Mendez v. Knowles’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 federal appellate · 3 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[B]ecause [Doody] filed his habeas petition after the effective date of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), we must deny the petition unless the state court’s adjudication of [Doody’s] claims resulted in a decision that was either (1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Doody v. Schriro · Doody v. Ryan

2. “Additional differences between Mendez's case and Gibson buttress our conclusion that the jury did not convict Mendez based on a constitutionally deficient burden of proof. First, in Mendez’s case, several instructions regarding the beyond a reasonable doubt standard were read to the jury after the jury was given the preponderance of the evidence instruction; whereas in Gibson, once the preponderance of the evidence standard was read to the jury, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard was not included in any subsequent instructions. Second, the prosecutor in Mendez's case, unlike the prosecutor in Gibson, did not discuss, much less emphasize, the preponderance of the evidence standard in her closing argument. Third, the victim of Gibson's prior sexual offenses and the charged offense was the same, whereas Mendez’s prior sexual offenses involved different victims than those involved in his charged offenses. We conclude that no rational juror would have understood the instructions on evidence of prior sexual misconduct to relieve the jury of its duty to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mendez had committed the charged offenses. We therefore uphold Mendez’s convictions as constitutionally sound.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Doe v. Busby

3. “finding of the court-appointed expert that Mendez was competent to stand trial”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Mikhel