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554 S.W.2d 74

Higgs v. Commonwealth

Kentucky Supreme Court

Decided June 10, 1977

Kentucky Supreme Court · decided 1977-06-10

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“In the circumstances of this case, petitioner's inability to cross-examine Loyd as to the alleged confession plainly denied him the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause. Loyd's alleged statement that the petitioner fired the shotgun constituted the only direct evidence that he had done so; coupled with the description of the circumstances surrounding the shooting, this formed a crucial link in the proof both of petitioner's act and of the requisite intent to murder. Although the Solicitor's reading of Loyd's alleged statement, and Loyd's refusals to answer, were not technically testimony, the Solicitor's reading may well have been the equivalent in the jury's mind of testimony that Loyd in fact made the statement; and Loyd's reliance upon the privilege created a situation in which the jury might improperly infer both that the statement had been made and that it was true. Since the Solicitor was not a witness, the inference from his reading that Loyd made the statement could not be tested by cross-examination. Similarly, Loyd could not be cross-examined on a statement imputed to but not admitted by him. Nor was the opportunity to cross-examine the law enforcement officers adequate to redress this denial of the essential right secured by the Confrontation Clause. Indeed, their testimony enhanced the danger that the jury would treat the Solicitor's questioning of Loyd and Loyd's refusal to answer as proving the truth of Loyd's alleged confession. But si”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Taylor v. Commonwealth

““With the jury’s tendency to accept as true a statement unanswered by a witness who invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege, together with the defendant’s inability to cross-examine the witness, defendant is unduly prejudiced .... And the error was compounded by the prosecutor’s awareness that the [witness] would invoke the privilege.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Commonwealth v. Brown

Relies on Douglas v. Alabama

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1977-06-10

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently November 2001

3 state decisions

101977198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

PER CURIAM.

¶1Appellant was convicted on the charge of larceny and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.

¶2He contends that the court erred by permitting the Commonwealth to call to the stand a co-indictee, Glenda Lenori, and ask her:

“On the night of July 1,1974, in Nicho-lasville, Kentucky, you saw the blue light of a Nicholasville cruiser, did the defendant, James Carl Higgs, state to you that he had ripped off a store in Lancaster, Kentucky?”
The witness replied:
“I refuse to answer on the grounds that it might incriminate me.”

¶3When the Commonwealth proposed calling Glenda Lenori as a witness, defendant objected, and reminded the court that she was a co-indictee and compelling her to testify would be a violation of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

¶4Under a somewhat similar set of facts the court held in Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965), that the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution was applicable since the defendant could not cross-examine the witness who invoked the protection of the Fifth Amendment. The court stated that the witness’ “ . . . reliance upon the privilege created a situation in which the jury might improperly infer both that the statement had been made and that it was true.” Obviously if appellant told Glenda Lenori that he “ripped off” a store in Lancaster, the statement would be most damaging to his defense. With the jury’s tendency to accept as true a statement unanswered by a witness who invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege, together with the defendant’s inability to cross-examine the witness, defendant is unduly prejudiced. In the present case, although there was ample competent evidence to support a verdict of guilty, the evidence was entirely circumstantial and not so overwhelming as to render the error nonprejudicial. And the error was compounded by the prosecutor’s aware-

¶5ness that appellant would invoke the privilege.

¶6The judgment is reversed and remanded for a new trial.

All concur.
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