Richmond v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1976
Citation profile
53 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 53 later decisions — most recently October 2020 · most notably Logan v. State (1981), Johnson v. State (1978)
53 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Escobedo v. Illinois · Malloy v. Hogan · McNabb v. United States · Mallory v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 53 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[f]elony-murder is an unusual offense in that the death arising out of the robbery is purely an incident of the basic offense. It makes no difference whether or not there was an intent to kill.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Cook v. State · Cloman v. State““The State of Wyoming accords the same protection to its citizens and those within its jurisdiction and there is no reason why we should not apply Wyoming constitutional provisions in the administration of our jurisprudence, as long as they do not infringe upon the constitutional standards of the United States Constitution * * *. This court has never been blind to the fact that ‘protection of constitutional rights of an accused is not the peculiar province of the federal courts.’ Dryden v. State, Wyo.1975, 535 P.2d 483, 491 . Nor are we blind to the rule that constitutional standards announced by the Supreme Court of the United States are minimal, which rights may be enlarged under State constitutional provisions if justifiable.””
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“"The rule has long been that one preliminary hearing, unproductive for the State, does not prohibit another. As set out in United States ex rel. Rutz v. Levy, 1925, 268 U.S. 390, 393 , 45 S.Ct. 516, 517 , 69 L.Ed. 1010 , 1011: "`Under state law it has uniformly been held that the discharge of an accused person upon a preliminary examination for want of probable cause constitutes no bar to a subsequent preliminary examination before another magistrate. Such an examination is not a trial in any sense and does not operate to put the defendant in jeopardy. * * *' "Since that 1925 decision, there has been no change in the law.[3]"”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.