IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 50094
ROBERTA ANN EVANS, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) Boise, May 2024 Term
v. )
) Opinion Filed: August 19, 2024
MARK B. WRIGHT, M.D., ST. LUKE’S )
MAGIC VALLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
CENTER, LTD., )
)
Defendants-Respondents. )
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Twin Falls County. Michael P. Tribe, District Judge.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Points Law, PLLC, Boise, for Appellant Roberta Ann Evans. Michelle R. Points
argued.
Tolman Brizee & Cannon, P.C., Twin Falls, for Respondent Mark B. Wright. Casey
Hemmer argued.
Quane McColl, PLLC, Boise, for Respondent St. Luke’s Magic Valley Regional
Medical Center. Anita Hurlburt argued.
_____________________
MEYER, Justice.
This case concerns a medical malpractice action arising from a total hip replacement
surgery performed on Roberta Evans by Dr. Mark B. Wright, at St. Luke’s Magic Valley Regional
Medical Center (St. Luke’s). In the months after the surgery, Evans consistently complained about
pain and discomfort at several follow-up appointments. After the pain persisted, she sought a
second opinion from a doctor who confirmed that Evans’s hip bone socket was abnormally
anteverted. 1 Evans underwent revision surgery, which also revealed significant findings of
periprosthetic joint infection.
Evans initiated a lawsuit against Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s, alleging negligence in their
1
Tipped or bent forward. Anteverted, Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary (24th ed. 1965).
1
follow-up care and treatment of her. On Dr. Wright’s and St. Luke’s motions, the district court
dismissed the case, finding that Evans’s cause of action was barred by the two-year statute of
limitations under Idaho Code section 5-219(4). Because Evans’s surgical complications consistent
with abnormal anteversion and impingement were objectively ascertainable by March 4, 2019,
revealing that some damage was present, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 7, 2018, Evans had a total hip replacement performed by Dr. Wright at St.
Luke’s Magic Valley Regional Medical Center in Twin Falls, Idaho. After the surgery, Dr. Wright
and St. Luke’s reported to Evans that post-operative imaging showed that the components were in
“excellent” position with no signs of complications. In the following months, Evans reported
experiencing several types of pain, such as incision pain, thigh pain, groin hip pain, and discomfort
during intimacy. She also felt that her hip was abnormal and complained that it was “catching” or
“clicking.” Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s informed her that if her complaints did not subside in the
next nine months, they might need to consider other options but during the interim they would
wait and see if the issues resolved.
The following year, Evans had several follow-up appointments in which she expressed her
continued pain and discomfort in her left hip. At those appointments, X-ray images were taken.
Although different treatment options were recommended related to daily activities and exercise,
the pain persisted. Evans independently chose to seek a second opinion, and on June 17, 2019, she
visited Dr. Greg Irvine at St. Luke’s Clinic-Orthopedics in McCall. Dr. Irvine reviewed the
imaging taken on April 22, 2019. He noted that the imaging depicted the “acetabular component
appears to be abnormally anteverted and perhaps a bit vertical.” Dr. Irvine’s plan included a CT
scan the following day, which Dr. Irvine interpreted as “[h]ip is anteverted about 65 degrees with
the neck of the femur impinging on the posterior acetabular component rim, causing a high
likelihood of anterior subluxation.”
Evans was referred to Dr. Jared Armstrong for a surgical consultation and was seen on July
8, 2019. Dr. Armstrong reviewed Evans’s previous imaging and CT scan and assessed that Evans
had a “failed left total hip arthroplasty – impingement of femoral stem on posterior acetabular cup;
left hip and thigh pain.” An arthroplasty revision was then scheduled. On October 19, 2019, Evans
underwent revision surgery with Dr. Armstrong. The surgery confirmed that Evans had
2
“significant findings” of periprosthetic joint infection and metallosis. 2 Dr. Armstrong found
“[t]here was a groove worn on the posterior femoral stem along the posterior femoral neck
consistent with impingement on the acetabular wall.”
On April 6, 2021, Evans filed her pre-litigation screening application with the Idaho State
Board of Medicine. On August 19, 2021, Evans filed her complaint and demand for jury trial. Dr.
Wright and St. Luke’s subsequently filed respective motions to dismiss or for judgment on the
pleadings and memoranda in support. Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s argued that Evans’s cause of
action was time-barred.
On April 5, 2022, Evans filed a response to the motions to dismiss and a personal
declaration in support of her response. Evans also filed a motion to convert the motions to dismiss
to motions for summary judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(c),
“so that the Court may review the Declaration of Roberta Ann Evans and the medical records
attached thereto.” Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s moved to strike Evans’s declaration.
On April 19, 2022, Evans’s motion to convert came before the district court with several
other motions, including Dr. Wright’s and St. Luke’s separate motions to dismiss, motions to strike
the declaration of Roberta Evans, and motions to shorten time for the hearing on their motions to
strike. Evans’s declaration, with numerous medical records attached, accompanied her motion to
convert the motions to dismiss to motions for summary judgment so that the district court could
consider matters outside the pleadings. At the hearing, the district court first heard the parties’
arguments and granted, from the bench, Dr. Wright’s and St. Luke’s motions to strike Evans’s
declaration. The district court then took the motions to dismiss under advisement.
On May 2, 2022, the district court granted Dr. Wright’s and St. Luke’s motions to dismiss.
On May 4, 2022, final judgment was entered. On May 17, 2022, Evans filed a motion for
reconsideration, a memorandum in support, and an alternative motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint. After oral argument was held on Evans’s motion for reconsideration, the
district court issued a written decision denying Evans’s motion on July 28, 2022.
On September 8, 2022, Evans filed her notice of appeal. On April 6, 2023, Dr. Wright filed
a motion to dismiss appeal, and St. Luke’s joined in Dr. Wright’s motion. This Court denied Dr.
2
Metallosis is a condition caused by the buildup and shedding of metal debris, which occurs when metal joint
replacement devices rub against each other and release metal ions into the body. Metallosis and Metal Poisoning,
DRUGWATCH.COM, https://www.drugwatch.com/hip-replacement/metallosis/#:~:text=Metallosis%20is%20a%
20condition%20caused,groin%20pain%2C%20numbness%20and%20swelling (last visited Aug. 15, 2024).
3
Wright’s motion to dismiss but requested the parties include briefing on the motion to dismiss
appeal in their substantive briefs.
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Was Evans’s notice of appeal timely filed?
2. Is Evans’s motion to convert properly before this Court?
3. Did the district court err in dismissing Evan’s amended complaint as time-barred under the
statute of limitations?
4. Did the district court err in failing to consider Evans’s equitable estoppel argument?
5. Are Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure is reviewed de novo. Paslay v. A&B Irrigation Dist., 162 Idaho 866, 868,
406 P.3d 878,
880 (2017). “A 12(b)(6) motion looks only at the pleadings to determine whether a claim for relief
has been stated.” Hammer v. Ribi,
162 Idaho 570, 573,
401 P.3d 148, 151 (2017) (quoting Young
v. City of Ketchum,
137 Idaho 102, 104,
44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002)). A case should not be
dismissed for failure to present a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff cannot
prove any facts supporting the claim that would entitle her to relief. Paslay,
162 Idaho at 869,
406
P.3d at 881 (citation omitted). On review of a dismissal, this Court determines whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts to support her claim, which, if true, would entitle her to relief.
Hammer,
162 Idaho at 573,
401 P.3d at 151 (citation omitted). In doing so, we draw “all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”
Id. (quoting Idaho Wool Growers Ass’n, Inc. v. State,
154 Idaho 716, 720,
302 P.3d 341, 345 (2012)).
When reviewing the trial court’s decision to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment, courts apply an abuse of discretion standard. See Hamilton Materials, Inc. v.
Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), which
is identical to I.R.C.P. 12(b)). This Court applies an abuse of discretion standard to review the trial
court’s evidentiary rulings. Phillips v. E. Idaho Health Servs., Inc.,
166 Idaho 731, 741,
463 P.3d
365, 375 (2020). “Evidentiary rulings that constitute an abuse of discretion will not be reversed
unless ‘a substantial right of the party is affected.’”
Id. (quoting Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., Inc.,
156 Idaho 696, 701,
330 P.3d 1054, 1059 (2014)).
We apply our well-known abuse of discretion standard to review discretionary decisions
of a trial court, which requires us to consider “[w]hether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the
4
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4)
reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863,
421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).
The interpretation of a statute or court rule is a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review. See E. Idaho Econ. Dev. Council v. Lockwood Packaging Corp. Idaho, 139
Idaho 492, 495,
80 P.3d 1093, 1096 (2003); City of Idaho Falls v. H-K Contractors, Inc.,
163
Idaho 579, 581,
416 P.3d 951, 953 (2018). “The date for when a cause of action accrues may be a
question of fact or law.” Walsh v. Swapp Law, PLLC,
166 Idaho 629, 635,
462 P.3d 607, 613
(2020) (citation omitted). “[I]f no disputed issues of material fact exist, when a cause of action
accrues is a question of law for determination by this Court.”
Id. (alterations in original) (citation
omitted).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Evans timely filed her notice of appeal.
As an initial matter, Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s urge this Court to dismiss Evans’s appeal.
They argue that Evans’s appeal is time-barred because Evans failed to file her notice of appeal
within forty-two days of the judgment, as required by Rule 14 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. The
district court entered its final judgment on May 4, 2022, and Evans filed her notice of appeal on
September 8, 2022 (127 days later). Evans argues that her appeal is timely under Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 11.2(b) because she filed a motion for reconsideration within fourteen days of
entry of the judgment, which terminated the forty-two-day period in which to file her notice of
appeal. Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s counter that the motion for reconsideration Evans filed does not
serve to terminate the time for Evans to file an appeal of the final judgment because motions for
reconsideration only apply to interlocutory orders.
Rule 11.2(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a] motion to reconsider
any order of the trial court entered before final judgment may be made at any time prior to or
within 14 days after the entry of a final judgment. A motion to reconsider an order entered after
the entry of final judgment must be made within 14 days after entry of the order.” I.R.C.P.
11.2(b)(1). Thus, a party may file a timely motion to reconsider any order: (1) at any time before
the court enters a final judgment or (2) within fourteen days after the court enters a final judgment.
See id.
5
Appeals from the district court must be made within forty-two days of the entry of the
appealable order or judgment. I.A.R. 14(a). Failure to observe this timing requirement renders the
Court without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. I.A.R. 21. However, Rule 14 of the Idaho Appellate
Rules provides that this requirement is terminated by the filing of a motion that “if granted, could
affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment in the action[.]” I.A.R. 14(a). A
motion for reconsideration falls under this category. See BHC Intermountain Hosp., Inc. v. Ada
County, 148 Idaho 294, 295,
221 P.3d 520, 521 (2009) (“A motion for reconsideration may also
toll the time to file a notice of appeal; however, the motion must be made no later than fourteen
days after entry of the final judgment. I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B).”).
We take this opportunity to emphasize that the following portion of Rule 14 of the Idaho
Appellate Rules is not a tolling provision; rather, it terminates the appeal-filing time:
The time for an appeal from any civil judgment or order in an action is terminated
by the filing of a timely motion which, if granted, could affect any findings of fact,
conclusions of law or any judgment in the action . . . in which case the appeal period
for all judgments or orders commences to run upon the date of the clerk’s filing
stamp on the order deciding such motion.
I.A.R. 14(a) (emphasis added).
Here, on May 2, 2022, the district court granted Dr. Wright’s and St. Luke’s motions to
dismiss. Subsequently, on May 4, 2022, the district court entered final judgment. Following this,
on May 17, 2022, Evans filed a motion for reconsideration and memorandum in support along
with an alternative motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. The motion for
reconsideration was timely filed and served within fourteen days after the entry of the judgment.
See I.R.C.P. 2.2(a)(1). The district court then entered an order on the motion for reconsideration
that started the forty-two-day appeal period on July 28, 2022. Since Evans’s notice of appeal was
filed on September 8, 2022, within forty-two days of the denial of her Rule 11.2(b) motion, Evans’s
appeal was timely filed. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction to hear Evans’s appeal because
her motion for reconsideration terminated the appeal-filing timeframe, which was restarted when
the court entered its order disposing of the post-judgment motion for reconsideration.
B. Although not directly addressed by the district court, its ruling on Evans’s motion to
strike shows that it implicitly rejected Evans’s motion to convert.
Evans’s motion to convert came before the district court with several other motions,
including Dr. Wright’s and St. Luke’s separate motions to dismiss, motions to strike the declaration
of Roberta Evans, and motions to shorten time for hearing on their motions to strike. With
6
numerous medical records attached, Evans’s declaration accompanied her motion to convert so
that the district court could consider matters outside the pleadings. At the hearing, the district court
first heard arguments and orally granted Dr. Wright’s and St. Luke’s motions to shorten the time
for hearing their motions to strike. Then, the district court heard arguments and granted from the
bench Dr. Wright’s and St. Luke’s motions to strike Evans’s declaration. The district court did not
explicitly deny Evans’s motion to convert.
1. The district court made an implicit ruling while deciding Dr. Wright’s and St. Luke’s
motion to strike, which is tantamount to a rejection of Evans’s motion to convert.
Evans argues that the district court erred in holding that the motions to dismiss brought
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure could not be converted to a motion for
summary judgment under Rule 56. Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s counter by arguing that Evans
voluntarily withdrew her motion to convert and, therefore, it is not properly before this Court on
appeal.
Even if a district court does not explicitly address an issue below, the court’s decision on
the matter could be implicit in its ruling on another issue. See Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada Cnty.
Hous. Auth., 124 Idaho 450, 463,
860 P.2d 653, 666 (1993) (“[E]ven though the district court did
not explicitly address the qualified immunity issue in responding to [the defendants’] motions to
dismiss and post-trial motions, it is implicit in the court’s rulings that it rejected [the defendants’]
properly raised immunity claims.”). Dr. Wright’s and St. Luke’s representation that Evans
voluntarily withdrew her motion to convert is inaccurate. Instead, the district court granted the
motions to strike Evans’s declaration, making a ruling on her motion to convert a foregone
conclusion, which she acknowledged to the district court. However, her acknowledgment that there
was nothing left to rule on after the district court granted Dr. Wright’s and St. Luke’s motions to
strike her affidavit was not a withdrawal of her motion to convert—it was simply an
acknowledgment that the district court had implicitly denied her motion. Given that Evans’s
motion to convert and Dr. Wright’s and St. Luke’s motions to strike go hand in hand, this Court
will consider the arguments asserted on appeal.
2. The district court erred in determining that only the movant can present material outside
of the pleadings to convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, within her motion to convert argument, Evans is essentially arguing that the
district court erred in striking her declaration. Dr. Wright’s and St. Luke’s primary argument
supporting the motions to strike was that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) only contemplates
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conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion into a summary judgment motion if the moving
party presents matters outside of the pleadings. In its ruling on the motions to strike, the district
court ruled that a non-moving party could not submit matters outside the pleadings to convert a
motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. The court explained:
[T]he [c]ourt has reviewed the cases cited [and] the briefing presented by the
parties. . . .
...
I don’t think it’s entirely clear about the moving party, the non-moving party
being able to file declarations or documents to take this out of the motion to dismiss,
but certainly looking at the rule, in the 12(b), 12(c), 12(d), the [c]ourt has reviewed
[Bennett v. Bank of Eastern Oregon, 167 Idaho 481,
472 P.3d 1125 (2020)], which
is a 2020 case.
It certainly, I don’t want to say it’s entirely clear. . . .
...
. . . I think [the motion to convert] is intended, when the movant presents
matters outside the pleadings, so I’m going to grant the motion to strike, based on
those rules and the caselaw cited.
The district court also offered a second reason for granting Dr. Wright’s and St. Luke’s motions
to strike. The court stated, “[I]f the [c]ourt has misapplied the rule, and a non-moving party can
convert this to summary judgment, in an exercise of discretion, the [c]ourt is not going to consider
the declaration[.]”
The district court relied on Bennett, 167 Idaho at 485, 472 P.3d at 1129, and Rule 12(b)
through (d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for the “notion that conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6)
[motion] to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment should only occur when matters outside the
pleadings are submitted by the moving party and considered by the [c]ourt.” The notion emerged
from the standard of review section in Bennett that stated “[i]f a 12(b)(6) movant presents ‘matters
outside the pleadings’ and the trial court does not exclude them, then ‘the motion must be treated
as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.’” Bennett, 167 Idaho at 485, 472 P.3d at 1129
(emphasis in original) (quoting I.R.C.P. 12(d)).
We disagree with the notion espoused by Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s, which is based on the
standard of review statement from Bennett. Rule 12(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for
8
summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable
opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.
I.R.C.P. 12(d). The plain language of the rule allows a non-movant to present matters outside the
pleadings to the court. However, the court still has the discretion to exclude those matters outside
the pleadings. See id.
The district court erred in concluding that conversion of a motion to dismiss to a motion
for summary judgment only occurs when matters outside the pleadings are submitted by the
moving party. However, while this was in error, the court properly exercised its discretion in
refusing to consider the additional evidence proffered by Evans.
C. The district court did not err in dismissing Evans’s complaint as time-barred under
the applicable statute of limitations.
Evans’s medical malpractice claim does not allege that Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s were
negligent in the first hip replacement operation. Instead, she contends that Dr. Wright and St.
Luke’s were negligent in not addressing her symptoms or the cause of those symptoms, which
were later confirmed through imaging to be an impingement. Evans argues that the district court
abused its discretion by holding that the post-operative complications commenced the running of
the statute of limitations. Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s maintain that the district court correctly held
that the statute of limitations began to run on or before November 12, 2018, or, alternatively, no
later than March 4, 2019.
To begin, Idaho Code section 5-219(4) requires that “[a]n action to recover damages for
‘professional malpractice’ must be commenced within two years after the cause of action has
accrued.” Conner v. Hodges, 157 Idaho 19, 24,
333 P.3d 130, 135 (2014) (alteration in original)
(quoting Conway v. Sonntag,
141 Idaho 144, 146,
106 P.3d 470, 472 (2005)). The cause of action
accrues “as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of” and “shall not be
extended by reason of any continuing consequences or damages resulting therefrom or any
continuing professional or commercial relationship between the injured party and the alleged
wrongdoer . . . .” I.C. § 5-219(4). In most cases, the act or omission complained of and the injury
to the plaintiff occur simultaneously, particularly in the medical context. Davis v. Moran,
112
Idaho 703, 708,
735 P.2d 1014, 1019 (1987).
However, before the action begins to accrue, this Court has held that there must be “some
damage.” Stuard v. Jorgenson, 150 Idaho 701, 704–05,
249 P.3d 1156, 1159–60 (2011) (citing
Lapham v. Stewart,
137 Idaho 582, 586,
51 P.3d 396, 400 (2002)). When deciding if “some
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damage” has occurred, the trial court should establish the moment when the “fact of injury
becomes objectively ascertainable.” Conner, 157 Idaho at 24,
333 P.3d 130 at 135 (quoting Davis,
112 Idaho at 709,
735 P.2d at 1020). The term “objectively ascertainable” refers to having
objective medical proof that supports the existence of an actual injury. See
id. (citation omitted).
The “objectively ascertainable injury” standard is merely an additional analytical tool for
determining when “some damage” has occurred. Conway, 141 Idaho at 146–47, 106 P.3d at 472–
73.
Below, the district court found that some damage had occurred before April 2019:
[Evans’s] claim arose, and the statute of limitations period commenced, upon her
sharing with [Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s] that she was exhibiting symptoms, which
showed some damages had occurred. [Evans’s] complaints of suffering from
popping, clicking, and pain shortly after her August 2018 surgery, in and of itself,
indicates that there was “some damage”, and a cause of action “on account of the
provision of or failure to provide health care” arose, and the statute of limitations
period began to run, as of that time.
Evans contends that, based on the medical notes and imaging, some damage became objectively
ascertainable on April 22, 2019, not on November 12, 2018, the date relied on by the district court.
Evans argues that before an abnormality was revealed on her April 22, 2019, X-rays, she was only
suffering from symptoms that Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s attributed to the natural healing process.
For an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, all facts alleged in
Evans’s amended complaint are treated as true. Hammer, 162 Idaho at 574–75, 401 P.3d at 152–
53. Because Evans filed her pre-litigation screening application with the Idaho Board of Medicine
on April 6, 2021, and assuming she filed her complaint in district court within 30 days of the pre-litigation screening panel’s advisory decision, the inquiry for this Court is whether some damage
became objectively ascertainable before April 6, 2019. See I.C. § 6-1005 (“[T]he applicable statute
of limitations shall be tolled and not be deemed to run during the time that such a claim is pending
before such a panel and for thirty (30) days thereafter.”). If so, her medical malpractice cause of
action against Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s is barred by the statute of limitations.
Working backward in time, Evans’s amended complaint indicates that, in June 2019, she
obtained a second opinion from Dr. Irvine, who reviewed the X-rays taken on April 22, 2019, and
noted that the imaging showed “acetabular component appears to be abnormally anteverted and
perhaps a bit vertical.” Put simply, Evans’s damage was shown on the X-rays taken on April 22,
2019. Evans argues that this date is when some damage became objectively ascertainable, and the
10
statute of limitations began to run. Evans’s argument is unavailing because whether there was
some damage or whether that damage was objectively ascertainable does not depend upon her
knowledge. See Lapham, 137 Idaho at 587,
51 P.3d at 401.
As we stated in 1985 in Streib v. Veigel, this Court previously adopted a “discovery rule”
in 1964 stating that a medical malpractice cause of action did not accrue until the patient learned,
or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have discovered, the damages resulting
from the doctor’s negligence. 109 Idaho 174, 175,
706 P.2d 63, 64 (1985). However, in 1971, the
legislature amended Idaho Code section 5-219(4) to not apply the discovery rule to malpractice
cases, with two exceptions for foreign objects left in a patient’s body and for fraudulent
concealment of negligence.
Id. “To require that the fact of damage must be objectively
ascertainable to the injured party would simply reinstate a discovery rule[.]” Lapham,
137 Idaho
at 587,
51 P.3d at 401. The subjective discovery rule has been consistently rejected in Idaho. See,
e.g., Wyman v. Eck,
161 Idaho 723, 726–27,
390 P.3d 449, 452–53 (2017). In addition, the date
some damage is ascertained is not necessarily the first date it is objectively ascertainable.
Dr. Irvine ordered a CT scan for the following day. His interpretation of the CT scan
showed “[c]ompared to the most recent [April 22, 2019,] plain x-ray, the acetabular component
appears to be in the same position.” Thus, Evans’s impingement—some damage—was present on
April 22, 2019. She discussed a possible revision surgery with a physician assistant at that
appointment. Even more so, the amended complaint alleges that some damage was present even
before that date because the notes from April 22, 2019, indicate that the X-rays remained “[o]verall
unchanged in comparison to previous [X]-rays.” The previous X-rays were taken on January 2,
2019. In other words, the CT scan confirmed what the previous X-rays reflected to be the cause of
the popping, catching, and pain—the impingement. Therefore, some damage was present earlier
and was objectively ascertainable before April 6, 2019.
According to Evans’s amended complaint, between the date of the surgery in August 2018
and the following November, Evans complained “that her hip felt ‘abnormal,’ which included
complaints that it was ‘catching’ or ‘clicking.’” Notably, on March 4, 2019, Evans’s left hip had
“thigh abnormality with swelling compared to the right side.” Evans’s amended complaint shows
that there was some damage between November 2018 and March 2019. Her complaints were
consistent with an impingement, which the CT scan later confirmed.
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Evans’s assertion that before April 22, 2019, she was only suffering from symptoms that
Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s attributed to the natural healing process is inconsistent with the
allegations in her complaint in which she describes complications consistent with Dr. Irvine’s and
Dr. Armstrong’s opinions from June and July 2019. Evans’s position that her damages became
objectively ascertainable only when the April 22, 2019, X-rays showed an abnormally anteverted
hip bone socket would amount to applying a discovery rule. See Lapham, 137 Idaho at 587,
51
P.3d at 401.
To summarize, the district court correctly determined that the two-year statute of
limitations barred Evans’s medical malpractice claim and, therefore, did not err in granting Dr.
Wright’s and St. Luke’s motions to dismiss.
D. The district court erred by failing to consider Evans’s equitable estoppel argument;
however, the error was harmless.
Evans argues that the district court abused its discretion by completely failing to address
her argument that the theory of equitable estoppel prevented Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s from
asserting that the statute of limitations bars Evans from pursuing her medical malpractice claim.
Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s counter that equitable estoppel does not apply, and even if it does, the
elements of equitable estoppel were not met under the facts of this case.
The district court must address all the issues the parties present. See Davis v. Davis (Est. of
Davis), 167 Idaho 229, 235,
469 P.3d 16, 22 (2020) (“It [is] incumbent on the district court to
address all of the issues raised before it.”). Evans’s argument was raised both in her response to
Dr. Wright’s and St. Luke’s motions to dismiss and in support of her motion for reconsideration.
However, the district court did not mention the argument in its memorandum decision on the
motions to dismiss or its memorandum decision on the motion for reconsideration. The district
court erred in failing to address Evans’s theory of equitable estoppel when granting Dr. Wright’s
and St. Luke’s motions to dismiss.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel serves as a bar to a statute of limitations defense under
certain circumstances. Gregory v. Stallings, 167 Idaho 123, 131–32,
468 P.3d 253, 261–62 (2020).
“Equitable estoppel does not eliminate, toll, or extend the statute of limitations.” Ferro v. Soc’y of
Saint Pius X,
143 Idaho 538, 540,
149 P.3d 813, 815 (2006). It only bars a party from asserting the
statute of limitations as a defense for “a reasonable time after the party asserting estoppel discovers
or reasonably could have discovered the truth.”
Id. at 540–41, 149 P.3d at 815–16. The party
invoking equitable estoppel must prove four elements:
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(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or
constructive knowledge of the truth;
(2) that the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth;
(3) that the false representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be
relied upon; and
(4) that the person to whom the representation was made, or from whom the facts
were concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his
prejudice.
Gregory, 167 Idaho at 131–32, 468 P.3d at 261–62 (citation omitted).
Evans argues that Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s should be estopped from relying on the two-year statute of limitations contained in Idaho Code section 5-219 as a defense. Evans emphasizes
that although her medical records suggested a possible impingement on November 12, 2018, X-
rays on January 2, 2019, showed no signs of impingement. However, she was only informed of
abnormal findings on April 22, 2019. Despite confirming the abnormality, Evans claims that Dr.
Wright and St. Luke’s then downplayed the issue and advised her to wait. The gist of Evans’s
equitable estoppel argument is that St. Luke’s and Dr. Wright should be equitably estopped from
defending based on the statute of limitations because their actions led her astray—away from the
truth of her condition—and away from timely filing a medical malpractice claim against them for
not properly treating her symptoms. Evans has not satisfied the first element of equitable estoppel.
She did not show that Dr. Wright or St. Luke’s made false representations or concealed material
facts. Evans did not demonstrate that Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s had actual knowledge of the injury
she alleges they were trying to hide. She also did not show that Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s should
be charged with constructive knowledge of her injury. Notably, her argument that her damages
became objectively ascertainable only when the X-rays showed an abnormally anteverted hip bone
socket undermines her equitable estoppel argument that Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s falsely
represented or concealed her injury. Those two factual scenarios cannot simultaneously be true.
Because Evans has not satisfied the first element of equitable estoppel, we do not reach the
remaining elements of her claim. Her equitable estoppel claim fails on its merits. In that vein, the
district court’s error in not addressing Evans’s equitable estoppel argument was harmless.
E. Neither party is entitled to attorney fees.
Both Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code
section 12-121 and costs under Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. St. Luke’s argues
that Evans’s appeal is frivolous and without a basis in fact or law because it is merely an attempt
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to find a more sympathetic trier of fact. Dr. Wright argues that Evans has done nothing more than
request that this Court “reweigh the evidence or second guess the lower court.” Evans did not
request attorney fees on appeal.
“An award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121 is not a matter of right,
‘but is appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the case
was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.’” BrunoBuilt,
Inc. v. Strata, Inc., 166 Idaho 208, 222,
457 P.3d 860, 874 (2020) (quoting Hoover v. Hunter,
150
Idaho 658, 664,
249 P.3d 851, 857 (2011)). “On the other hand, when a party pursues an action
which contains fairly debatable issues, the action is not considered to be frivolous and without
foundation.”
Id. (citations omitted). In this case, Evans raised several legitimate legal arguments.
We determined that the district court erred in ruling on some of the issues that Evans raised, even
if the errors ultimately proved to be harmless. Accordingly, we decline to award attorney fees on
appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121 to Dr. Wright or St. Luke’s.
As the prevailing party on appeal, Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s are entitled to costs pursuant
to Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a).
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s order dismissing Evans’s complaint. We decline to award
attorney fees to either party on appeal. Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s are granted their costs on appeal
as the prevailing parties.
Chief Justice BEVAN and Justices MOELLER, ZAHN and FLEMING, J. pro tem,
CONCUR.
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