Keel v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Disqualification of judicial officer for cause. (a)A judicial officer may not act as such in a court of which he is a member in an action in which (1)he is a party or is directly interested; (2) he was not present and sitting as a member of the court at the hearing of a matter submitted for its decision; (3) he is a material witness; (4) he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree; (5) either party has retained him as their attorney or has been professionally counseled by him in any matter within two years preceding the filing of the action; (6) the judicial officer feels that, for any reason, he cannot give a fair and impartial decision. (b)Tn an action specified in (a)(4) and (5) of this section the disqualification may be waived by the parties and is waived unless a party raises the objection. (c) If a judicial officer disqualifies himself or consents to disqualification, the presiding judge of the district shall immediately transfer the action to another judge of that district to which the objections of the parties do not apply or are least applicable and if there is no such judge, the chief justice of the supreme court shall assign a judge for the hearing or trial of the action. If a judicial officer denies his disqualification the question shall be heard and determined by another judge assigned for the purpose by the presiding judge of the next higher level of courts or, if none, by the other members of the supreme court. The heari”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Amidon v. State

2. “However upright the judge, ... however free [he or she might be] from the slightest inclination [to do anything but] justice, there is a peril of ... unconscious bias or prejudice, or that any former opinion formed [during the attorney-client relationship] may still linger to affect unconsciously [the judge’s] present judgment, or that [the judge] may be moved or swayed unconsciously by his [or her] knowledge of ... facts which may not be revealed or stated at the trial, or cannot be under the rales of evidence. No effort of the will can shut out memory.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Mustafoski v. State

3. “[B]y expanding [subsection (a)(5) ] ...[,] Alaska’s legislature evidenced concern about a somewhat distinct problem: namely, that any professional relationship between a judge and one of the parties, formed or nurtured in any manner during the months preceding the judge’s elevation to the bench, might create a risk of partiality or the appearance of partiality. The [legislature’s] concern was that personal loyalties fostered during [the attorney-client relationship] might generate conscious or unconscious partiality, or at least its appearance.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Mustafoski v. State