Holt v. Black’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The guarantee against double jeopardy is significantly different from procedural guarantees held in the Linkletter line of cases to have prospective effect only. While this guarantee, like the others, is a constitutional right of the criminal defendant, its practical result is to prevent a trial from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe procedural rules that govern the conduct of a trial. A number of the constitutional rules applied prospectively only under the Linkletter cases were found not to affect the basic fairness of the earlier trial, but to have been directed instead to collateral purposes such as the deterrence of unlawful police conduct, Mapp v. Ohio, supra [ 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 ]. In Waller, however, the Court’s ruling was squarely directed to the prevention of the second trial’s taking place at all, even though it might have been conducted with a scrupulous regard for all of the constitutional procedural rights of the defendant. “We would not suggest that the distinction that we draw is an ironclad one that will invariably result in the easy classification of cases in one category or the other. The element of reliance embodied in the Linkletter analysis will not be wholly absent in the case of constitutional decisions not related to trial procedure . . . .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 179 Ind. App. 87 - Bey v. State

2. ““[T]he fundamental changes in constitutional law which require reversal of this case occurred well before appellant’s trial in 1973. In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), the Supreme Court decisively rejected any Constitutional distinction between the ‘civil’ law nature of Juvenile Court proceedings and the ‘criminal’ law nature of courts of general adult jurisdiction. When in 1969 the Supreme Court held for the first time that the double jeopardy clause was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the constitutional ban upon two prosecutions — one in a juvenile court adjudication and the other (after waiver) in the adult criminal court — was complete. Since Benton [Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 ] and before Breed a number of states have held that the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution applied to juveniles.” [Citations omitted.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 179 Ind. App. 87 - Bey v. State

3. ““[I]n 1973 when appellant was tried twice for the same offense in the state courts of Kentucky, there was then no basis for reliance upon any United States Supreme Court opinion which could be read as allowing that practice in the face of the double jeopardy clause.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 179 Ind. App. 87 - Bey v. State