Vulcan Golf, LLC v. Google Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
2008
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (§ 32 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (§ 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (§ 901 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (§ 901 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act)
Relies on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly · Conley v. Gibson · Warth v. Seldin · Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. · Reves v. Ernst & Young
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[Although consumers are not confused when they reach a competitor’s website, there is nevertheless initial interest confusion. This is true in this case, because by Equitrac’s placing the term Copitrack [Promatek’s trademark] in its metatag, consumers are diverted to its website and Equitrac reaps the goodwill Promatek developed in the Copitrak mark. That consumers who are misled to Equitrac’s website are only briefly confused is of little or no consequence. In fact, ‘that confusion as to the source of a product or service is eventually dispelled does not eliminate the trademark infringement which has already occurred.’ What is important is not the duration of the confusion, it is the misappropriation of Promatek’s goodwill. Equitrac cannot unring the bell.... Consumers who are directed to Equitrac’s webpage are likely to learn more about Equitrac and its products before beginning a new search for Promatek and Copitrak. Therefore, given the likelihood of initial consumer confusion, the district court was correct in finding Promatek could succeed on the merits.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“(a) Civil Action (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services ... uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[C]ertain of the defendants register, license and/or “park,” 2 among other things, domain names that are the same as or substantially and confusingly similar to the plaintiffs’ distinctive trade names or marks. 3 The defendants do this because they know that when an internet user types a domain name into the address bar on the Google web browser, there is a possibility that the user will either guess the domain name for the plaintiff (and guess wrong) or misspell the name he or she is looking for.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.