IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
Nos. 125,681
126,069
STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,
v.
MIA MARIE COLLINS,
Appellant.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
There are three essential elements of a Brady violation claim: (1) The evidence at
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is
impeaching; (2) that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or
inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must be material so as to establish prejudice. See
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87,
83 S. Ct. 1194,
10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; TYLER J. ROUSH, judge. Submitted without oral argument
December 15, 2023. Opinion filed September 13, 2024. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.
Sam S. Kepfield, of Hutchinson, was on the brief for appellant.
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STEGALL, J.: In May 2019, Mia Marie Collins attempted to flee from police while
driving a stolen vehicle through downtown Wichita. As a result of the chase, Collins
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struck another vehicle, killing two people and injuring three others. She was initially
charged with two counts of felony murder, two alternative counts of fleeing or attempting
to elude an officer, three counts of aggravated battery, and single counts of possession of
methamphetamine and driving while suspended. Collins ultimately agreed to plead guilty
to two counts of felony murder, one count of fleeing or attempting to elude an officer,
and three counts of aggravated battery. The remaining charges were dismissed per the
plea agreement.
In the plea agreement, the State recommended hard 25 life sentences for the two
felony-murder counts, and the low grid sentence for the remaining four counts. The State
recommended that all sentences run concurrent, except for Count 5—the aggravated
battery of victim J.W., who suffered a traumatic brain injury. The State, relying in part on
J.W.'s lawyer's statements, recommended that Collins serve this 38-month sentence
consecutively. The plea agreement explicitly informed Collins that she retained the right
to argue for any other legal sentence before the district court. The agreement also stated
that the district court had discretion to reject the plea agreement's sentencing
recommendations and impose its own lawful sentence.
The day after Collins signed the plea agreement, the State sent defense counsel a
news article stating that J.W. had settled a civil lawsuit against the Wichita Police
Department (WPD). The article described how J.W. had been awarded an undisclosed
settlement and reported J.W.'s statements blaming her injuries on the WPD—not on
Collins.
Collins then filed a motion to withdraw her plea. Essentially, she claimed that had
she known the information contained in the article—which she contends the State had a
duty to share with her before the plea agreement—she would not have agreed to the terms
of the plea agreement concerning Count 5 and therefore her plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily made. Even though the record is clear that the State did not have the
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information concerning the settlement when Collins signed the plea agreement, she
argued the State had a duty to know. She added that had the parties had the information,
the State would have recommended that the 38-month sentence for Count 5 run
concurrent as well. She alleged that the State's failure to disclose this settlement
information amounted to a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87,
83 S. Ct.
1194,
10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) (requiring that prosecutors disclose evidence favorable to
the accused if that evidence is material to either guilt or punishment, regardless of
whether the prosecution acted in good faith).
The district court held a hearing on Collins' motion. At that hearing, the defense
stipulated to the specific facts presented in the State's response to Collins' motion to
dismiss—including the fact that J.W.'s attorney had spoken with the State's attorney and
informed him that a settlement in the J.W. civil suit against WPD was "imminent." No
further details concerning the settlement were provided. The stipulation further agreed
that the State had shared this information with the defense prior to Collins' entry of her
plea. Additionally, the State provided a text message thread between the prosecution and
the defense in which the lawyers discussed the possibility of running Count 5 concurrent,
and the State explained that it intended to hold firm to running Count 5 consecutive.
The district court held that whether a Brady violation occurred and whether good
cause existed for a withdrawal of plea was not a "close call" in this case. The court held
that because the State was not a party to the civil suit against WPD it could not be
charged with knowledge of the settlement agreement. The district court followed the
State's recommendation in the plea agreement, acknowledging that it had the flexibility to
choose any legal sentence it deemed appropriate and included its own independent
reasons for ordering Collins to serve Count 5's sentence consecutively.
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Collins now appeals, reprising the arguments she made below. Jurisdiction is
proper under K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(3)-(4) for the first-degree murder charge, both as a crime
where the maximum sentence of life imprisonment has been imposed and as an off-grid
crime.
Standard of Review
We generally review the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea for abuse of
discretion. State v. Fritz, 299 Kan. 153, 154,
321 P.3d 763 (2014). A judicial action
constitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is
based on an error of law; or (3) it is based on an error of fact. State v. Levy,
313 Kan. 232,
237,
485 P.3d 605 (2021). An abuse of discretion indicates that no reasonable person
could agree with the decision of the trial court. See State v. Mosher,
299 Kan. 1, 3,
319
P.3d 1253 (2014). The party asserting the district court abused its discretion bears the
burden of showing such abuse of discretion. State v. Crosby,
312 Kan. 630, 635,
479 P.3d
167 (2021).
"A plea of guilty or nolo contendere, for good cause shown and within the
discretion of the court, may be withdrawn at any time before sentence is adjudged."
K.S.A. 22-3210(d)(1). When determining whether a defendant has demonstrated good
cause to withdraw their plea, a district court generally looks to the following three factors
from Edgar: (1) whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2)
whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of;
and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made. State v. Frazier, 311 Kan.
378, 381,
461 P.3d 43 (2020) (citing State v. Edgar,
281 Kan. 30, 36,
127 P.3d 986
[2006]).
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These factors are not applied mechanically to the exclusion of other factors. Fritz,
299 Kan. at 154. These factors establish "'viable benchmarks'" for the district court when
exercising its discretion, but the court "should not ignore other factors that might exist in
a particular case." State v. Schaefer,
305 Kan. 581, 588,
385 P.3d 918 (2016); see
Frazier, 311 Kan. at 382 (applying contract principles to good cause showing).
In her initial motion to withdraw plea, Collins argued that her situation fell under
the second Edgar factor—that she was misled by the State during plea negotiations. In
her appellate brief, counsel suggests that Collins' situation is not a perfect fit for any
single Edgar factor, but rather fits somewhere between the second and third factor. Under
either factor, the core argument is the same: had Collins been aware of J.W.'s sentiments
and the WPD settlement before signing a plea agreement, she believes that she would
have been able to use those facts as leverage to convince the State to recommend Count 5
run concurrent. She argues that the State's failure to disclose this information,
intentionally or unintentionally, constituted a Brady violation which as a matter of law
qualifies as good cause under the Edgar factors.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution requires that pleas must be knowingly and voluntarily made. Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 745,
90 S. Ct. 1463,
25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970). Brady v. Maryland
requires that prosecutors disclose evidence favorable to the accused if that evidence is
material to "'guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.'" State v. Warrior,
294 Kan. 484, 506,
277 P.3d 1111 (2012) (quoting Brady,
373 U.S. at 87).
"There are three components or essential elements of a Brady violation claim:
(1) The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) that evidence must have been suppressed by
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the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must be material so as to
establish prejudice.
"Under the test for materiality governing all categories of Brady violations,
evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Warrior, 294 Kan. 484, Syl. ¶¶ 10, 11.
We review a trial court's determination as to the existence of a Brady violation under a
split standard of review. First, a trial court's ultimate decision concerning whether a
Brady violation occurred is a legal question which we review de novo. When answering
that question, however, we must give deference to a trial court's findings of fact. United
States v. Turner,
674 F.3d 420, 428 (5th Cir. 2012) ("[Courts] consider alleged Brady
violations de novo. This de novo review 'must proceed with deference to the factual
findings underlying the district court's decision.'").
We need not consider all three of Brady's essential elements because the second is
determinative and, as the district court noted, it does not present a "close call." There is
no evidence in the record showing the State willfully or inadvertently suppressed
evidence. Both parties agree that the State did not intentionally suppress or withhold any
evidence. And both acknowledge that the prosecutor did not actually know about the
settlement prior to Collins' plea entry.
The State had communicated with J.W.'s attorney about all matters related to
Collins' plea agreement. That attorney acknowledged he did not share J.W.'s feelings with
the State. All parties acknowledge that the State freely shared with the defense what
information it had. Communications between the State's attorney and defense counsel
indicated that the State communicated that a settlement may be imminent, but that the
State was committed to running Count 5 consecutive.
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The district court found that there were many legitimate reasons why J.W.'s
attorney would decline to share information about J.W. with the State during the pending
civil suit against the Wichita police. The district court found that to "impute [the] lack of
information to the State, . . . is not fair"; that the State cannot be expected to "read
between the lines or know what is coming out or even expect that they get that
information"; and that even if the State had forcibly tried to get that information, it would
have been unable to. In sum, the district court found that "with regard to the Brady issue,"
the State's lack of knowledge regarding the civil suit made this "a nonissue." We agree.
Without a Brady violation, Collins' motion to withdraw failed and it cannot be
resuscitated on appeal. To drive the point home, we note that on the point of contention,
the district court judge stated his own independent reasons for ordering Count 5 to run
consecutive:
"In fact, I think there's rationale to run all of the counts consecutively. This—despite
what other people may have done, focusing on Ms. Collins' behavior, which is the focus
of a criminal sentencing hearing, Ms. Collins, after having a history of being given the
opportunity to rehabilitate herself on probation, found herself in a stolen vehicle, and
when confronted by the police, from all accounts, immediately took off and drove
extremely fast through downtown Wichita. That put everybody's life in danger.
Unfortunately, those risks came to fruition.
"But there is a difference between people who, for whatever reason, choose to
use drugs or alcohol and people who choose to use drugs or alcohol and then involve the
rest of the community in their own risky behavior. And that is the offensive part that only
Ms. Collins is responsible for.
"Unfortunately, it resulted in this terrible tragedy. But while two people died and
a number of others were injured, we're only running two of the counts consecutively—
I'm only running two of the counts consecutively. And that represents the credit for Ms.
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Collins taking responsibility for her actions, that represents the, in my opinion, good-faith
negotiation between the prosecution and the defense. And while that may have been or
not have been the sentence that I would have suggested had I been involved in the
negotiations, I do find that the sentence agreed upon in the plea agreement is a fair
sentence and takes into account mitigation factors cited by the defense, as well as the
factors from the prosecution about why they believe that more than one count should be
punished in this case. So for those reasons, that is the Court's sentence."
Given all this, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Collins'
motion to withdraw her plea for a lack of good cause.
Arguments Relating to Jail Time Credit Are Moot
On a final note, this case is before the court as two consolidated cases. One being
the appeal related to Collins' motion to withdraw her plea (No. 125,681), the other
involving a motion for jail time credit (No. 126,069).
Following her conviction, Collins filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence,
arguing that the sentence in this case should run concurrent with a previous traffic case,
19 TR 1743. Collins argued that the judge in the traffic case had ordered that sentence to
run concurrent with the present case, and that the failure to acknowledge this deprived
her of six months' jail time credit. Though the district court initially denied her motion to
correct an illegal sentence, she later filed a motion to correct/adjust jail time and was
awarded the six months' credit on August 22, 2022. Therefore, arguments regarding
appeal No. 126,069 are moot. State v. Roat, 311 Kan. 581, 584,
466 P.3d 439 (2020).
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.
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