Volume 551 — South Western Reporter, Third Series

<p> Justice Boyd delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Green, Justice Johnson, Justice Guzman, Justice Devine, Justice Brown, and Justice Blacklock joined. </p>

When a divorce complaint is filed and served, a statutory injunction goes into effect prohibiting both parties from changing the beneficiary on any life insurance policy that names either party as the beneficiary without the consent of the other party or a court order. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-106(d)(2) (2010). Jessica Olson sued her husband, Bryan Olson, for divorce. A week later, Ms. Olson, while seriously ill, changed the beneficiary on her life insurance policy from her husband to her mother. Ms. Olson died a few days later. Her mother, Rose Coleman, collected the life insurance benefits. Ms. Coleman sued Mr. Olson for grandparent visitation under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-306 (2010). Mr. Olson responded that he did not oppose visitation, and therefore, Ms. Coleman was not entitled to court-ordered visitation. In addition, Mr. Olson countersued to recover the life insurance benefits. The trial court awarded the insurance benefits to the Olsons' child, finding that Ms. Olson had intended to remove Mr. Olson and substitute their child as the insurance beneficiary. The trial court ordered Ms. Coleman to pay the remaining life insurance funds into the court registry, to account for her expenditures, and to pay a judgment for expenditures that did not benefit the child. The trial court also granted Ms. Coleman's petition for grandparent visitation. The Court of Appeals reversed, awarding the life insurance benefits to Mr. Olson based on Ms. Olson's violation of the statutory injunction and its consideration of Mr. Olson's financial needs. In addition, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's award of visitation to Ms. Coleman. We hold that (1) Ms. Olson violated the statutory injunction under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-106(d)(2) when she removed Mr. Olson as her life insurance beneficiary (2) the Olsons' divorce action abated when Ms. Olson died and the statutory injunction became ineffective (3) a trial court, after the abatement of a divorce action, may remedy a violation of the statutory injunction after considering the equities of the parties (4) the trial court erred by awarding the life insurance benefits to the Olsons' child based on the pleadings and the evidence (5) the Court of Appeals erred by awarding the life insurance benefits to Mr. Olson without sufficient evidence of the equities of the parties (6) the trial court, on remand, may remedy the violation of the statutory injunction by awarding all or a portion of the life insurance benefits to either or both parties after hearing additional evidence and considering the equities of the parties and (7) Ms. Coleman was not entitled to court-ordered grandparent visitation absent Mr. Olson's opposition to visitation. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals we reverse and vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

In 2014, the General Assembly enacted a statute waiving Tennessee's sovereign immunity for claims brought against the State pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301 to 4335 ("USERRA"). The waiver of sovereign immunity became effective on July 1, 2014, and applied to USERRA claims "accruing on or after" that date. After passage of the statute, the plaintiff brought a USERRA claim against the defendant, an entity of the State, but his claim was based on facts that occurred prior to August 8, 2011. The trial court dismissed the claim, explaining that the claim accrued prior to July 1, 2014, and remained barred by sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the claim accrued on July 1, 2014, when the plaintiff gained a judicial remedy by the enactment of the statute waiving sovereign immunity. We conclude that the claim accrued prior to July 1, 2014, and remains barred by sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

Drayton Beecher Smith, II ("Attorney") pled guilty in 2007 to federal charges of receipt and possession of images depicting child pornography and was sentenced to five years of imprisonment. In conjunction with these charges, Attorney consented to his disbarment, which was ordered in 2008. In August 2014, after being discharged from prison and while on probation, Attorney petitioned to be reinstated to the practice of law in Tennessee. The Board of Professional Responsibility ("BPR") opposed Attorney's petition, and a hearing panel was appointed ("the Panel"). After an evidentiary hearing, the Panel denied Attorney's petition. Attorney sought review in chancery court, and the chancery court reversed the Panel's decision and ordered Attorney reinstated. The BPR sought review in this Court. Initially, we hold that the chancery court had subject-matter jurisdiction of Attorney's petition in spite of the BPR's untimely filing of its application for costs. We further hold that the chancery court misapplied the applicable standard of review and thereby committed reversible error. Accordingly, we reverse the chancery court's ruling and reinstate the Panel's decision.