Evans v. Buchanan’s Empirical Analysis
555 F.2d 373 · 1977
Citation profile
49 federal appellate · 14 district · 3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 101 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2015 · most notably Resident Advisory Board ex rel. Wylie v. Rizzo (1977), Delaware State Board of Education v. Evans (1977)
49 federal appellate · 14 district · 3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. · Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al. · Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody · Washington v. Davis · Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 101 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when improper standards, criteria, or procedures are used.”
7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“‘When matters are decided by an appellate court, its rulings, unless reversed by it or a superior court, bind the lower court. Thus a cause proceeds to final determination. While power rests in a federal court that passes an order or decision to change its position on a subsequent review in the same cause, orderly judicial action, except in unusual circumstances, requires it to refuse to permit the relitigation of matters or issues previously determined on a former review.’”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“A court is not at liberty to issue orders merely because it believes they will produce a result which the court finds desirable. The existence of a constitutional violation does not authorize a court to seek to bring about conditions that never would have existed even if there had been no constitutional violation. The remedy for a constitutional violation may not be designed to eliminate arguably undesirable states of affairs caused by purely private conduct (de facto segrega tion) or by state conduct which has in it no element of racial discrimination. This much is settled by Milliken v. Bradley, [ 418 U.S. 717 , 94 S.Ct. 3112 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974)]. See also Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U.S. 1027 , 92 S.Ct. 707 , 30 L.Ed.2d 723 (1972), affirming 326 F.Supp. 1235 (D.N.J.); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 , 97 S.Ct. 555 , 50 L.Ed.2d 450 . Nor may' a remedial desegregation order require “as a matter of substantive constitutional right, any particular degree of racial balance or mixing” [ . . . ] Swann v. Board of Education, supra, 402 U.S. [1] at 24, 91 S.Ct. [1267] at 1280 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 554 ] . . . [See also] Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. [717] at 740-41 [ 94 S.Ct. 3112 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 ], . . . These are limitations by which a trial court must abide. The task of a remedial decree in a school desegregation case is simply to correct the constitutional violation and to eradicate its effects. “As with any equity case, the nature ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Evans v. Buchanan
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.