Oregon v. Ice’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

29 federal appellate · 6 district · 717 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 892 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In light of this history, legislative reforms regarding the imposition of multiple sentences do not implicate the core concerns that prompted our decision in Apprendi. There is no encroachment here by the judge upon facts historically found by the jury, nor any threat to the jury's domain as a bulwark at trial between the State and the accused. Instead, the defendant — who historically may have faced consecutive sentences by default — has been granted by some modern legislatures statutory protections meant to temper the harshness of the historical practice.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. RUDY B. · State v. Andrews

2. “Most States continue the common-law tradition: They entrust to judges’ unfettered discretion the decision whether sentences for discrete offenses shall be served consecutively or concurrently. In some States, sentences for multiple offenses are presumed to run consecutively, but sentencing judges may order concurrent sentences upon finding cause therefor. Other States, including Oregon, constrain judges’ discretion by requiring them to find certain facts before imposing consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences. It is undisputed that States may proceed on the first two tracks without transgressing the Sixth Amendment. The sole issue in dispute, then, is whether the Sixth Amendment, as construed in Apprendi and Blakely , precludes the mode of proceeding chosen by Oregon and several of her sister States. We hold, in light of historical practice and the authority of States over administration of their criminal justice systems, that the Sixth Amendment does not exclude Oregon’s choice.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Reed, 91767 (5-14-2009) · State v. Mundon

3. “Our application of Apprendi’s rule must honor the “longstanding common-law practice” in which the rule is rooted. Cunningham [v. California], 549 U. S.[ 270, 281, 127 S. Ct. 856 , 166 L. Ed. 2d 856 (2007)]. The rule’s animating principle is the preservation of the jury’s historic role as a bulwark between the State and the accused at the trial for an alleged offense. See Apprendi, 530 U. S. at 477 . Guided by that principle, our opinions make clear that the Sixth Amendment does not countenance legislative encroachment on the jury’s traditional domain. . . . The historical record demonstrates that the jury played no role in the decision to impose sentences consecutively or concurrently. Rather, the choice rested exclusively with the judge.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Witherspoon · 290 Or. App. 296 - State v. Frinell