55 Va. App. 1 - Bly v. Commonwealth’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We concluded in Bly , Accordingly, here, as in Deville , where “a trial judge, sitting as ‘both trier of fact and arbiter of law,’ finds the Brady evidence inconsequential, there can be ‘no logical possibility’ that its earlier disclosure “would have altered the outcome of the case.’ ” Id. at 757-58, 627 S.E.2d at 532 (quoting Stroik v. State, 671 A.2d 1335, 1340 (Del.1996)). That is because, “[u]nder such circumstances, we need not hypothesize how a reasonable jury would likely have reacted to the new information. We know with certitude, from the factfinder himself, that the outcome of the proceeding would not have been different had the evidence been disclosed earlier.” Id. However, as further explained in Deville , “a trial court cannot foreclose appellate review by an ipse dixit denial of prejudice. Just as the original finding of guilt must fail if no ‘rational trier of fact’ could have made such a finding, so too the factual finding of no prejudice should be set aside if patently unreasonable.” Id. (internal citations omitted).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 55 Va. App. 624 - Coley v. Commonwealth

2. “In Brady , this Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. We have since held that the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by the accused, and that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. Such evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Moreover, the rule encompasses evidence known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor. In order to comply with Brady , therefore, the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in this case, including the police.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bly v. Com.

3. ““Absent clear evidence to the contrary in the record, the judgment of a trial court comes to us on appeal with a presumption that the law was correctly applied to the facts.” Caprino v. Commonwealth, 53 Va.App. 181, 184 , 670 S.E.2d 36, 37-38 (2008) (quoting Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978 , 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977)); see Groves v. Commonwealth, 50 Va.App. 57, 61-62 , 646 S.E.2d 28, 30 (2007) (“This means the ‘judge is presumed to know the law and apply it correctly in each case.’ ” (quoting Crest v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 165 , 172 n. 3, 578 S.E.2d 88 , 91 n. 3 (2003))).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 55 Va. App. 624 - Coley v. Commonwealth