¶1*350Karl Fryzel * with whom Michael E. Geltner, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court) and Timothy J. Hmielewski * were on the brief for appellants.
¶2Alexia Morrison, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., and John A. Terry, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.
¶3Before WRIGHT, McGOWAN and TAMM, Circuit Judges.
¶5Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge McGOWAN.
¶7On November 11, 1974, the Seventh Street branch of the National Bank of Washington was robbed by two armed men who wore hats completely covering their hair, but employed no other form of disguise. The bandits disarmed the bank’s private security guard immediately upon entering the bank lobby. While one stood watch, the other proceeded through the bank manager’s office into the tellers’ cage area, where he filled a brown paper bag with bills of various denominations. The entire incident consumed less than five minutes. A subsequent audit revealed that the robbers fled with $13,214 in cash, as well as the bank guard’s revolver.
¶8Under an indictment filed in the District Court on February 12,1975, appellants were convicted by a jury of armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970)) and armed robbery (of the gun; 22 D.C.Code §§ 2901, 3202 (1973)). On appeal both appellants claim to have been denied effective assistance of counsel. Appellant Gartrell asserts further that his conviction should be overturned because the trial judge ruled that a prior attempted robbery conviction could be used to impeach him if he chose to testify. We find appellants’ contentions unpersuasive with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel, but we think that the trial court must reexamine the ruling challenged by Gartrell. Accordingly, the conviction of *351Smith is affirmed, and the case is remanded ' as to Gartrell for further proceedings of the nature hereinafter described.
¶9I
¶10Appellants maintain that they were deprived of effective legal representation through trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress their in-court identifications by three government witnesses. These identifications, so it is said, were constitutionally suspect because they followed in the wake of suggestive pre-trial investigation procedures. In particular, appellants object to the fact that local police and a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent displayed certain photographs to the Government’s identification witnesses during the pretrial period.
¶11On the day after the crime, and again on the day of appellants’ trial, surveillance film pictures taken by bank cameras while the robbery was in progress were shown to all three identification witnesses — the private security guard, the Seventh Street branch manager, and a teller.1 Prior to appellants’ arrest, the same three individuals also viewed several arrays of photographs from police files, and identified from among them appellant Smith or appellant Gartrell or both.2
¶12Appellants contend that exhibition of the bank surveillance pictures was im*352proper because likely to result in retention of the image observed therein, rather than recall of the persons actually seen on the day of the robbery. With respect to the police photo arrays, appellants voice at least two complaints: first, that in some instances the arrays were displayed so long after tfie robbery as to be inherently suggestive, and thus to cast doubt on all subsequent identifications by the viewers; and second, that in any event the arrays were unnecessary since the police had probable cause to arrest appellants even without photo identification by the government witnesses, and therefore could have resorted directly to the presumably more reliable lineup procedure. In light of this allegedly objectionable official behavior, appellants claim that trial counsel were duty-bound to move to suppress the subsequent testimony of government identification witnesses. Their failure to make such motion, in appellants’ view, constitutes grounds for reversal and a new trial. We disagree.
¶13Appellants have not demonstrated that their representation by trial counsel was inadequate. In U. S. v. DeCoster, 159 U.S. App.D.C. 326, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C.Cir. 1973), this court held that “a defendant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate.”3 This court thus departed from the older, more restrictive standard under which parties claiming ineffective assistance of counsel were required to show that counsel’s performance had reduced the proceedings to a “farce and a mockery of justice.”4Diggs v. Welch, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (1945). See also Jones v. Huff, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 152 F.2d 14 (1945). However, even under the more recent approach, with its correspondingly higher standards of acceptable advocacy, the conduct of the defense attorneys in this case was unobjectionable.
¶14Both defense attorneys were aware from the outset that the Government had obtained pretrial photographic identifications from witnesses who were expected to identify defendants in court and to recount the circumstances of their earlier identifications of the same individuals. The trial transcript strongly suggests that the prosecutor allowed both defense lawyers and appellant *353Smith to view all the photographs previously displayed to the various witnesses.5 Appellants do not now claim that defense counsel were denied such an opportunity. Appellant Gartrell, while apparently not shown all of the “mug shots” exhibited by police, did see a number of these photos which were supplied to his attorney by the prosecutor.
¶15Not only do the defense trial attorneys in this case appear to have been fully apprised of the photo array details, but they were also familiar with the applicable law concerning such pretrial identification techniques. Both expressed satisfaction that, while the weight and credibility of the identification evidence might be subject to dispute, the constitutionality of the procedures followed in obtaining such evidence was beyond question. The fact that a pretrial photo “spread” can be appropriate under recent controlling Supreme Court decisions was explicitly acknowledged by defense counsel. Appellant Gartrell’s attorney stated that he knew of “no improprieties . .. which would necessitate a suppression hearing,” and appellant Smith’s attorney concurred.6
¶16Counsel’s failure to move to suppress was thus the product of deliberate and informed decision, not oversight or inadvertence.7 As an appellate court, remote *354from the trial arena, we are reluctant to second-guess the considered judgments of experienced trial counsel. Particularly is this so when such judgments appear sound, even after evaluation by a tribunal enjoying the benefits of hindsight and time for reflection. Here, nothing in the record convinces us that the pretrial photo identifications violated the due process standard elaborated by the Supreme Court in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968).8 Under these circumstances, we perceive no reason why conscientious advocacy should require the futile formality of a suppression hearing.
¶17In Simmons, the Court recognized the widespread use of photo exhibits in criminal law enforcement, and declined the opportunity to promulgate general rules governing such identification techniques. Rather, the Court held that “each case must be considered on its own facts,” and that pretrial photographic displays would not warrant reversal of a criminal conviction unless the procedures employed were “so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” 390 U.S. at 384, 88 S.Ct. at 971.9 If anything, the photo identifications upheld under the newly-announced standard in Simmons were more suggestive than those criticized by appellants here.
¶18The underlying events in Simmons were very similar to those in the case currently before us. Two armed men robbed a savings and loan association in midafternoon on a business day. They wore no masks. In the course of their investigation of this incident, FBI agents obtained a series of at least six snapshots from a sister of the man suspected of having driven the robbers’ getaway car. The set of snapshots consisted primarily of group photographs. Petitioner Simmons appeared in several, if not all,10 of the photos. Five bank employees, each of whom had had ample occasion to observe the bandits, viewed the series of snapshots on the day after the crime. Each witness was alone when he or she examined the photographs, and each witness independently identified Simmons as one of the *355robbers.11 At trial the Government solicited only in-court identifications from these witnesses, and made no direct reference to the pretrial snapshot displays. Despite the small number of photos shown to the witnesses, and despite the recurring appearanee of Simmons in those photos, the Supreme Court found neither a due process violation nor a need to reverse as an exercise of its supervisory authority over the lower federal courts.12
¶19¡n light of the Simmons result, we are unable to discern any fatal flaw in the identification procedures followed in the matter now at hand and made known to defense counsel in advance of trial.13 The *356photographic representation of the lineup conducted in this case convinces us that that procedure was eminently fair; and indeed appellants do not contend otherwise. While one photo array shown to Mary Roach, a teller at the Seventh Street branch bank, contained only three pictures and therefore might appear more suspect than the displays in Simmons, the latter suffered from a malady even more troublesome than insufficient size. As noted above, Simmons’s likeness appeared several times in the set of snapshots shown to the bank employees. Even a witness of less than ordinary alertness could have been expected to notice the repeated occurrence of a particular face in the various group photos. Given Simmons, we regard trial counsel’s failure to object to the identification testimony in this case as understandable and certainly within the bounds of reasonable competence.
¶20With the exception of their complaints about the timing of the photo displays, appellants make no assertions that the pretrial photo showings actually were suggestive in specific ways. Instead, we are apparently asked to assume that the pretrial identification procedures were constitutionally defective, and then to reverse appellants’ convictions because trial counsel did not notice the defects. This we are unwilling to do. Appellants contend that their inability to allege particular deficiencies could have been alleviated if a suppression hearing had been convened to help uncover evidence of impermissible suggestiveness. To this predicament, we can only respond that this is precisely the reason that ineffective assistance claims should be initially addressed to the trial court.14
¶21In any event, appellants presently have represented to us that “all of the facts that are relevant for the determination of the ineffective assistance of counsel issue are in the record.” Brief for Appellants at 27. Looking to those record facts we find, as indicated above, no warrant for reversal on that ground.15
¶22II
¶23Appellant Gartrell seeks reversal of his conviction on the ground that the district judge erred in ruling that a prior conviction would be admissible for impeachment purposes if Gartrell chose to testify in his own defense. The trial in this case was held on July 17, 18, and 21,1975. The new Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1,1975. The impeachment by prior conviction issue, therefore, was and is governed by Fed.R.Evid. 609(a).16 Gartrell’s *357claim in this regard presents difficulty, because the controlling relevance of Rule 609 was unrecognized at trial. In the colloquy of record about admissibility, the Rule was never mentioned by the prosecution, the defense, or the court. The district judge seems to have decided to permit use of Gartrell’s prior conviction by reference to earlier law in this Circuit. See Luck v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 348 F.2d 763 (1965); Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029, 88 S.Ct. 1421, 20 L.Ed.2d 287 (1968). This was error.
¶24Despite substantial surface similarity, the inquiry to be conducted by the trial court under Rule 609(a) differs significantly from that mandated by Luck and its progeny. Adherence to the proper standard by the District Court might have produced a different ruling on the impeachment question. Had evidence of his prior conviction been excluded, appellant Gartrell in all likelihood would have taken the stand and the jury presumably would have heard him deny participation in the bank robbery. As explained further below, we cannot say, on the facts of this case, that failure to apply Rule 609 constituted harmless error. Therefore, we remand the case to the District Court for a determination of whether, within the meaning of Rule 609(a), the probative value of Gartrell’s prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect.17 If it decides that the prior conviction was admissible, the conviction stands, subject to further review on appeal; if it decides that it should have been excluded, the conviction is reversed and a new trial ordered.18
¶25Judicial construction of the provisions of Rule 609 has thus far been rather sparse, especially when contrasted with the veritable flood of decisions treating problems of impeachment by prior conviction under the Luck norms.19 Our review of the available *358materials persuades us that Rule 609 has been designed to work at least three important changes in the approach of federal courts to the problems of impeachment by prior conviction:
(i) Evidence of some prior convictions (i. e., convictions for crimes involving dishonesty or false statement) is now automatically admissible for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness. With respect to these convictions, trial courts are no longer free to exercise the discretion they enjoyed under Luck.20 Congress has substituted its judgment *359that evidence of such crimes is always sufficiently related to credibility to justify its admission, regardless of possible prejudice to the defendant. See H.R. Conf.Rep.No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 7098, 7103.
(ii) The addition of the phrase “to the defendant” at the end of Rule 609(a)(1) reflects a deliberate choice to regulate impeachment by prior conviction only where the defendant’s interests might be damaged by admission of evidence of past crimes, and not where the prosecution might suffer, or where a non-defendant witness complains of possible loss of reputation in the community.21 This procedure may be contrasted with earlier possibilities under Luck. Although in practice Luck hearings were most frequently conducted to determine whether a criminal defendant who wished to testify could be impeached with evidence of his prior convictions, in theory the Luck discretionary standard was equally applicable to all witnesses and parties. In order to avoid undue prejudice to any individual, the trial court could exclude prior conviction evidence which it concluded had only limited probative value with respect to credibility.
(iii) Crucial for present purposes, the language of Rule 609(a)(1), as enacted, manifests an intent to shift the burden of persuasion with respect to admission of prior conviction evidence for impeachment. Luck held that such evidence *360could be excluded “where the trial judge believes the prejudicial effect of impeachment far outweighs the probative relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility.” 348 F.2d at 768 (emphasis added). Gordon reiterated this test, and emphasized that “[t]he burden of persuasion in this regard is on the accused . . The underlying assumption [of Luck] was that prior convictions would ordinarily be admissible unless this burden is met.” 383 F.2d at 939. Presumably, the House Subcommittee version of Rule 609(a)(1) would have preserved the approach already developed by the case law in this Circuit. As amended by the Subcommittee, the rule provided that previous felony convictions could be used to impeach a witness “unless the court determines that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence of the conviction[s].”22 H.R.Rep.No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in [1974] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 7075, 7084 (emphasis added). Rejecting this option, the version of Rule 609 which ultimately emerged from the Conference Committee and became law allows impeachment by prior felony conviction (for a crime not involving dishonesty or false statement) “only if . the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant.” Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(1) (emphasis added). This modest variation in language is not purely semantic. The prosecution now must bear the burden of establishing that prior conviction evidence should be admitted. Our grammatical interpretation of the bare wording of Rule 609 is reinforced by the remarks of two leading conferees during debate on the floor of the House. Defending the Conference Committee product, Congressman Dennis said,
What the present compromise does is to say that you can inquire on cross examination about these [sic] type of prior convictions which really bear on credibility, and you can ask about all other felonies on cross examination, only if you can convince the court, and the burden is on the government, which is an important change in the law, that the probative value of the question is greater than the damage to the defendant. .
120 Cong.Rec.H. 12,257 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974). Representative Hungate declared, “[T]he rule puts the burden on the proponent of [prior conviction] evidence to show that it should be used — to show that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant.” Id. at 12,254. See also United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 1976).
¶26The labyrinthine history of Rule 609 has been authoritatively canvassed elsewhere.23 We mention only those aspects of the Rule’s background which bear on the present controversy. Rule 609 was one of the most hotly contested provisions in the Federal Rules of Evidence.24 The current language *361of the Rule is unquestionably the product of careful deliberation and compromise. The House of Representatives and the Senate Judiciary Committee agreed that criminal defendants should not be impeached by evidence of prior convictions unless the earlier offenses involved dishonesty or false statement. Adoption of this position by the full Senate was blocked only at the last moment, only by a bare majority, and only after Senator McClellan had succeeded in forcing a second vote on the matter.
¶27Faced with the task of forging a consensus between views both strongly held and widely divergent, the Conference Committee was aware of the substantial sentiment in both chambers for limiting impeachment by prior conviction, especially in the criminal defendant-as-witness context. The House debate almost ten months earlier was particularly revealing. As reported by the Judiciary Committee, Rule 609 banned impeachment by prior conviction, regardless of the identity of the witness, except where the crime in question had involved dishonesty or false statement. Representative Hogan vigorously pressed for amendment of the proposal to authorize impeachment by any prior felony conviction. Resurrecting the suggestion previously advanced by a Special House Subcommittee, Representative Smith countered with a compromise amendment along the lines of Luck. Sitting as a Committee of the Whole, the House first replaced the Hogan amendment with the Smith amendment, and then rejected the latter in favor'of the Judiciary Committee version by a vote of 48-10. 120 Cong.Rec.H. 551-57 (daily ed. Feb. 6,1974). The small minority of members voting overwhelmingly favored the “dishonesty or false statement” approach. The Conference Committee sought a formula which would improve upon Luck in providing at least the appearance of more definite restrictions on the use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes. At the same time, the Conference could not avoid the fact that a narrow majority of the Senate wished to permit impeachment with any prior felony conviction.25 Rule 609, as currently effective, resolves these opposing tensions by retaining the trial court’s discretion to allow impeachment with any prior felony, but shifting to the prosecution the burden of demonstrating that probative value on the issue of credibility outweighs prejudicial effect to the defendant.
¶28The Government has contended, both in its brief and on oral argument, that *362Gartrell’s earlier crime, attempted robbery, involved “dishonesty or false statement,” as that phrase is used in the Federal Rules of Evidence. If this contention were accurate, the Government would be correct in its conclusion that Rule 609(a)(2) provides for the automatic admissibility of evidence of GartrelPs prior conviction. The District Court’s decision could be upheld, even though rendered without reference to the newly-applicable Rules. However, the Government has misconstrued the language in question, partially through a misplaced reliance on comments of this court in cases decided under Luck. Attempted robbery is not a crime involving “dishonesty or false statement” within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2). If Gartrell’s prior conviction is to be admitted at all, it must be admitted only after the court makes the determination prescribed in Rule 609(a)(1).
¶29The Conference Committee Report fully supports this position:
By the phrase “dishonesty and false statement” the Conference means crimes such as perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused’s propensity to testify truthfully.
¶30H.R.Conf.Rep.No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 7098, 7103. Numerous remarks made in the course of floor debate, set forth in the Appendix to this opinion, substantiate the interpretation that robbery may not be classified legitimately as an “offense in the nature of crimen falsi.” Congress clearly intended the phrase to denote a fairly narrow subset of criminal activity. Moreover, research into the derivation of the term “crimen falsi” indicates that Congress’s restrictive construction comports with historical practice. While commentators have uncovered some divergence between civil and common law usage, the expression has never been thought to comprehend robbery or other crimes involving force.26 Even in its broadest sense, the *363term “crimen falsi” has encompassed only those crimes characterized by an element of deceit or deliberate interference with a court’s ascertainment of truth. As graphically observed by Senator McClellan, robbery is not such a crime:
There is no deceit in armed robbery. You take a gun, walk out, and put it in a man’s face and say, “Give me your money,” or walk up to the counter of the cashier and say, “this is a holdup; give me your money.” There is no deceit in that. They are not lying. They mean business. They will murder you if you do not do it.
¶31120 Cong.Rec.S. 19913 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1974).
¶32Our interpretation of the words “dishonesty or false statement” is consistent with that adopted by the majority of courts which have had occasion to apply Rule 609(a)(2) in the period since July 1, 1975. In United States v. Millings, 175 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 535 F.2d 121 (1976), this court held that “dishonesty or false statement” did not comprehend either of appellant’s two prior convictions, one for unlawful possession of narcotics, the other for carrying a pistol without a license. Judge Robb explained:
An intent to deceive or defraud is not an element of either offense. . . . Certainly we cannot say that either offense, in the language of the Conference Committee, is “peculiarly probative of credibility”. Although it may be argued that any willful violation of law evinces a lack of character and a disregard for all legal duties, including the obligations of an oath, Congress has not accepted that expansive theory.
¶33535 F.2d at 123.27 Two recent Third Circuit *364cases, decided the same day, have argued convincingly that petty larceny is not ordinarily a crime involving dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609(a)(1). See Government of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 282 (3rd Cir. 1976) (reviewing a March, 1975 trial, and therefore applying the circuit’s traditional crimen falsi limitation on impeachment by misdemeanor conviction, but construing Rule 609(a)(2) in dictum); 28 and Government of Virgin Islands v. Testamark, 528 F.2d 742, 743 (3d Cir. 1976) (actually applying Rule 609(a)(2), and holding that the new enactment tracks the circuit’s long-standing crimen falsi restriction). Contra, United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding, without the benefit of argument by the parties, that a petty larceny conviction was properly admitted for impeachment purposes, “since the crime at issue involved dishonesty”). The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922 (7th Cir. 1976) simply found it unnecessary to discuss whether evidence of a prior robbery conviction might be admitted under Rule 609’s “dishonesty or false statement” provision, focusing its attention instead solely on the discretionary language of Rule 609(a)(1) (see note 18 supra). In like manner, at least two District Courts have apparently regarded the “dishonesty” issue as too clear for comment. See United States v. Brown, 409 F.Supp. 890 (W.D.N.Y.1976) (excluding prior conviction for illegal narcotics possession); and United States v. Jackson, 405 F.Supp. 938 (E.D.N.Y.1975) (excluding prior conviction for assault). See also Carlsen v. Javurek, 526 F.2d 202, 210 (8th Cir. 1975) (dictum in civil case recognizing that misdemeanor conviction for assault and battery would not be admissible under Rule 609, because prior crime did not involve dishonesty or false statement).
¶34The Government has invoked Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1020, 88 S.Ct. 1421, 20 L.Ed.2d 287 (1967), and United States v. Simpson, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 445 F.2d 735 (1970), in aid of the proposition that stealing, and in particular the crime of robbery, involves dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609(a)(2). Gordon and Simpson are not unique. Other cases decided by this court pursuant to the Luck standard might also have been cited. See, e. g., Gass v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 767, 416 F.2d 767 (1969); Smith v. United States, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 131, 406 F.2d 667 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 963, 89 S.Ct. 1315, 22 L.Ed.2d 753 (1969); and Williams v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 332, 394 F.2d 957 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 984, 89 S.Ct. 457, 21 L.Ed.2d 445 (1968). But see United States v. McCord, 420 F.2d 255 (1969). The simple answer to the Government’s argument is that none of these cases involved Rule 609. Luck had held that, under the then applicable version of D.C.Code § 14-305,29 trial courts should exercise discretion in determining whether to permit impeachment by prior conviction. 348 F.2d at 767-69. Gordon represented the effort of this tribunal to be helpful to the District Court in its exercise of that discretion. The nature of the prior crime was one factor identified in both the Luck and Gordon opinions as relevant to the impeachment issue. When Judge (now *365Chief Justice) Burger, writing in Gordon, characterized stealing as “conduct which reflects adversely on a man’s honesty and integrity,” he was not holding that all prior convictions for theft and related crimes were automatically admissible for impeachment purposes. He said merely that such offenses had some bearing on an individual’s credibility, a bearing which the trial court should consider in exercising its discretion. By contrast, the Gordon opinion noted, acts of violence “generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity,” thus implying that virtually any showing of prejudicial effect should be sufficient to exclude evidence of such prior convictions. See 383 F.2d at 940.
¶35The issue under Rule 609(a)(2) is entirely different from that confronted by this court in Gordon, Simpson, and other cases descendant from Luck. The new Rule provides that a prior conviction for a crime involving dishonesty or false statement is automatically admissible for impeachment purposes. With respect to such evidence, the trial court enjoys no discretion. See text accompanying note 20 supra. In its Conference Committee Report, Congress has spelled out the meaning of the phrase “dishonesty or false statement” as it is used in Rule 609(a)(2). See text preceding note 26 supra. The Report plainly shows that the set of crimes involving dishonesty or false statement under the Rule is not coterminous with the set of crimes bearing on credibility in the Luck-Gordon analysis. The Gordon and Simpson precedents are not controlling in this case, and indeed are essentially irrelevant.30
¶36As we indicated at the beginning of this part of our opinion, we cannot view as harmless error (28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970); Fed.R.Crim.P. 52) the trial court’s failure to follow Rule 609 in deciding whether to permit impeachment of Gartrell by prior conviction evidence.31 Gartrell expressed a desire to testify in his own defense. His attorney informed the District Court that Gartrell wished to deny any connection with the robbery. We can only infer that Gartrell was dissuaded from this intention primarily by the trial court’s refusal to exclude evidence of his prior conviction, an attempted robbery offense two years earlier for which he had been sentenced to six years’ probation.
¶37Admittedly, the Government’s evidence in this case was very strong. Two eyewitnesses identified Gartrell at trial as one of the bank robbers. In addition, these same witnesses testified to their previous identification of Gartrell at a police lineup and in various photo displays. The bank film surveillance photographs, depicting an individual closely resembling Gartrell, were introduced into evidence and examined by the jury. On the other hand, these bank photos were somewhat hazy in texture, and may perhaps have left the jurors with some doubt that either of the robbers pictured actually was Gartrell. Moreover, despite Gartrell’s presence in a police lineup convened for bank manager Dudley and other *366witnesses, Dudley picked two other men (one of them appellant Smith) from the lineup and identified them as the robbers. Had a resolute denial from the witness stand by Gartrell accompanied the indistinct character of the bank photos and the misidentification by Mr. Dudley, his stance before the jury would have been ponderably different.
¶38Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), held that where an error at trial is of constitutional dimension, an appellate court may not find that error harmless, unless the court is convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. Here, however, the District Court’s failure to exercise its discretion under Rule 609(a)(1) does not assume constitutional proportions. Indeed, in United States v. Belt, 514 F.2d 837, 846-50 (D.C. Cir. 1975), we upheld the constitutionality of D.C.Code § 14-305 (1973), which completely deprives District of Columbia trial courts of the discretion they enjoyed under Luck, and dictates the automatic admissibility of any prior felony conviction for impeachment purposes.32
¶39We turn then, from Chapman to Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), the case most frequently cited on harmless error review where constitutional infirmity is not involved. Justice Rutledge’s opinion offers the following directives:
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress. .
But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.
¶40328 U.S. at 764-65, 66 S.Ct. at 1248 (footnote and citation omitted) (emphasis added). Of course, in the case at bar, there has been a departure from a “specific command of Congress.” When Chapman was decided after Kotteakos, the Court addressed itself in terms only to constitutional error. This left violations of a “specific command of Congress” arguably in limbo between Chapman, on the one hand, and Kotteakos, on the other. But even if it be assumed that the claimant of harmless error with respect to such a violation must meet a more demanding standard than Kotteakos, we need not decide here whether such a standard is necessary or how it is to be defined. This is so because, even under Kotteakos, we are not “sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect . ” nor can we say “with fair assurance . . . that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error. . .”
¶41The conviction of appellant Smith is affirmed. As to appellant Gartrell, the case is remanded to the District Court for the purpose of the inquiry described above in the text accompanying notes 17 and 18.
¶42It is so ordered.
¶43APPENDIX
¶44Consensus on the meaning of “dishonesty or false statement” appears to have transcended policy disagreements on the general impeachment by prior conviction issue. Senator McClellan’s prepared statement, reprinted in the Congressional Record, concentrated predictably on the problem created when an accused takes the stand as a witness:
*367Particularly relevant to a witness’s credibility and worthiness of belief is the prior criminal record of such a witness.
Those who favor the rule as reported in this bill [i.e., the Senate Judiciary Committee version; see note 24 supra] agree that prior convictions do have a bearing on credibility. But they want to limit that judgment only to crimes involving dishonesty or false statement. They make ineligible crimes of murder, rape, armed robbery and other serious felonies. They do not seem to believe that those who have committed these other serious felonies are just as likely to lie under oath as those who have committed crimes involving “dishonesty.”
I cannot accept that conclusion. Surely a person who has committed a serious crime — a felony — will just as readily lie under oath as someone who has committed a misdemeanor involving lying. Would a convicted rapist, cold-blooded murderer or armed robber really hesitate to lie under oath any more than a person who has previously lied? Would a convicted murderer or robber be more truthful than such a person?
Of course not!
¶45120 Cong.Rec.S. 19909 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1974). Substantially similar comments may be found in a memorandum entered into the Record by Senator Hart, id, and in oral declarations by Senators Hruska and Thurmond, id at 19909 and 19912.
¶46The picture in the House was more unsettled. Congressman Hogan believed the drafters were ill-advised to use the phrase “dishonesty or false statement,” because it was too imprecise.
The courts would certainly have difficulty with the term “dishonesty” in the present proposal of rule 609(a). Although ordinarily one would think of car theft as involving dishonesty, it might be contended that the “joyriding” type of case did not involve dishonesty. Then, too, one might think that [sic] housebreaking as usually involving dishonesty, but there could be cases where the trespass was obviously not accompanied by any intention to steal or commit any other crime, so that argument could be made that some kinds of offenses normally thought to involve dishonesty did not involve dishonesty on the facts. The standard employed in the committee’s rule is simply not a very satisfactory one.
sjc sfc . $
What, really, is dishonesty or false statement in judicial or legal terms? Unless one practices in a jurisdiction which has statutorily defined crimen falsi, the common law definition of “any crime which may injuriously affect the administration of justice, by the introduction of falsehood and fraud” is applicable. This definition has been held to include forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, suppression of testimony by bribery, conspiracy to procure the absence of a witness or to accuse of crime, obtaining money under false pretenses, stealing, moral turpitude, shoplifting, intoxication, petit larceny, jury tampering, embezzlement and filing a false estate tax return. In other jurisdictions, some of these same offenses have been found not to fit the crimen falsi definition.
¶47120 Cong.Rec.H. 552 (daily ed. Feb. 6,1974). Congressmen Dennis and Wiggins, not sharing the above reservations about the clarity of the drafters’ expression, attempted to dispel their colleagues’ doubts and to set the record straight.
Mr. DENNIS. … We [i.e., the House Judiciary Committee] have said that, for the purpose of attacking credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible only if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement. In other words, if it in fact did bear on his credibility. Certainly, if he has been convicted of perjury or false pretense or fraud or something of that kind, it does reflect on his credibility, but if he stole an automobile when he was 18 years old or if he slugged somebody in a bar 10 years ago or something like that, then it has no connection to his *368credibility at all and it should not be inquired about on that basis.
¶48Id. at 553.
Mr. WIGGINS. … The thrust of “dishonesty” as used in this bill [i.e., the House Judiciary Committee version, described above by Mr. Dennis] goes to his [i.e., a witness’] veracity and his ability to relate the truth. “Dishonesty” is tested, for example, by perjury convictions and convictions dealing with false statements, but not generally criminality. Evidence for a conviction of murder goes to criminality, not to dishonesty.
¶49Id. at 555.
¶50Unfortunately, these well-intentioned efforts by knowledgeable legislators did not completely eliminate uncertainty. The following exchange reflects the House’s failure to achieve unanimity on the “dishonesty or false statement” matter.
Mr. DANIELSON. …
With respect, Mr. Chairman, to the distinction, if any, between the terms “dishonesty” and “false statement,” I would like to point out that unless there has been a remarkable change in the meaning of words in recent years, “dishonesty” and “false statement” are not necessarily the same.
I respectfully submit, there is no point in using both terms in section 609(a), unless they mean two different things, or at least that the term “dishonesty” is much broader than “false statement.”
Who can state that murder does not involve dishonesty? Who can, for instance, say stealing does not involve dishonesty, then what does it involve?
The terms “dishonest” and “false statement” are not synonymous as used in this code section, and to the extent that we are establishing legislative history here, I want today to make it clear that when I voted for this bill out of committee, and when I vote for it today, it was and is my intention that the term “dishonesty” is broader than “false statement,” and any offense involving moral turpitude such as stealing, robbery, burglary, or what have you, in my opinion is an offense involving dishonesty.
I want to make the record eminently clear that I do not equate “dishonesty” precisely with “false statement.”
Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DANIELSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman believes what he said, which I am sure he does, he should support the Hogan amendment [impeachment by any prior felony and by misdemeanors involving dishonesty or false statement] rather than the committee version [impeachment only by crimes involving dishonesty or false statement] or the substitute [Luck approach; for further detail on the different proposals before the House, see text following note 24 supra]. I agree with him precisely.
Mr. DANIELSON. Mr. Chairman, I am glad we are in agreement. I just feel it is unnecessary to go that far, because I think the form the committee has brought out covers the field adequately. Unless we so stultify the meaning of “dishonesty” that it is limited to false statements, we have covered everything we need to do in this particular case.
Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DANIELSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I would agree with my friend that dishonesty is a bit broader than false statement, but I would not agree that it covers such things as crimes of violence. What we are getting at here is crimen falsi, in the technical language, perjury, false pretense, fraud, and perhaps some other things.
Mr. DANIELSON. Moral turpitude.
Mr. DENNIS. It goes to one’s honesty and one’s credibility, and it does not cover the waterfront on all crimes for which a person can be sent to jail in excess of a year such as my friend from Maryland (Mr. HOGAN) wants to do.
*369Mr. DANIELSON. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to agree with the gentleman from Indiana that it involves that which shall be generally regarded as a dishonest act.
Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DANIELSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Chairman, the courts have not borne out the gentleman’s interpretation of what is dishonesty. The courts have sometimes rejected under this same guideline robbery, theft, and many other crimes that under the gentleman’s definition would be considered “dishonesty.”
Mr. DANIELSON. Mr. Chairman, I submit that, if the gentleman please, with the courts aided by this colloquy on the floor as to what the Congress means when it says “dishonesty,” they will be able to apply the rule correctly.
¶51Id. at 555-56. For a slightly later manifestation of the dispute between Congressmen Hogan and Dennis, see Rules of Evidence, Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 15-18 (1974).
¶52Difficulty in interpreting the legislative history of Rule 609(a)(2) is magnified by the fact that identical language in the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, D.C.Code § 14-305(b)(1)(B) (1973), received a different gloss in the House Committee Report which accompanied that statute. The Report of the Committee on the District of Columbia stated,
The offenses which involve dishonesty or false statement and which may be used in the discretion of the cross-examining party include, but are not limited to, any offense involving fraud, or intent to defraud, larceny, robbery; rape; false pretenses, forgery, uttering, embezzlement, housebreaking, or burglary; receiving stolen property, sales of narcotic and depressant and stimulant drugs; unauthorized use of a motor vehicle; taking property without right; procuring; or any attempt to commit or any assault with intent to commit any of the above offenses. . . . It is the intent of your Committee that the offenses which are excluded from use are primarily those of passion and short temper, such as assault.
¶53H.R.Rep. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1970) (citations omitted). For cases implementing the D.C.Code provisions, see, e.g., United States v. Belt, 514 F.2d 837, 841 & n.8 (D.C.Cir. 1975) (no question raised about admissibility of misdemeanor conviction for petty larceny; Government conceded that admission of misdemeanor assault conviction was error); Williams v. United States, 337 A.2d 772, 775-76 (D.C.App.1975) (misdemeanor conviction for carrying a pistol without a license admissible); Durant v. United States, 292 A.2d 157, 160-61 (D.C. App.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1127, 93 S.Ct. 946, 35 L.Ed.2d 259 (1973) (misdemeanor conviction for unlawful possession of narcotics admissible).
¶54Of course, by virtue of the blanket admissibility of prior felony convictions under the D.C.Code, the committee commentary reproduced above has considerably less practical significance than the contrasting annotation contained in the Conference Report on the Federal Rules of Evidence (quoted in text preceding note 26). Judicial adherence to the 1970 House Committee Report results only in broader availability of misdemeanor convictions for impeachment purposes. One need not minimize the potential dangers associated with prosecutorial introduction of prior misdemeanor convictions, in order to appreciate that such tactics typically do not represent a threat of prejudice as great as that posed by the impeachment use of prior felony convictions.