¶1dissenting.
¶2The indictment alleges that on or about February 5, 1974, appellant did with intent to defraud and harm another, pass to Mary Fread a writing that had been made so that it purported to be the act of another, who did not authorize the act.
¶3Appellant contends that the State failed to prove that the Oklahoma conviction alleged for enhancement was for an offense which occurred subsequent to the conviction in Robertson County, Texas, alleged as the first of two prior felonies for enhancement.
¶4Appellant admitted that he had been convicted for both offenses. The State introduced a properly certified copy of an indictment showing that the appellant had been indicted for the offense of burglary in Robertson County and the judgment and sentence, properly certified and exemplified, bearing the same cause number, were also introduced. Attached to the judgment and sentence were photographs and fingerprints. In this case the sentence had been pronounced against the appellant on April 13, 1964.
¶5The State also introduced appellant’s Oklahoma pen-packet containing properly certified and exemplified copies of the judg*811ment and sentence, along with photographs and fingerprints, showing that appellant had been convicted in Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, for the offense of second degree burglary on May 27, 1968.
¶6Also admitted into evidence as provided for by Article 3718, V.A.C.S., were the printed statute books of the State of Oklahoma purporting to have been printed under authority in that state. Section 152 of Title 22 provides that the statute of limitations for the prosecution of burglary in the State of Oklahoma is three years.
¶7Appellant testified at the punishment stage of the trial. He admitted that he had been convicted in April, 1964, in Robertson County and then spent time in the Texas Department of Corrections. Following his release he worked for a year and a half at a canning factory in Oklahoma. Garner then stated that he went to trial in Oklahoma in May of 1968 and had spent about four months in jail awaiting trial. He also said that eight other persons were involved with him in the offense in Oklahoma and that following his conviction he spent time in the Oklahoma State Penitentiary. On cross-examination he denied remembering when either of the offenses was committed.
¶8Assuming that the information from the Oklahoma conviction should not have been admitted, there is sufficient proof to show that the offense was committed subsequent to the prior alleged conviction in Robertson County. A greater period of time than that provided by the Oklahoma statute of limitations elapsed between appellant’s conviction in Robertson County and his conviction in Oklahoma.
¶9The record reflects that appellant was born March 14, 1945. He testified that he lived in Franklin County most of his life and went to the ninth grade in school. The indictment alleges the date of the offense in Robertson County as December 22, 1962. He was seventeen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. According to his testimony, he had been in jail over nine months before he was tried. He testified that after leaving the Texas Department of Corrections he went to Oklahoma and held a job for a year and a half and that he was in jail in Oklahoma about four months before he was convicted in 1968. The records from Oklahoma show that he was a “Second Termer.” Considering his age, his testimony about where he lived and the records, the evidence is sufficient to show that the offense for which appellant was convicted in Oklahoma occurred subsequent to his release from the Texas Department of Corrections for time served following the Robertson County, Texas conviction.
¶10The judgment should be affirmed.