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← 55 U.S. 25 - John Brown Administrator of John Aspden Deceased et al. v. Mathias Aspden's Administrators et al.

John Brown Administrator of John Aspden Deceased et al. v. Mathias Aspden's Administrators et al.’s Empirical Analysis

55 U.S. 25 · 1852

Citation profile

30
cited by 30 later decisions
4
cited 4 times by the Supreme Court
8
states following
April 1957
most recently cited

5 federal appellate · 1 district · 10 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 30 later decisions (4 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 1957 · most notably Bronson v. Schulten (1881), Wetmore v. Karrick (1907)

5 federal appellate · 1 district · 10 state decisions

7018521860187018801890190019101920193019401950decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Aspden v. Nixon · Ex parte Many

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““A motion lias been made for a rehearing in this case, and we have been referred to the practice of the English Chancery Court in support of the application. The argument presupposes that this court, in cases in equity, has adopted the rules and practice of the English chancery. But this is a mistake. The English chancery is a court of original jurisdiction; and this court is sitting as an appellate tribunal. It would be impossible, from the nature and office of the two tribunals, to adopt the same rules of practice in both. * * * In tiie House of Lords, in England, to which the appeal lies from tiie Court of Chancery, a rehearing is altogether unknown. A reargument, indeed, may be ordered, if the house desires it, for its own satisfaction. But the chancery rules in relation to reheariugs, in the technical sense of the word, are altogether inapplicable to the proceedings on the appeal. “Undoubtedly this court may and would call for a reargument, where doubts are entertained which it is supposed may be removed by further discussion at the bar. And this may be done after judgment is entered, provided the order for reargument is entered at the same term. But the rule of the court is this: That no reargument will be heard in any case after judgment is entered, unless some member of the court who concurred in the judgment after-wards doubts the correctness of his opinion, and desires a further argument on the subject. And when that happens, the court will, of its own accord, appri”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.