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← 553 F.3d 1294 - Dixon v. Kirkpatrick

Dixon v. Kirkpatrick’s Empirical Analysis

553 F.3d 1294 · 2009

Citation profile

56
cited by 56 later decisions
3
states following
April 2024
most recently cited

18 federal appellate · 11 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 56 later decisions — most recently April 2024 · most notably Morris v. City of Colorado Springs (2012), McBeth v. Himes (2010)

18 federal appellate · 11 district · 3 state decisions

460200920102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Mitchell v. Forsyth · Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205 Will County Illinois · Johnson v. Jones · Garcetti v. Ceballos

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 56 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(1) whether the speech was made pursuant to an employee’s official duties; (2) whether the speech was on a matter of public concern; (3) whether the government’s interests, as employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service are sufficient to outweigh the plaintiffs free speech interests; (4) whether the protected speech was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action; and (5) whether the defendant would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the protected conduct.”
    25 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “First, the court must determine whether the employee speaks pursuant to his official duties. If the employee speaks pursuant to his official duties, then there is no constitutional protection because the restriction on speech simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created. Second, if an employee does not speak pursuant to his official duties, but instead speaks as a citizen, the court must determine wheth er the subject of the speech is a matter of public concern. If the speech is not a matter of public concern, then the speech is unprotected and the inquiry ends. Third, if the employee speaks as. a citizen on a matter of public concern, the court must determine whether the employee’s interest in commenting on the issue outweighs the interest of the state as employer. Fourth, assuming the employee’s interest outweighs that of the employer, the employee must show that his speech was a substantial factor or a motivating factor in a detrimental employment decision. Finally, if the employee establishes that his speech was such a factor, the employer may demonstrate that it would have taken the same action against the employee even in the absence of the protected speech.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[T]his Court has held that First Amendment rights are protected unless the employer shows that some restriction is necessary to prevent the disruption of official functions or to insure effective performance by the employee. In other words, unless the government employer can show that the termination was based on legitimate reasons grounded in the efficient conduct of political business, there is no need to proceed to balancing, and the First Amendment interest of the plaintiff prevails.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.