and that they have not damaged the plaintiff, and ask that his complaint be dismissed.

Before Gage, J., Laurens, February, 1899. Information against C. R. Elmore for violation of ordinance of city of Laurens for selling picture frames without license. From order of Circuit Court sustaining appeal of defendant from judgment of mayor, the city of Laurens appeals. cite: 100 U. S., 607; 145 U. S., 1. The latter cites: 52 S. C, 508; 156 U. S., 296; 12 Cush., 495; 153 U. S., 289; 47 Fed. R., 208; 120 U. S., 489; 39 Kan., 764; 39 S. W. .R., 1; 133 Pa. St., 284.

Before Klugh, J., Anderson, October term, 1898. Action for damages by John K. Owings against Money-nick Oil Mill, on the following complaint: I. That the defendant is a corporation duly chartered under and by the laws of the State of South Carolina, having its principal place of business at Pelzer, S. C. II. That on or about the nth day of November, 1897, the plaintiff was in the employ of the defendant at Pelzer, S. C., as a laborer. III.

Before Buchanan, J., Florence, September, 1898. Action by M. L. Timmons against D. C. Turner, administrator of R. W. Turner, R. C. McLendon, sheriff, and J. W. McCown, clerk, on the following complaint: I. That on the 28th day of February, A. D. 1894, the defendant, R. W. Turner, in consideration of advances which this plaintiff at the same time agreed to make to said defendant for agricultural purposes, executed to this plaintiff a lien on the crop or crops to be made on…

Before Aldrich, J., Bamberg, December, 1898. Application for rule to- show cause by plaintiff, in J. W. Barnes v. W..H. Bamberg. From order refusing rule, the plaintiff appeals.

Before Buchanan, J., Sumter, October, 1898. Claim by A. D. Moses against Sumter County for fees for holding inquest as coroner. From order of county board of commissioners refusing to pay claim, claimant appealed to Circuit Court. From order of that Court reversing board, county appeals.

Before Krtjgh, J., Anderson, December, 1898. Action by W. T. Dean against Charleston and Western Car. R. R. Co., for damages for burning the trees, underbrush, and leaves on ten acres of land. From judgment by D. N. Russell, magistrate, in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals to Circuit Court, and from judgment affirming magistrate, it appeals. cites: On second question: 37 Me., 92; Ross.v. R. R. Co., 6 Allen; Grissell v. Ry. Co., 32 E. & A. Ry.

Before Kitjgh, J., Pickens, October, 1898. Action for possession of land by Benjamin Smith and Andrew Smith against R. F. Smith. From Circuit order granting nonsuit because issues raised are res judicata, plaintiffs appeal on following exceptions: 1. His Honor erred in not construing the deed from Perrin O’Dell to' Robt. N. Smith, Benj.

<p>Before Aldrich, J., Barnwell, January, 1899.</p> <p>Action in partition by M. R. Brickie against F. M. Leach, Mary A. Dantzler, Lizzie Gates, Hattie C. Bruce, W. F. Patrick, B. W. Gates, J. R. Hamilton, as executor of F. W. Fairey, and Susan E. Cooner, Maggie Fairey, Rachael A. Hamilton, Eugenie Reeves, Fannie Fairey, Bettie Fairey, Marie Fairey, Franklin W. Fairey, and Franklin Fairey.</p> <p>The deed of partition referred to in the opinion is as follows :</p> <p>State of South Carolina, County of Barnwell. This agreement, made by and between W. F. Patrick and his wife, Carrie M. Patrick; V. V. Brickie and his wife, Rachael Ann M. Brickie, of Bamberg, Barnwell County, State of South Carolina; Thos. B. Leach and his wife, Francis M. Leach, of Greenville, Greenville County, and State aforesaid; S. D. Dantzler and his wife,' Mary A. Dantzler, of Autaugaville, Autauga County, State of Alabama; B. W. Gates and his wife, Elizabeth E. Gates, of Bamberg, Barn-well County, State of South Carolina; and A. H. Bruce and his wife, Hattie C. Bruce, of Rowesville, Orangeburg County, State aforesaid, this 21st day of November, 1889, to wit: The following division of certain property owned by the above named parties in common, shall be binding on each and every one of the parties, according to the terms and stipulations hereinafter contained. First. Each husband and wife above mentioned being entitled to $400.22 in said property, it is mutually agreed that: 1st. W. F. Patrick and his wife, Carrie M. Patrick, shall have in settlement of their interest one storehouse and lot located on Bamberg street, valued at $235.92, and $164.30 in cash. 2d. V. V. Brickie and his wife, R. A. M. Brickie, shall have in settlement of their interest one certain house and lot on the new road to Cowpens Ford, valued at $250, and one vacant lot fronting sixty feet on Bamberg street, valued at $100, and $50.22 in cash. 3d. Thos. B. Leach and his wife, Francis M. Leach, shall have in settlement of their interest their indebtedness of $129.63, and an interest amounting to $270.59 in one certain house and lot fronting 200 feet, more or less, on Elm street, said lot being valued at $700; also, they shall pay the parties in interest $29.19 for the remaining interest in the said house and lot. 4th. S. D. Dantzler and his wife, Mary A. Dantzler, shall have in settlement of their interest a share amounting to $400.22 in the Crossroads or Zeigler place, said place containing 178 acres, more or less, valued at $1,068; also they shall pay to the parties interested $185.41 for the remaining interest in the said Crossroads or Zeigler place. 5th. B. W. Gates and his wife, Elizabeth E. Gates, shall have in settlement of their interest, a share amounting to $482.37 in the Crossroads or Zeigler place, said place containing 178 acres, more or less, valued at $1,068. 6th. A. H. Bruce and his wife, Hattie C. Bruce, shall have in settlement of their interest a share or interest amounting to $400.22 in one certain house and lot fronting 200 feet, more or less, on Elm street, said lot being valued at $700. And it is further agreed by and between the parties above named that they hereby bind themselves to secure unto the above named parties who have accepted their interest in real estate good and sufficient titles to said property, and unitedly to defend the same. And also it is further agreed that W. F'. Patrick shall act and is hereby appointed as our lawful agent to transact all other business pertaining to the securing of deeds, collecting rents, notes and accounts, and any other matters of interest whatsoever. In witness whereof we have affixed our hands and seals the day and year above written. W. F. Patrick, Carrie M. Patrick, V. V. Brickie, R. A. M. Brickie, T. B. Leach, F. M. Leach, S. D. Dantzler, M. A. Dantzler, B. W. Gates, E. E. Gates, A. H. Bruce, H. C. Bruce, [l. s.] Witness'. J. J. Hughes, W. B. Brickie, M. B. Leach, W. J. Zimmerman, J. L. Dantzler, L. B. Fowke, W. C. Crum.</p> <p>So much of the Circuit decree as relates to the questions made by the appeal is as follows :</p> <p>Upon the reading of the pleadings, J. R. Hamilton, as executor of F. W. Fairey, and a defendant herein, demurred to the 4th, 5th, and 6th paragraphs of the answer of his co-defendants, B. W. Gates and lizzie E. Gates, “wherein it is alleged as affirmative relief, that the deed given to- F. W. Fairejq the said Hamilton, testator, while'it is absolute on its face, yet it was intended to secure a debt and was intended as a mortgage, upon the ground that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense or cause of action.” The demurrer, which is in writing, and was duly submitted, states in three paragraphs the specific objections to the said answer. Counsel for the executor cited, in support of the demurrer, numerous authorities, chiefly from other States. It was not necessary for the Gates to allege in their answer that Fairey procured the deed from them, or either of them, through the ignorance of the grantor, or through mistake, undue influence or fraud, because if, as matter of fact, such was not the case, such allegations would have been improper. The answer does allege that the deed, though absolute upon its face, was at the time it was executed, given by grantors, and received by Mr. Fairey as a security only, a mortgage, to secure a certain amount of money. I think that the answer is sufficient. The lapse of time is not sufficient to defeat the relief asked for, and is no ground of demurrer. The demurrer is overruled.</p> <p>The case was heard by me upon the pleadings and the testimony taken by the master. The action is for the partition of the land described in the complaint, the plaintiff alleging in her complaint that she and certain of the defendants are cotenants on said land. Most of the answers deny this co-tenancy, and set up a deed of partition, dated November 21 st, 1889, made between the parties who then owned this land and other lands in common. By said deed the tract of land described in the complaint was assigned to the defendants, Mary A. Dantzler, B. W. Gates, and Lizzie E. Gates, and other lands to the other parties, including the plaintiff. All of the parties went into possession of the lands assigned to them, respectively, assigned to them under and in pursuance of said deed. Most of the defendants contend that plaintiff is estopped by said deed, and has no interest in the land described in the complaint, and of which she demands partition. There is no reference in the complaint to this deed of partition and settlement, no attack made upon it, and plaintiff has never taken any step to have it set aside. She makes no offer to surrender the land which she took under the deed, and her complaint is for the partition of the lands assigned to her sisters and held by them. The evidence shows that the various parties interested in the several parcels went into possession of said parts so assigned immediately after the execution of the said deed of partition, and remained in such possession of the same as their own property. There was no mistake or fraud in the making or execution of said deed, and no advantage taken of any one. The lands partitioned in 1889 were owned by the plaintiff, her brother, and several sisters, in common. The partition was made as a family settlement and to save expense. All of the parties were of full age. The sisters, or ladies, were represented at the time of the partition by their husbands— for the husband of each signed the deed. Each sister was attending to her own affairs, looking after her own interest in person, and also had the benefit of her husband’s advice and aid. Counsel for plaintiff argued that the written agreement to partition the land, executed in 1889, was impracticable and impossible of performance — because an acre of land assigned to plaintiff has never been delivered to- her yet because of some defect in the - title — and because no money has ever passed, as stipulated in the agreement to be paid to make said partition equal. I can see no defect, legally speaking, in the title to the acre of land referred to. It is true that Y. Y. Brickie, the husband of plaintiff, testified that he once owned the land, but he also testified that he had agreed to sell it to G. Y. Patrick, had made him bond for title; that Patrick had paid for it, taken possession of it, and built a house on it. G. Y. Patrick was the father of the plaintiff, he died, and that upon his death, plaintiff, her brothers and sisters, as heirs at law of their father, included that lot in the partition made in 1889. Assuming that V. V. Brickie never made a title to G. Y. Patrick, then the legal title would be in Y. V. Brickie, and the equitable and real title would have been in G. Y. Patrick during his life, and in his heirs upon his death. V. V. Brickie and all the heirs at law of G. Y. Patrick were parties to the deed of partition in 1889. All under their hands and seals signed and executed and delivered the same. I can see no legal defect in the title of plaintiff to- this acre of land, and, under the circumstances, I consider her title sufficient. This reasoning is upon the assumption that the facts are as stated. The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to show these facts. No written deeds, bonds for title, &c., as above referred to, were put in evidence. All that we know is based upon parol testimony. The evidence shows that G. Y. Patrick was in possession of the lot when he died, that it passed to his heirs, and they partitioned it among themselves. I hold, under the law and the testimony, that said deed of partition made in 1889 was, and is, binding upon the parties thereto; that plaintiff has no- interest in the land sought to be partitioned, and that plaintiff is estopped from maintaining this action by said deed. I refer, among other cases, as containing the law applicable to- this action, tO' Smith v. Tanner, 32 S. C., 259; Roundtree v. Lane, 32 S. C., 160; Kennemore v. Kennemore, 26 S. C, 251; McCreery v. Blume, 17 S. C., 54; Kennedy v. Ettizvan Phos. Cor., 17 S. C., 420; an áStoney v. McNeile, 1 McC., 85. * * *</p> <p>It is further ordered and adjudged, that the defendant, J. R. Hamilton, as executor of the estate of F. W. Fairey, do pay to Hattie C. Bruce $100 within ninety days from notice of this decree, and, failing so to do, the said Hattie C. Bruce is hereby given judgment in her favor and against the said J. R. Hamilton, as executor as aforesaid, for the sum of $100, with leave to issue execution therefor.</p> <p>As the litigation was begun b}r the plaintiff, and as she has failed to sustain her complaint, she is responsible for much of the litigation, and it is ordered that the plaintiff do pay one-half of the costs of this action, to be taxed by the clerk of this Court. As much of the litigation was due to the efforts of the executor of F. W. Fairey, and to' that of those who claim under said F. W. Fairey, to sustain as deeds the conveyance herein held to be only securities, and as those efforts have failed, I think that the executor of the estate of F. W. Fairey should pay the remaining half of the costs of this action, to be taxed by the clerk of this Court, and accordingly it is so 'ordered, adjudged, and decreed.</p> <p>From this decree the plaintiff and the defendant, J. R. Hamilton, as executor of F. W. Fairey, appeal; the defendants, F. M. Leach, Mary A. Dantzler, Lizzie E. Gates, Hattie C. Bruce, W. T. Patrick, and B. W. Gates, are respondents.</p> <p>cite: Equity zsoill not declare a deed absolute, a mortgage in absence of allegations and proof that it zvas procured through ignorance of grantor, or through mistake, undue influence or fraud: io S. E. R., 140; 20 S. E. R., 700; 3 Rich. Eq., 163; t DeS., 345; 11 S. E. R., 240. The conditions stated in the lease not being complied with, the sale becomes absolute: 33 S. C.,' 494; 3 S. E. R., 600. Inadequacy of price zvill not convert a deed into a mortgage: 31 S. C., 277. Facts do not warrant the finding that the deed zvas intended as a mortgage: 54 S. C., 164; 52 S. C., 54. No issue not necessarily involved in the action can be determined therein: 48 S. C., 130. Hamilton did not voluntarily come into case, and should not be required to pay one-half costs: 43 S. C., 352. Neither should plaintiff be so required, as some action was absolutely necessary to settle these matters: 36 S. C, 138.</p> <p>cite: Testimony of Bruce was not incompetent, under sec. 400, 47 S. C., 492. A deed absolute may in equity by extrinsic and parol evidence be shown to be a mortgage: 52 S. C., 54. In equity suits costs are wholly zvithin discretion of Circuit Judge: 15 S. C., 194, 610, 612; 20 S. C., 34; 22 S. C, 271; 24 S. C, 264; 24 S. C, 525; 52 S. C, no. In absence of fraud or mistake the partition agreement or deed is binding on the parties: 32 S. C., 259, 160; 26 S. C, 25; 17 S. C., 54, 420; 1 McC., 55.</p> <p>cites : Testimony of Bmce zvas competent: 3 S. C., 425; 9 S. C., 392: 25 S. C., 228; 26 S. C., 160. Plaintiff is estopped from claiming any interest in the land by reason of the partition agreement: 32 S. C., 259; 26 S. C., 251; 17 S. C., 420; 1 McC., 85; 3 McC., 429. Plaintiff brought the action, has failed, and should pay costs: 15 S. C, 611, 612; 18 S. C, 560; 20 S. C, 34; 21 S. C., 183; 22 S. C., 271; 24 S. C., 264, 595; 52 S. C., no.</p>

Before Benet, J., Charleston, December, 1898. Action by Pope Manufacturing G>. against William H. Welch and Edward B. Welch, copartners, undér the name and style of The Charleston Cycle Co. From order dismissing and striking out first and second counter-claims, interposed by defendant, E. B. Welch, defendants appeal. cite: A partnership contract is joint and several, and one member may set up as a counter-claim a debt due him as an individual against partnership debt: Code,…

Before Gary, J., Richland, October, 1898. Action for damages by Alice E. Oliver and her husband, P. M. Oliver, against Columbia, Newberry and Laurens R. R. Co. From Circuit order overruling defendant’s demurrer it appeals. cite: The duties of a railroad to an idler or trespasser are negative: 18 Wis., 175. Defendant only bound to carry plaintiff to Clinton; beyond that point it sold ticket as agent: 21 S. C., 39.

Before Townsend, J., Spartanburg, December, 1898. Motion to dissolve an attachment in Hampton Bros. v. Matilda Bogan. From order dissolving attachment, plaintiffs appeal. The following is the bond in question: State of South Carolina, County of Spartanburg, Court of Common Pleas.

<p>Petition for mandamus in the original jurisdiction of the Court by J. H. Garrison against City of Laurens and Laurens Cotton Mills.</p>

Before Benet, J., Barnwell, March, 1899. Action by Elizabeth A. Brown against Charles F. Pechman. From order of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals on the following exceptions: 1.

Before Benet, J., Spartanburg, April, 1898. Action by James S. Welch against The Clifton Manufacturing Company. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. cite: Evidence as. to other post-dated checks improper: 24 S. S., 366. Plaintiff is estopped from maintaining this action by having received a post-dated check: 6 N. W. R., 131.

Before Townsend, J., Greenville, March, 1899. Action by Mrs. F. C. McBryde against South Carolina Mutual Insurance Co. From order of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals. cites: Nonsuit should not have been granted, (a) because of evidence of waiver: 36 S. C., 273; 9 S. E. R., 233. (6) because by-laws do not provide for forfeiture for defect in proofs of loss: 102 Pa. St, 281; 13 S. W. R., 882714 S. E. R., 237; 51 S. C., 540; 96 U. S., 242.

Before Townsend, J., Laurens, December, 1898. Information against W. R. Crawford for violation of ordinance of the city of Laurens. From order of Circuijt Court overruling decision of mayor, city of Laurens appeals.