Dixon v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It would seem to me that it is intellectually dishonest to pretend that Dixon was not prejudiced by L.A.’s silence. The record clearly reflects that at the time of voir dire L.A. was a criminal defendant, who for all practical purposes was in the middle of negotiating a plea agreement with the State. I believe that it would be difficult for a juror in L.A.’s position to be unbiased. I certainly do not believe that we can presume, despite L.A.’s protest to the contrary, that she was unaffected by her relationship with the State. [[Image here]] “... Jurors know that it is their job to be fair and to avoid prejudice and bias. They are so instructed during the court’s oral charge. After a trial, asking a juror if her verdict was affected by anything that would reflect on her ability to be fair, especially after that juror has been thoroughly questioned by defense counsel, is extremely unlikely to elicit a positive response. In essence the juror would have to admit her misconduct or bias in open court and to testify that she intentionally disregarded her duty to be fair. The juror would be unfamiliar with what would be the personal consequences of such an admission and might very well fear that she would be held in contempt or charged with a crime such as obstruction of justice if she admitted that her verdict was tainted by her bias. For these reasons it is unwise to place great weight on an answer affirming a lack of bias.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 55 So. 3d 1257 - Dixon v. State

2. ““Certainly it would be a serious concern if a prospective juror was subject to the discretionary decisions of the district attorney. Human nature being what it is, it would have been natural for defense counsel to be suspicious about a juror who was beholden to the State, and to be reluctant to take the chance that the juror might be biased and wanting to curry favor with the State by voting to convict. Indeed, trial counsel testified that had L.A. been truthful he would have attempted to strike her for cause, and, failing that, he would have exercised a peremptory challenge and struck her from the venire.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 55 So. 3d 1257 - Dixon v. State